Nicocles or the Cyprians

There are people who frown upon eloquence and censure men who study philosophy,[*](For Isocrates' use of the word “philosophy” as covering what we mean by “culture” and his identification of “discourse” with the cultivated life see General Introduction, pp. xxiii ff.) asserting that those who engage in such occupations do so, not for the sake of virtue, but for their own advantage. Now, I should be glad if those who take this position would tell me why they blame men who are ambitious to speak well, but applaud men who desire to act rightly; for if it is the pursuit of one's own advantage which gives them offense, we shall find that more and greater advantages are gained from actions than from speech.

Moreover, it is passing strange if the fact has escaped them that we reverence the gods and practice justice, and cultivate the other virtues, not that we may be worse off than our fellows, but that we may pass our days in the enjoyment of as many good things as possible. They should not, therefore, condemn these means by which one may gain advantage[*](Advantage (in the good sense) which works no disadvantage to others. Cf. Isoc. 15.275.) without sacrifice of virtue, but rather those men who do wrong in their actions or who deceive by their speech and put their eloquence to unjust uses.

I am astonished that those who hold the view to which I have just referred do not rail also against wealth and strength and courage; for if they are really hostile to eloquence because there are men who do wrong and speak falsehood, they ought to disparage as well all other good things; for there will be found also among men who possess these some who do wrong and use these advantages to the injury of many.[*](Good things are bad if badly used. See Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1094b 17. Cf. Seneca, Ep. i. 5. 9: “multa bona nostra nobis nocent.”)

Nevertheless, it is not fair to decry strength because there are persons who assault people whom they encounter, nor to traduce courage because there are those who slay men wantonly, nor in general to transfer to things the depravity of men, but rather to put the blame on the men themselves who misuse the good things, and who, by the very powers which might help their fellow-countrymen, endeavor to do them harm.[*](The same argument is made at length in Isoc. 15.251-252, also in defense of eloquence.)

But the fact is that since they have not taken the trouble to make distinctions after this manner in each instance, they are ill-disposed to all eloquence; and they have gone so far astray as not to perceive that they are hostile to that power which of all the faculties that belong to the nature of man is the source of most of our blessings. For in the other powers which we possess we are in no respect superior to other living creatures; nay, we are inferior to many in swiftness and in strength and in other resources;

but, because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish.[*](For the power of speech as the faculty which has raised us from the life of beasts to that of civilized man see Xen. Mem. 4.3.11 ff. Cf. Isoc. 15.273, Isoc. 4.48 ff., and Shelley: “He gave man speech and speech created thought.” Isocrates refers to this passage in Isoc. 15.253, and quotes exactly from sections 5-9.)

For this it is which has laid down laws concerning things just and unjust, and things base and honorable; and if it were not for these ordinances we should not be able to live with one another. It is by this also that we confute the bad and extol the good. Through this we educate the ignorant and appraise the wise; for the power to speak well is taken as the surest index of a sound understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul.

With this faculty we both contend against others on matters which are open to dispute and seek light for ourselves on things which are unknown; for the same arguments which we use in persuading others when we speak in public, we employ also when we deliberate in our own thoughts; and, while we call eloquent those who are able to speak before a crowd, we regard as sage those who most skilfully debate their problems in their own minds.

And, if there is need to speak in brief summary of this power, we shall find that none of the things which are done with intelligence take place without the help of speech, but that in all our actions as well as in all our thoughts speech is our guide, and is most employed by those who have the most wisdom. Therefore, those who dare to speak with disrespect of educators and teachers of philosophy deserve our opprobrium no less than those who profane the sanctuaries of the gods.

I, myself, welcome all forms of discourse which are capable of benefiting us even in a small degree; however, I regard those as the best and most worthy of a king, and most appropriate to me, which give directions on good morals and good government;[*](The aim of the worthy orator is proper conduct in private and in public life. See Isoc. 4.4, and General Introduction, pp. xxiv ff.) and especially those which teach how men in power should deal with the people, and how the rank and file should be disposed to their rulers. For I observe that it is through such discourses that states attain the highest prosperity and greatness.

On the former topic, how a ruler should act, you have heard Isocrates speak; on the following topic, what his subjects must do, I shall attempt to discourse, not with any thought of excelling him, but because this is the most fitting subject for me to discuss with you. For if I did not make clear what I desire you to do, I could not reasonably be angry with you if you were to mistake my purpose; but if, after I have announced my policy beforehand, none of my desires are carried out, then I should justly blame those who fail to obey me.

And I believe that I should most effectively exhort you and urge you to remember my words and heed them, not if I should confine myself to giving you advice and then, after counting out my precepts, make an end, but if, before doing this, I should prove to you, first, that you ought to be content with our present government, not only from necessity, nor because we have lived under it all our lives, but because it is the best of all governments;

and, second, that I hold this office, not illegally nor as a usurper, but with the just sanction of gods and men, and by virtue of my earliest ancestors, and of my father and of myself. For, once these claims have been established, who will not condemn himself to the severest punishment if he fails to heed my counsels and commands?

Speaking, then, of forms of government (for this was the subject I set out to lay before you), I imagine that we all believe that it is altogether monstrous[*](A protest against the new “equality.” Cf. Isoc. 2.14. In Isoc. 7.21-22 Isocrates praises the old democracy of Athens for recognizing ability and worth.) that the good and the bad should be thought worthy of the same privileges, and that it is of the very essence of justice that distinctions should be made between them, and that those who are unlike should not be treated alike but should fare and be rewarded in each case according to their deserts.

Now oligarchies and democracies seek equality for those who share in the administration of them; and the doctrine is in high favor in those governments that one man should not have the power to get more than another—a principle which works in the interest of the worthless! Monarchies, on the other hand, make the highest award to the best man, the next highest to the next best, and in the same proportion to the third and the fourth and so on. Even if this practice does not obtain everywhere, such at least is the intention of the polity.

And, mark you, monarchies more than other governments keep an appraising eye upon the characters and actions of men, as everyone will admit. Who, then, that is of sound mind would not prefer to share in a form of government under which his own worth shall not pass unnoticed, rather than be lost in the hurly-burly of the mob and not be recognized for what he is? Furthermore, we should be right in pronouncing monarchy also a milder government, in proportion as it is easier to give heed to the will of a single person than to seek to please many and manifold minds.

Now one might multiply arguments to prove that this form of government is more agreeable and mild and just than others; yet, even from those I have advanced it is easy to see this at a glance. As for its other advantages, we can best appreciate how far monarchies excel other governments in planning and carrying out any course of action required of them if we place their most important practices side by side and try to review them. In the first place, then, men who enter upon office for an annual term are retired to private life before they have gained any insight into public affairs or any experience in handling them;

while men who are permanently in charge of the same duties, even though they fall short of the others in natural ability, at any rate have a great advantage over them in experience. In the next place, the former neglect many things, because each looks to the others to do them; while the latter neglect nothing, knowing that whatever is done depends upon their own efforts. Then again, men who live in oligarchies or democracies are led by their mutual rivalries to injure the commonwealth[*](Party rivalry in the old Athenian democracy was carried on for the good of the state according to Isoc. 4.79. Not so in contemporary Athens, Isoc. 4.167.) while those who live in monarchies, not having anyone to envy, do in all circumstances so far as possible what is best.

Furthermore, the former are dilatory in action,[*](See Demosthenes' contrast between the checks and delays which were put upon him as leader of the Athenians and Phillip's freedom to act and strike quickly, Dem. 18.294. Cf. Dem. 4.40-46.) for they spend most of their time over their private concerns; and when they do assemble in council, you will find them more often quarrelling[*](For the selfish bickerings of the platform orators see Isoc. 12.12) with each other than deliberating together; while the latter, for whom no councils or times of meeting are prescribed, but who apply themselves to the state's business both day and night, do not let opportunities pass them by, but act in each case at the right moment.

Again, the former are ill-disposed toward each other and would rather have their predecessors and their successors in office administer the state as badly as possible, in order that they may win for themselves as much credit as possible; while the latter, because they are in control of affairs throughout their lives, are at all times actuated by feelings of good will.