Panegyricus

Isocrates

Isocrates. Isocrates with an English Translation in three volumes, by George Norlin, Ph.D., LL.D. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1928-1980.

And they dared to do these things, not so much in contempt of their foes as in keen rivalry against each other: the Lacedaemonians envying our city its victory at Marathon, and seeking to even the score, and fearing, furthermore, lest our city should twice in succession be the instrument of saving Hellas; while our ancestors, on the other hand, desired above all to maintain the reputation they had won, and to prove to the world that in their former battle they had conquered through valor and not through fortune, and in the next place to incite the Hellenes to carry on the war with their ships, by showing that in fighting on the sea no less than on the land valor prevails over numbers.[*](Paralleled in Plat. Menex. 240d; Lys. 2.23; Lyc. 1.108.)

But though they displayed equal courage, they did not meet with similar fortunes. The Lacedaemonians were utterly destroyed. Although in spirit they were victorious, in body they were outworn; for it were sacrilege to say that they were defeated, since not one of them deigned to leave his post.[*](This paragraph is closely paralleled in Lys. 2.31; Hyp. 6.27; and Lyc. 1.48.) Our ancestors, on the other hand, met and conquered the advance squadron of the Persians and when they heard that the enemy were masters of the pass,[*](Thermopylae.) they sailed back home and adopted such measures for what remained to be done that, however many and however glorious had been their previous achievements, they outdid themselves still more in the final hazards of that war.

For when all the allies were in a state of dejection, and the Peloponnesians were fortifying the Isthmus and selfishly seeking their own safety; when the other states had submitted to the barbarians and were fighting on the Persian side, save only those which were overlooked because of their insignificance; when twelve hundred ships of war were bearing down upon them, and an innumerable army[*](An army of 2,640,000, acc. to Hdt. 7.185.) was on the point of invading Attica; when no light of deliverance could be glimpsed in any quarter, but, on the contrary, the Athenians had been abandoned by their allies and cheated of their every hope;

and when it lay in their power not only to escape from their present dangers but also to enjoy the signal honors which the King held out to them, since he conceived that if he could get the support of the Athenian fleet he could at once become master of the Peloponnesus also, then our ancestors scorned to accept his gifts;[*](The attempt to bribe the Athenians was, according to Hdt. 8.136, made after the battle of Salamis.) nor did they give way to anger against the Hellenes for having betrayed them and rush gladly to make terms with the barbarians;

nay, by themselves they made ready to battle for freedom, while they forgave the rest for choosing bondage. For they considered that while it was natural for the weaker states to seek their security by every means, it was not possible for those states which asserted their right to stand at the head of Hellas to avoid the perils of war; on the contrary, they believed that just as it is preferable for men who are honorable to die nobly rather than to live in disgrace, so too it is better for cities which are illustrious to be blotted out from the sight of mankind rather than to be seen in a state of bondage.

It is evident that they were of this mind; for when they were not able to marshal themselves against both the land and the sea forces at once, they took with them the entire population, abandoned the city, and sailed to the neighboring island, in order that they might encounter each force in turn.[*](Cf. Lys. 2.33 ff.) And yet how could men be shown to be braver or more devoted to Hellas than our ancestors, who, to avoid bringing slavery upon the rest of the Hellenes, endured to see their city made desolate, their land ravaged, their sanctuaries rifled, their temples burned, and all the forces of the enemy closing in upon their own country?

But in truth even this did not satisfy them; they were ready to give battle on the sea—they alone against twelve hundred ships of war. They were not, indeed, allowed to fight alone; for the Peloponnesians, put to shame by our courage, and thinking, moreover, that if the Athenians should first be destroyed, they could not themselves be saved from destruction, and that if the Athenians should succeed, their own cities would be brought into disrepute, they were constrained to share the dangers. Now the clamors that arose during the action, and the shoutings and the cheers—things which are common to all those who fight on ships—I see no reason why I should take time to describe;[*](Unlike Gorgias, Fr. 18, and Lys. 2.37, who do go into such details.)

my task is to speak of those matters which are distinctive and give claim to leadership, and which confirm the arguments which I have already advanced. In short, our city was so far superior while she stood unharmed that even after she had been laid waste she contributed more ships to the battle for the deliverance of Hellas than all the others put together[*](So Isoc. 12.50 Lys. 2.42. But according to Hdt. 8.44-48 the Athenians furnished 180, the others 198.) who fought in the engagement; and no one is so prejudiced against us that he would not acknowledge that it was by winning the sea fight that we conquered in the war, and that the credit for this is due to Athens.[*](Cf. Isoc. 12.51.)

Who then should have the hegemony, when a campaign against the barbarians is in prospect? Should it not be they who distinguished themselves above all others in the former war? Should it not be they who many times bore, alone, the brunt of battle, and in the joint struggles of the Hellenes were awarded the prize of valor? Should it not be they who abandoned their own country to save the rest of Hellas, who in ancient times founded most of the Hellenic cities, and who later delivered them from the greatest disasters? Would it not be an outrage upon us, if, having taken the largest share in the evils of war, we should be adjudged worthy of a lesser share in its honors, and if, having at that time been placed in the lead in the cause of all the Hellenes, we should now be compelled to follow the lead of others?