Panegyricus

Are not Egypt[*](See Isoc. 5.101; Isoc. 4.140.) and Cyprus[*](See Isoc. 4.141 and note.) in revolt against him? Have not Phoenicia and Syria[*](Evagoras had ravaged Phoenicia and Syria, stormed Tyre, and made Cilicia revolt from Persia. See Isoc. 9.62.) been devastated because of the war? Has not Tyre, on which he set great store, been seized by his foes? Of the cities in Cilicia, the greater number are held by those who side with us and the rest are not difficult to acquire. Lycia[*](Lycia was subjected to Persia by Harpagus (Hdt. 1.176), but never tamed.) no Persian has ever subdued.

Hecatomnus, the viceroy of Caria, has in reality been disaffected for a long time now,[*](See Dio. Sic. 15.2.) and will openly declare himself whenever we wish. From Cnidus to Sinope[*](From Cnidus in S.W. Asia Minor to Sinope on the Black Sea; a line drawn from Cnidus to Sinope cuts off Asia Minor from Asia. The expression “from Cnidus to Sinope” was a catch phrase.) the coast of Asia is settled by Hellenes, and these we need not to persuade to go to war—all we have to do is not to restrain them. With such bases at our command for the operation of our forces, and with so widespread a war threatening Asia on every side, why, then, need we examine too closely what the outcome will be? For since the barbarians are unequal to small divisions of the Hellenes, it is not hard to foresee what would be their plight if they should be forced into a war against our united forces.

But this is how the matter stands: If the barbarian strengthens his hold on the cities of the coast by stationing in them larger garrisons than he has there now, perhaps those of the islands which lie near the mainland, as, for example, Rhodes and Samos and Chios, might incline to his side; but if we get possession of them first, we may expect that the populations of Lydia and Phrygia and of the rest of the up-country will be in the power of our forces operating from those positions.

Therefore we must be quick and not waste time, in order that we may not repeat the experience of our fathers.[*](In the Persian Wars.) For they, because they took the field later than the barbarians and had to abandon some of their allies,[*](The Ionians in Asia Minor. See Hdt. 5.103.) were compelled to encounter great numbers with a small force; whereas, if they had crossed over to the continent in time to be first on the ground, having with them the whole strength of Hellas, they could have subdued each of the nations there in turn.

For experience has shown that when you go to war with people who are gathered together from many places, you must not wait until they are upon you, but must strike while they are still scattered. Now our fathers, having made this mistake at the outset, entirely retrieved it only after engaging in the most perilous of struggles; but we, if we are wise, shall guard against it from the beginning, and endeavor to be the first to quarter an army in the region of Lydia and Ionia,

knowing that the King holds sway over the people of the continent, not because they are his willing subjects, but because he has surrounded himself with a force which is greater than any of those which they severally possess. So whenever we transport thither a force stronger than his, which we can easily do if we so will, we shall enjoy in security the resources of all Asia. Moreover, it is much more glorious to fight against the King for his empire than to contend against each other for the hegemony.

It were well to make the expedition in the present generation, in order that those who have shared in our misfortunes may also benefit by our advantages and not continue all their days in wretchedness. For sufficient is the time that is past, filled as it has been with every form of horror;[*](Cf. the picture of distress in Isoc. Letter 9.8-10.) for many as are the ills which are incident to the nature of man, we have ourselves invented more than those which necessity lays upon us, by engendering wars and factions among ourselves;

and, in consequence, some are being put to death contrary to law in their own countries, others are wandering with their women and children in strange lands, and many, compelled through lack of the necessities of life to enlist in foreign armies,[*](The hireling soldiers in Greece were becoming a serious problem. See Isoc. 5.96, 120, 121; Isoc. Letter 9.9.) are being slain, fighting for their foes against their friends. Against these ills no one has ever protested; and people are not ashamed to weep over the calamities which have been fabricated by the poets, while they view complacently the real sufferings, the many terrible sufferings, which result from our state of war; and they are so far from feeling pity that they even rejoice more in each other's sorrows than in their own blessings.

But perhaps many might even laugh at my simplicity if I should lament the misfortunes of individual men, in times like these, when Italy has been laid waste,[*](By Dionysius I. See Dio. Sic. 14.106 ff.) when Sicily has been enslaved,[*](The Sicilian cities, Selinius, Agrigentum, and Himera, were surrendered to the Carthaginians by Dionysius. See Dio. Sic. 13.114.) when such mighty cities have been given over to the barbarians,[*](By the Treaty of Antalcidas.) and when the remaining portions of the Hellenic race are in the gravest peril.

I am amazed at those who hold power in our states,[*](The same complaint against the leading statesmen is made in Isoc. Letter 9.8.) if they think that they have occasion to be proud when they have never been able either to propose or to conceive a remedy for a situation so momentous; for they ought, if they had been worthy of their present reputation, to have dropped all else, and have proposed measures and given counsel about our war against the barbarians.

Perhaps they might have helped us to get something done; but even if they had given up before gaining their object, they would, at any rate, have left to us their words as oracles for the future. But as things are, those who are held in highest honor are intent on matters of little consequence, and have left it to us, who stand aloof from public life,[*](For Isocrates' aloofness from public life see Isoc. 5.81; Isoc. 12.9-10; Isoc. Letter 1.9; Isoc. Letter 8.7; and General Introd. p. xix.) to advise on matters of so great moment.

Nevertheless, the more faint-hearted our leading men happen to be, the more vigorously must the rest of us look to the means by which we shall deliver ourselves from our present discord. For as matters now stand, it is in vain that we make our treaties of peace; for we do not settle our wars, but only postpone them and wait for the opportune moment when we shall have the power to inflict some irreparable disaster upon each other.

We must clear from our path these treacherous designs and pursue that course of action which will enable us to dwell in our several cities with greater security and to feel greater confidence in each other. What I have to say on these points is simple and easy: It is not possible for us to cement an enduring peace unless we join together in a war against the barbarians, nor for the Hellenes to attain to concord until we wrest our material advantages from one and the same source and wage our wars against one and the same enemy.[*](That is, instead of warring among themselves and plundering each other, the Greeks must wage their wars against, and seek their plunder from, the barbarians. Cf. 15 and 187; Isoc. 5.9.)

When these conditions have been realized, and when we have been freed from the poverty which afflicts our lives—a thing that breaks up friendships, perverts the affections of kindred into enmity, and plunges the whole world into war and strife[*](Cf. Theognis, 386 ff.)—then surely we shall enjoy a spirit of concord, and the good will which we shall feel towards each other will be genuine. For all these reasons, we must make it our paramount duty to transfer the war with all speed from our boundaries to the continent, since the only benefit which we can reap from the wars which we have waged against each other is by resolving that the experience which we have gained from them shall be employed against the barbarians.

But is it not well, you may perhaps ask, on account of the Treaty,[*](The Treaty of Antalcidas. See 115-120 and notes.) to curb ourselves and not be over-hasty or make the expedition too soon, seeing that the states which have gained their freedom through the Treaty feel grateful toward the King, because they believe that it was through him that they gained their independence, while those states which have been delivered over to the barbarians complain very bitterly of the Lacedaemonians and only less bitterly of the other Hellenes who entered into the peace, because, in their view, they were forced by them into slavery? But, I reply, is it not our duty to annul this agreement, which has given birth to such a sentiment—the sentiment that the barbarian cares tenderly for Hellas, and stands guard over her peace, while among ourselves are to be found those who outrage and evilly entreat her?

The crowning absurdity of all, however, is the fact that among the articles which are written in the agreement it is only the worst which we guard and observe. For those which guarantee the independence of the islands and of the cities in Europe have long since been broken and are dead letters on the pillars,[*](Articles of treaties were commonly inscribed on pillars of stone, set up either within a public temple or near it.) while those which bring shame upon us and by which many of our allies have been given over to the enemy—these remain intact, and we all regard them as binding upon us, though we ought to have expunged them and not allowed them to stand a single day, looking upon them as commands, and not as compacts; for who does not know that a compact is something which is fair and impartial to both parties, while a command is something which puts one side at a disadvantage unjustly?

On this ground we may justly complain of our envoys who negotiated this peace,[*](Chiefly Antalcidas of Sparta and Tiribazus, the Persian satrap, negotiated the peace. Isocrates complains that the treaty was arbitrary—not based on any principle whatsoever.) because, although dispatched by the Hellenes, they made the Treaty in the interest of the barbarians. For they ought, no matter whether they took the view that each of the states concerned should retain its original territory, or that each should extend its sovereignty over all that it had acquired by conquest, or that we should each retain control over what we held when peace was declared—they ought, I say, to have adopted definitely some one of these views, applying the principle impartially to all, and on this basis to have drafted the articles of the Treaty.

But instead of that, they assigned no honor whatsoever to our city or to Lacedaemon, while they set up the barbarian as lord of all Asia; as if we had gone to war for his sake, or as if the rule of the Persians had been long established, and we were only just now founding our cities—whereas in fact it is they who have only recently attained this place of honor, while Athens and Lacedaemon have been throughout their entire history a power among the Hellenes.

I think, however, that I shall show still more clearly both the dishonor which we have suffered, and the advantage which the King has gained by putting the matter in this way: All the world which lies beneath the firmament being divided into two parts, the one called Asia, the other Europe, he has taken half of it by the Treaty, as if he were apportioning the earth with Zeus,[*](Compare the boast of Xerxes in Hdt. 7.8.) and not making compacts with men.

Yes, and he has compelled us to engrave this Treaty on pillars of stone and place it in our public temples[*](See Isoc. 12.107.)— a trophy far more glorious for him than those which are set up on fields of battle; for the latter are for minor deeds and a single success, but this treaty stands as a memorial of the entire war and of the humiliation of the whole of Hellas.