Panegyricus

For with this one exception, what else is lacking? Was it not he who decided the issue of the war, was it not he who directed the terms of peace, and is it not he who now presides over our affairs? Do we not sail off to him as to a master, when we have complaints against each other? Do we not address him as “The Great King” as though we were the captives of his spear? Do we not in our wars against each other rest our hopes of salvation on him, who would gladly destroy both Athens and Lacedaemon ?

Reflecting on these things, we may well be indignant at the present state of affairs, and yearn for our lost supremacy: and we may well blame the Lacedaemonians because, although in the beginning they entered upon the war[*](The Peloponnesian War.) with the avowed intention[*](See words of Brasidas in Thuc. 4.85.) of freeing the Hellenes, in the end they delivered so many of them into bondage, and because they induced the Ionians to revolt from Athens, the mother city from which the Ionians emigrated and by whose influence they were often preserved from destruction, and then betrayed them[*](By the Treaty of Antalcidas, negotiated by Sparta, the Ionian cities of Asia Minor and the neighboring islands were given over to Persia (Xen. Hell. 5.1.31).) to the barbarians—those barbarians in despite of whom they possess their lands and against whom they have never ceased to war.

At that time the Lacedaemonians were indignant because we thought it right by legitimate means to extend our dominion over certain peoples.[*](As, for example, over the Ionian cities.) Now, however, they feel no concern, when these peoples are reduced to such abject servitude that it is not enough that they should be forced to pay tribute and see their citadels occupied by their foes, but, in addition to these public calamities, must also in their own persons submit to greater indignities than those which are suffered in our world by purchased slaves[*](Slaves by purchase were in worse case than slaves by capture in battle.); for none of us is so cruel to his servants as are the barbarians in punishing free men.

But the crowning misery is that they are compelled to take the field with the enemy[*](The Ionian cities were forced to fight with the Persians against Cyprus. See 134.) in the very cause of slavery and to fight against men who assert their right to freedom, and to submit to hazards of war on such terms that in case of defeat they will be destroyed at once, and in case of victory they will strengthen the claims of their bondage for all time to come.

For these evils, who else, can we think, is to blame but the Lacedaemonians, seeing that they have so great power, yet look on with indifference while those who have placed themselves under the Lacedaemonian alliance are visited with such outrages, and while the barbarian builds up his own empire by means of the strength of the Hellenes? In former days, it is true, they used to expel tyrants and bring succor to the people, but now they have so far reversed their policy that they make war on responsible governments and aid in establishing absolute monarchies;

they sacked and razed the city of Mantinea,[*](In 383 B.C. Cf. Isoc. 8.100; Xen. Hell. 5.2.7.) after peace had been concluded; they seized the Cadmea[*](In the same year. See Xen. Hell. 5.2.25. The Cadmea was the citidel of Thebes.) in Thebes; and now[*](This helps in dating the Panegyricus. ) they are laying siege to Olynthus and Phlius:[*](The siege of Olynthus was begun in 382 B.C. See Xen. Hell. 5.2.11. The siege of Phlius was begun in 380 B.C. See Xen. Hell. 5.2.8.) on the other hand, they are assisting Amyntas, king of the Macedonians,[*](Amyntas, the father of Philip, was aided by the Spartans against Olynthus 383 B.C. See Isoc. 6.46 and Isoc. 5.106.) and Dionysius,[*](For the sympathy between Sparta and Dionysius see Isoc. 8.99, Isoc. 6.63.) the tyrant of Sicily, and the barbarian king who rules over Asia,[*](By the Peace of Antalcidas.) to extend their dominions far and wide.

And yet is it not extraordinary that those who stand at the head of the Hellenes should set up one man as master over a host of human beings so great that it is not easy to ascertain even their numbers, while they do not permit the very greatest of our cities to govern even themselves, but try to compel them to submit to slavery or else involve them in the greatest disasters?

But most monstrous of all it is to see a people who arrogate to themselves the right of leadership making war every day upon the Hellenes and committed for all time to an alliance with the barbarians.

And let no one suppose that I am ill-natured, because I have recalled these facts to you in rather harsh terms, after having stated at the outset that I intended to speak on conciliation; for it is not with the intention of stigmatizing the city of the Lacedaemonians in the eyes of others that I have spoken as I have about them, but that I may induce the Lacedaemonians themselves, so far as it lies in the power of words to do so, to make an end of such a policy.

It is not, however, possible to turn men from their errors, or to inspire in them the desire for a different course of action without first roundly condemning their present conduct; and a distinction must be made between accusation, when one denounces with intent to injure, and admonition,[*](Cf. Isoc. 8.72.) when one uses like words with intent to benefit; for the same words are not to be interpreted in the same way unless they are spoken in the same spirit.

For we have reason to reproach the Lacedaemonians for this also, that in the interest of their own city they compel their neighbors to live in serfdom,[*](In his second letter to Philip, 5, Isocrates urges him to make all the barbarians, excepting those who join forces with him, serfs of the Hellenes.) but for the common advantage of their allies they refuse to bring about a similar condition, although it lies in their power to make up their quarrel with us and reduce all the barbarians to a state of subjection to the whole of Hellas.

And yet it is the duty of men who are proud because of natural gifts and not merely because of fortune to undertake such deeds much rather than to levy tribute[*](For tribute levied by Sparta see Xen. Hell. 6.2.16.) on the islanders,[*](The Cyclades, hilly and comparatively barren.) who are deserving of their pity, seeing that because of the scarcity of land they are compelled to till mountains, while the people of the mainland,[*](The “mainlanders”—Persian subjects in Asia Minor.) because of the abundance of their territory, allow most of it to lie waste, and have, nevertheless, from that part of it which they do harvest, grown immensely rich.

It is my opinion that if anyone should come here from another part of the world and behold the spectacle of the present state of our affairs, he would charge both the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians with utter madness, not only because we risk our lives fighting as we do over trifles when we might enjoy in security a wealth of possessions, but also because we continually impoverish our own territory while neglecting to exploit that of Asia.

As for the barbarian, nothing is more to his purpose than to take measures to prevent us from ever ceasing to make war upon each other; while we, on the contrary, are so far from doing anything to embroil his interests or foment rebellion among his subjects that when, thanks to fortune, dissensions do break out in his empire we actually lend him a hand in putting them down. Even now, when the two armies are fighting in Cyprus,[*](Reference to the ten years' war between Artaxerxes and Evagoras, king of Salamis. For Evagoras see introduction to Isoc. 2, and for the war see Isoc. 9.64 ff.) we permit him to make use of the one[*](The armament of Tiribazus, composed largely of an army of Greek mercenaries and a navy drawn from Ionian Greeks.) and to besiege the other,[*](That of Evagoras.) although both of them belong to Hellas;

for the Cyprians, who are in revolt against him, are not only on friendly terms with us[*](See Isoc. 9.53-54; Xen. Hell. 4.8.24.) but are also seeking the protection of the Lacedaemonians; and as to the forces which are led by Tiribazus, the most effective troops of his infantry have been levied from these parts,[*](Greeks who sold their services as mercenary troops because of poverty at home. See Isoc. 4.168 and note.) and most of his fleet has been brought together from Ionia; and all these would much more gladly make common cause and plunder Asia than risk their lives fighting against each other over trifling issues.

But these things we take no thought to prevent; instead, we wrangle about the islands of the Cyclades, when we have so recklessly given over so many cities and such great forces to the barbarians. And therefore some of our possessions are now his, some will soon be his, and others are threatened by his treacherous designs. And he has rightly conceived an utter contempt for us all;

for he has attained what no one of his ancestors ever did: Asia has been conceded both by us and by the Lacedaemonians to belong to the King; and as for the cities of the Hellenes, he has taken them so absolutely under his control that he either razes them to the ground or builds his fortresses within them. And all this has come about by reason of our own folly, not because of his power.

And yet there are those who stand in awe of the greatness of the King's power and maintain that he is a dangerous enemy,[*](Cf. Dem. 2.22.) dwelling at length on the many reversals which he has brought about in the affairs of the Hellenes. In my judgement, however, those who express such sentiments do not discourage but urge on the expedition; for if he is going to be hard to make war against when we have composed our differences and while he, himself is still beset by dissensions, then verily we should be in utmost dread of that time when the conflicting interests of the barbarians are settled and are governed by a single purpose, while we continue to be, as now, hostile to each other.

But even though these objectors do in fact lend support to my contention, yet, for all that, they are mistaken in their views about the power of the King; for if they could show that he had ever in the past prevailed over both Athens and Lacedaemon at once, they would have reason for attempting to alarm us now. But if this is not the case, and the truth is that when we and the Lacedaemonians have been in conflict he has but given support to one of the two sides and so rendered the achievements of that one side more brilliant, this is no evidence of his own power. For in such times of crisis small forces have often played a great part in turning the scale;[*](Cf. Dem. 2.14.) for example, even for the people of Chios[*](Chios revolted from Athens and joined Sparta after the Sicilian expedition (Thuc. 8.7). After the battle of Cnidus she joined Athens again (Dio. Sic. 14.84-94).) I might make the claim that whichever side they have been inclined to support, that side has proved stronger on the sea.

Nay, it is obviously not fair to estimate the power of the King from those exploits in which he has joined forces with the one or the other of us, but rather from the wars which he, unaided, has fought on his own behalf. Take, first, the case of Egypt: since its revolt from the King, what progress has he made against its inhabitants? Did he not dispatch to this war[*](Isocrates alone is authority for this war.) the most renowned of the Persians, Abrocomas and Tithraustes and Pharnabazus, and did not they, after remaining there three years and suffering more disasters than they inflicted, finally withdraw in such disgrace that the rebels are no longer content with their freedom, but are already trying to extend their dominion over the neighboring peoples as well?