Helen

There are some who are much pleased with themselves if, after setting up an absurd and self-contradictory subject, they succeed in discussing it in tolerable fashion; and men have grown old, some asserting that it is impossible to say, or to gainsay, what is false[*](So Antisthenes and the Cynics; cf. Plat. Soph. 240c.), or to speak on both sides of the same questions, others maintaining that courage and wisdom and justice are identical[*](A reference to the views of Plato and the Academy.), and that we possess none of these as natural qualities, but that there is one sort of knowledge concerned with them all.; and still others waste their time in captious disputations that are not only entirely useless, but are sure to make trouble for their disciples.

For my part, if I observed that this futile affectation had arisen only recently in rhetoric and that these men were priding themselves upon the novelty of their inventions, I should not be surprised at them to such degree; but as it is, who is so backward in learning as not to know that Protagoras and the sophists of his time have left to us compositions of similar character and even far more overwrought than these?

For how could one surpass Gorgias[*](Cf. Isoc. 15.268. Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily, pupil of Teisias, came to Athens on an embassy in 427 B.C.), who dared to assert that nothing exists of the things that are, or Zeno[*](This is Zeno of Elea, in Italy, and not the founder of the Stoic School of philosophy. Zeno and Melissus were disciples of Parmenides.), who ventured to prove the same things as possible and again as impossible, or Melissus who, although things in nature are infinite in number, made it his task to find proofs that the whole is one!

Nevertheless, although these men so clearly have shown that it is easy to contrive false statements on any subject that may be proposed, they still waste time on this commonplace. They ought to give up the use of this claptrap, which pretends to prove things by verbal quibbles, which in fact have long since been refuted, and to pursue the truth,

to instruct their pupils in the practical affairs of our government and train to expertness therein, bearing in mind that likely conjecture about useful things is far preferable to exact knowledge of the useless, and that to be a little superior in important things is of greater worth than to be pre-eminent in petty things that are without value for living.

But the truth is that these men care for naught save enriching themselves at the expense of the youth. It is their “philosophy” applied to eristic disputations[*](eristics, “wordy wrangling” “mere disputation for its own sake”; cf. General Introd., Vol. I, p. xxi and Isoc. 13.1.) that effectively produces this result; for these rhetoricians, who care nothing at all for either private or public affairs, take most pleasure in those discourses which are of no practical service in any particular.

These young men, to be sure, may well be pardoned for holding such views; for in all matters they are and always have been inclined toward what is extraordinary and astounding. But those who profess to give them training are deserving of censure because, while they condemn those who deceive in cases involving private contracts in business and those who are dishonest in what they say, yet they themselves are guilty of more reprehensible conduct; for the former wrong sundry other persons, but the latter inflict most injury upon their own pupils.

And they have caused mendacity to increase to such a degree that now certain men, seeing these persons prospering from such practices, have the effrontery to write that the life of beggars and exiles is more enviable than that of the rest of mankind, and they use this as a proof that, if they can speak ably on ignoble subjects, it follows that in dealing with subjects of real worth they would easily find abundance of arguments.

The most ridiculous thing of all, in my opinion, is this, that by these arguments they seek to convince us that they possess knowledge of the science of government, when they might be demonstrating it by actual work in their professed subject; for it is fitting that those who lay claim to learning and profess to be wise men should excel laymen and be better than they, not in fields neglected by everybody else, but where all are rivals.

But as it is, their conduct resembles that of an athlete who, although pretending to be the best of all athletes, enters a contest in which no one would condescend to meet him. For what sensible man would undertake to praise misfortunes? No, it is obvious that they take refuge in such topics because of weakness.

Such compositions follow one set road and this road is neither difficult to find, nor to learn, nor to imitate. On the other hand, discourses that are of general import, those that are trustworthy, and all of similar nature, are devised and expressed through the medium of a variety of forms and occasions of discourse whose opportune use is hard to learn, and their composition is more difficult as it is more arduous to practise dignity than buffoonery and seriousness than levity. The strongest proof is this:

no one who has chosen to praise bumble-bees and salt[*](Cf. Plat. Sym. 177b, where there is reference to an Encomium of Salt by an unknown writer. See Isoc. 12.135. Cf. Lucian's comic encomium, Praise of the Fly(see L.C.L. Lucian, Vol. I, pp. 81 ff.).) and kindred topics has never been at a loss for words, yet those who have essayed to speak on subjects recognized as good or noble, or of superior moral worth have all fallen far short of the possibilities which these subjects offer.

For it does not belong to the same mentality to do justice to both kinds of subjects; on the contrary, while it is easy by eloquence to overdo the trivial themes, it is difficult to reach the heights of greatness of the others[*](Cf. Isoc. 12.36.); and while on famous subjects one rarely finds thoughts which no one has previously uttered, yet on trifling and insignificant topics whatever the speaker may chance to say is entirely original.

This is the reason why, of those who have wished to discuss a subject with eloquence, I praise especially him who chose to write of Helen[*](This statement certainly seems to refer to Gorgias, Isoc. 10.(see particularly the end of that composition which is translated by Van Hook, Greek Life and Thought, pp. 162 ff. See also the Introduction to this discourse).), because he has recalled to memory so remarkable a woman, one who in birth, and in beauty, and in renown far surpassed all others. Nevertheless, even he committed a slight inadvertence—for although he asserts that he has written an encomium of Helen, it turns out that he has actually spoken a defense of her conduct!

But the composition in defense does not draw upon the same topics as the encomium, nor indeed does it deal with actions of the same kind, but quite the contrary; for a plea in defense is appropriate only when the defendant is charged with a crime, whereas we praise those who excel in some good quality. But that I may not seem to be taking the easiest course, criticizing others without exhibiting any specimen of my own[*](The same sentiment if found in Isoc. 11.9.), I will try to speak of this same woman, disregarding all that any others have said about her.

I will take as the beginning of my discourse the beginning of her family. For although Zeus begat very many of the demigods, of this woman alone he condescended to be called father. While he was devoted most of all to the son of Alcmena[*](Heracles.) and to the sons of Leda[*](Castor and Pollux.), yet his preference for Helen, as compared with Heracles, was so great that, although he conferred upon his son strength of body, which is able to overpower all others by force, yet to her he gave the gift of beauty, which by its nature brings even strength itself into subjection to it.

And knowing that all distinction and renown accrue, not from a life of ease, but from wars and perilous combats, and since he wished, not only to exalt their persons to the gods, but also to bequeath to them glory that would be immortal, he gave his son a life of labors and love of perils, and to Helen he granted the gift of nature which drew the admiration of all beholders and which in all men inspired contention[*](Quoted and discussed by Demetrius, On Style 23.).

In the first place Theseus[*](For Isocrates' view of Theseus see Isoc. 12.126 ff., with his references to this discussion of the hero. For Theseus see Eur. Hipp. 887 ff. and Plut. Thes. Theseus, reputed son of Aegeus and of Aethra, daughter of Pittheus, king of Troezen in Argolis, was honored as the founder of the political institutions of Athens. Cf. p. 79 and note.), reputedly the son of Aegeus, but in reality the progeny of Poseidon, seeing Helen not as yet in the full bloom of her beauty, but already surpassing other maidens, was so captivated by her loveliness that he, accustomed as he was to subdue others, and although the possessor of a fatherland most great and a kingdom most secure, thought life was not worth living amid the blessings he already had unless he could enjoy intimacy with her.

And when he was unable to obtain her from her guardians—for they were awaiting her maturity and the fulfilment of the oracle which the Pythian priestess had given—scorning the royal power of Tyndareus[*](Father of Helen.), disdaining the might of Castor and Pollux[*](Brothers of Helen.), and belittling all the hazards in Lacedaemon, he seized her by force and established her at Aphidna in Attica.

So grateful was Theseus to Peirithos, his partner in the abduction, that when Peirithos wished to woo Persephon, the daughter of Zeus and Demeter, and summoned him to the descent into Hades to obtain her, when Theseus found that he could not by his warnings dissuade his friend, although the danger was manifest he nevertheless accompanied him, for he was of opinion that he owed this debt[*](For the figure of speech in E)/RANOS see Isoc. 11.1 and Plat. Sym. 177c.) of gratitude—to decline no task enjoined by Peirithos in return for his help in his own perilous enterprise.