Trapeziticus

Furthermore, men of the jury, this too is easy for all to see—that whereas I, the plaintiff, if I distrusted the sufficiency of my proofs, could drop the prosecution even without entering into any agreement, yet Pasion, on account both of the examination of his slave under torture and the suits lodged with you, could not possibly free himself from his risks when he wished except by gaining the consent of me, the complainant. In consequence, I was not obliged to make an agreement about the dismissal of my charges, but it was necessary for him to do so about the repayment of my money.

Besides, it would have been a preposterous state of affairs if, before the memorandum had been drawn up, I should have had so little confidence in my case as not only to drop the charges against Pasion, but also to make an agreement concerning these charges and, after I had drawn up such written proof against myself, should then have desired to bring the case before you. And yet who would plan so foolishly in regard to his own interests?