Against Callimachus

Isocrates

Isocrates. Isocrates with an English Translation in three volumes, by Larue Van Hook, Ph.D., LL.D. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1945-1968.

Is it not outrageous, men of the jury, that, although such were the terms of the covenant and the oaths which were sworn were of such nature, Callimachus is so convinced of his own eloquence that he believes he will persuade you to vote in opposition to them? If he saw that the city regretted its past action, his conduct should not occasion surprise; but as a matter of fact you have shown the importance you attach to the covenant, not only in the enactment of the laws,

but when Philon of Coele was indicted for malversation on an embassy, and although he could offer no defense but merely cited the covenant in exoneration, you decided to dismiss his case and not even hold him for trial. And although the city does not think it proper to punish even confessed transgressors, yet this man has the effrontery to bring malicious charges against those who have done no wrong at all.

Furthermore, he is certainly not unaware of this either—that Thrasybulus and Anytus, men of the greatest influence in the city, although they have been robbed of large sums of money and know who gave in lists of their goods, nevertheless are not so brazen as to bring suit against them or to bring up old grudges against them; on the contrary, even if, in respect to all other claims, they have greater power than others to accomplish their ends,

yet in matters covered by the covenant at least they see fit to put themselves on terms of equality with the other citizens. And it is not these men alone who have accepted this point of view; no, not even one of you has dared to bring such an action. And yet it would be outrageous if you, while honoring your oaths where your own affairs are concerned, shall attempt to violate them in connexion with the calumnious charges of Callimachus, and if, while insisting that private agreements must be held valid by public authority, shall allow anyone who so desires, on his own private authority, to break the covenants of the state.