Against Callimachus

I learn that Callimachus not only intends to speak falsely in the matter of his complaint, but will also deny that the arbitration took place, and that he is prepared to go so far as to assert that he never would have entrusted an arbitration to Nicomachus, whom he knew to be an old friend of ours, and further, that it is improbable that he was willing to accept two hundred drachmas instead of ten thousand.

You must reflect, however, first, that we were not in dispute in the matter of the arbitration, but we committed it as an arbitration under stated terms, so that it is not at all strange that Callimachus chose Nicomachus as arbiter; it would have been far stranger if, after he had come to an agreement about the matter, he had then made difficulty about the choice of arbiter. In the next place, it is not reasonable to assume that, if ten thousand drachmas had been owing to him, he would have settled for two minas[*](10,000 drachmas=about $1800 or approximately 360 sterling; two minas (200 drachmas)=about $36 or between seven and eight pounds.); but since his charges were unjust and in the nature of blackmail, it is not astonishing that he was willing to take so little. Furthermore, if, after exorbitant demands, he exacted little, this is no proof in favor of his contention that the arbitration did not take place on the contrary, it confirms all the more our contention that his claim was unjust in the first place.

I am astonished that, while he judges himself capable of recognizing that it was not probable that he was willing to take two hundred drachmas instead of the ten thousand, yet believes that I am incapable of discovering, if I had wished to lie, that I ought to have asserted that I had given him more. But this I ask—that in so far as it would have been an indication in his favor that the arbitration did not take place, if he had proved the falsity of the testimony, to that same extent it shall be proof in favor of my contention that I tell the truth concerning the arbitration, inasmuch as it is clearly shown that he did not dare to proceed against my witness.

I think, however, that even if there had been neither arbitration nor witnesses to the actual facts and you were under the necessity of considering the case in the light of the probabilities, not even in this event would you have difficulty in arriving at a just verdict. For if I were so audacious a man as to wrong others, you would with good reason condemn me as doing wrong to him also; but as it is, I shall be found innocent of having harmed any citizen in regard to his property, or of jeopardizing his life, or of having expunged his name from the list of active citizens, or of having inscribed his name on Lysander's list.[*](A list of citizens who were deprived of their civic rights; cf. Isoc. 21.2 and Xen. Hell. 2.3.17-19.)

And yet the wickedness of the Thirty[*](For the crimes of the Thirty see the vivid account by Lysias in his speech Against Eratosthenes.) impelled many to act in this way for they not only did not punish the evil-doers but they even commanded some persons to do wrong. So as for me, not even when they had control of the government, shall I be found guilty of any such misdeed; yet Callimachus says that he was wronged after the Thirty had been expelled, the Piraeus had been taken, and when the democracy was in power, and the terms of reconciliation were being discussed.

And yet do you think that a man who was well behaved under the Thirty put off his wrongdoing until that period when even those who had formerly transgressed were repentant? But the most absurd thing of all would be this—that although I never saw fit to avenge myself on anyone of my existing enemies, I was attempting to injure this man with whom I have never had any business dealings at all!

That I am not responsible for the confiscation of the money of Callimachus I think I have sufficiently proved. But that it was not legally in his power to bring a suit pertaining to events which occurred then, not even if I had done everything he says I did, you will learn from the covenant of Amnesty.[*](Cf. Isoc. 18.2 note 1.) Please take the document.

Was it, then, a weak defense of my rights I trusted in when I entered this demurrer? On the contrary, do not the terms of the Amnesty explicitly exculpate any who have laid information against or denounced any person or have done any similar thing, and am I not able to prove that I have neither committed these acts nor transgressed in any other way? Please read the Oaths also.