De Facie Quae in orbe Lunae Apparet

Plutarch

Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. XII. Cherniss, Harold and William Clark Helmbold translators. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1957 (printing).

At this — for I wished Lucius to have time to collect his thoughts — I called to Theon. Which of

the tragic poets was it, Theon, I asked, who said that physicians
With bitter drugs the bitter bile purge?
Theon replied that it was Sophocles.[*](Sophocles, frag. 770 (Nauck²). The verse is quoted with variations at Cohibenda Ira, 463 F, and Tranquillitate Animi, 468 B.) Yes, I said, and we have of necessity to allow them this procedure; but to philosophers one should not listen if they desire to repulse paradoxes with paradoxes and in struggling against opinions that are amazing fabricate others that are more amazing and outlandish,[*](cf. Aristotle’s remark, Caelo, 294 A 20-21: τὸ δὲ τὰs περὶ τούτου λύσεις μὴ μᾶλλον ἀτόπους εἶναι δοκεῖη τῆς ἀπορίας, θαυμάσειεν ἆνa τις.) as these people do in introducing their motion to the centre. What paradox is not involved in this doctrine? Not the one that the earth is a sphere although it contains such great depths and heights and irregularities?[*](This objection to the Peripatetic and Stoic theory that the sphericity of the earth is a necessary consequence of the natural motion of earth downwards to the centre of the universe (Aristotle, Caelo, 297 A 8 - b 23; Strabo, i. 1. 20, chap. 11; Adrastus in Theon of Smyrna, p. 122. 1-16 [Hiller]) was often answered (cf. Dicaearchus in Pliny, Nat. Hist. ii. 65. 162; Adrastus in Theon of Smyrna, pp. 124. 7-127, 23, using arguments from Archimedes, Eratosthenes, and Dicaearchus; Cleomedes, i. 56 [p. 102. 9-20 Ziegler]; Alexander in Simplicius, Caelo, p. 546. 15-23; Alexander, Mixtione, p. 237. 5-15 [Bruns]). Plutarch, who defends Plato for constructing the spherical earth of molecules that are cubes on the ground that no material object can be a perfect sphere (Quaest. Plat. 1004 B - C), probably did not intend this or the subsequent paradoxes to be taken too seriously. Lamprias is simply riding Pharnaces as hard as he can, using any argument, good or bad, to make him appear ridiculous.) Not that people live on the opposite hemisphere clinging to the earth like wood-worms or geckos turned bottomside up?[*](cf. Lucretius, i. 1052-1067 in his argument against the Stoic motion to the centre. Plutarch mentions the antipodes in connection with the Stoics in Stoicorum Repugnantiis, 1050 B. In Herodoti Malignitate, 869 C it is said that some say that there are antipodes.) — and that we ourselves in standing remain not at right angles to the earth but at an oblique angle, leaning from the perpendicular
like drunken men?[*](cf. Aristotle, Caelo, 296 B 18 - 21 and 297 B 17 - 21: the courses of bodies falling to the earth form equal angles with the horizontal plane at the point of contact and are not parallel. So, Lamprias argues, men standing upright on the earth would not be parallel to one another but all in converging on the centre would deviate from the absolute perpendicular.) Not that incandescent masses of forty tons[*](Probably not aeroliths, as Raingeard supposes, but incandescent boulders such as are thrown up by volcanoes; for μύδροι in this sense cf. [Aristotle], Mundo, 395 B 22-23; Strabo, vi. 2. 8, chap. 274; vi. 2. 10, chap. 275; xiii. 4. 11, chap. 628. For the falling of great boulders within the earth cf. Lucretius, vi. 536-550, and Seneca, Nat. Quaest. vi. 22. 2; but Plutarch probably had in mind a subterranean geography such as that of Phaedo, 111 D ff., of which the next sentence but one contains an explicit reminiscence.) falling through the depth of the earth stop when they arrive at the centre, though nothing encounter or support them; and, if in their downward motion the impetus should carry them past the centre, they swing back again and return of themselves? Not that pieces of meteors burnt out on either side of the earth do not move downwards continually but falling upon the surface of the earth force their way into it from the outside and conceal themselves about the centre?[*](For the text and interpretation of this sentence cf. Class. Phil. xlvi (1951), pp. 139-140.) Not that a turbulent stream of water, if in flowing downwards it should reach the middle point, which they themselves call incorporeal,[*](cf. 926 B s.v.. According to the Stoics the limits of bodies are incorporeal and therefore in the strict sense nonexistent ( Communibus Notitiis, 1080 e; cf. 1081 B and S. V. F. ii, p. 159, frag. 488), since only the corporeal exists (S. V. F. ii, p. 115, frag. 320 and p. 117, frag. 329). Only corporeal existence, moreover, can produce an effect or be affected ( Communibus Notitiis, 1073 E, cf. S. V. F. ii, p. 118, frag. 336 and p. 123, frag. 363). How then can the incorporeal centre have any effect upon corporeal entities?) stops suspended [or] moves round about it, oscillating in an incessant and perpetual see-saw?[*](cf.Plato, Phaedo, 111 E 112 E, which is certainly the source of Plutarch’s figure, and Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s account in Meteorology, 355 B 32 356 A 19.) Some of these a man could not even mistakenly force
himself to conceive as possible. For this amounts to upside down and all things topsy-turvy, everything as far as the centre being down and everything under the centre in turn being up.[*](cf.Phaedo, 112 E 1-3. By introducing the conventional phrase ὑπὸ τὸ μέσον, which really begs the question, Lamprias makes the notion appear to be a ridiculous self-contradiction.) The result is that, if a man should so coalesce with the earth[*](That συμπαθείᾳ τῆς γῆς, which has given rise to many conjectures, need mean no more than this is proved by Dox. Graeci, p. 317 B 14-16: τῆς τε τῶν ὄντων συμαθείας καὶ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ἀλληλουχίας. For the figure used here cf. Aristotle, Caelo, 285 A 27-b 5, and Simplicius, Caelo, p. 389. 8-24 and p. 391. 33 ff. The most famous later parallel is the position of Lucifer in Dante’s Inferno, xxxiv. 76-120.) that its centre is at his navel, the same person at the same time has his head up and his feet up too. Moreover, if he dig through the further side, his [bottom] in emerging is [up], and the man digging himself up is pulling himself down from above [*](i.e. his feet emerge first; and they, his bottom part, are up. In digging himself up relatively to the surface through which he emerges, he is with reference to himself pulling himself not up to a position above his head but down to a position below his feet. The paradox rests upon the assumption that head and feet are respectively absolute up and absolute down for man (cf. Aristotle, Incessu Animal. 705 A 26 706 B 16, and Parva Nat. 468 A 1-12).); and, if someone should then be imagined to have gone in the opposite direction to this man, the feet of both of them at the same time turn out to be up and are so called.