De Facie Quae in orbe Lunae Apparet

All the same, let us assume, if you please, that

the motions of earthy objects in the heaven are contrary to nature; and then let us calmly observe without any histrionics and quite dispassionately that this indicates not that the moon is not earth but that she is earth in an unnatural location. For the fire of Aetna too is below earth unnaturally, but it is fire; and the air confined in skins,[*](cf. 928 B s.v.. Plutarch probably has in mind inflated skins used for floats; cf. Aristotle, Physics, 217 A 2 - 3, 255 B 26, Caelo, 311 B 9 - 13.) though by nature it is light and has an upward tendency, has been constrained to occupy an unnatural location. As to the soul herself, I said, by Zeus, is her confinement in the body not contrary to nature, swift as she is and fiery, as you say,[*](cf.S. V. F. ii, p. 217, frag. 773: οἱ μὲν γὰρ Στωϊκοὶ πνεῦμα λέγουσιν αὐτὴν ἔνθερμον καὶ διάπυρον. ) and invisible in a sluggish, cold, and sensible vehicle? Shall we then on this account deny that there is soul in body or that mind, a divine thing, though it traverses instantaneously in its flight all heaven and earth and sea,[*](For this commonplace of the flight of the mind through the universe cf. R. M. Jones, Class. Phil. xxi (1926), pp. 97-113.) has passed into flesh and wines and marrow under the influence of weight and density and countless qualities that attend liquefaction?[*](This is a reference to the Stoic notion that the embodiment of soul was a process of condensation or liquefaction. cf. Stoicorum Repugnantiis, 1053 B - C ( = S. V. F. ii, frag. 605) and for the qualities that would attend liquefaction S. V. F. ii, p. 155. 34: γῆς τε καὶ ὕδατος, παχνμερῶν καὶ βαρέων καὶ ἀτόνων ὅντων. ) This Zeus of yours too, is it not true that, while in his own nature he is single, a great and continuous fire, at present he is slackened and subdued and transformed, having become and continuing to become everything in the course of his mutations?[*](= S. V. F. ii, p. 308, frag. 1045. Zeus in his own nature is the state of the universe in the ecpyrosis, while at present he is the universe in the state of diacosmesis; cf. Placitis, 881 F 882 A (= Aëtius, i. 7. 33 = S. V. F. ii, frag. 1027), Diogenes Laertius, vii. 137 ( = S. V. F. ii, frag. 526), Stoicorum Repugnantiis, 1052 C ( = S. V. F. ii, frags. 1068 and 604), Communibus Notitiis 1075 A - C ( = S. V. F. ii, frag. 1049), and S. V. F. ii, frags. 1052, 1053, and 1056.) So look out and reflect, good sir, lest in rearranging and removing each thing to its natural location you contrive a dissolution of the cosmos and bring upon things the Strife of Empedocles — or rather lest you arouse against nature the ancient Titans and Giants[*](The Strife of Empedocles is connected with the mythical war of the Giants by Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem Comment. p. 849, 13-15 (ed. Cousin, Paris, 1864) = p. 659 (ed. Stallbaum).) and long to look upon that legendary and dreadful disorder and discord [when you have separated] all that is heavy and [all] that is light.

The suns bright aspect is not there descried, No, nor the shaggy might of earth, nor sea

as Empedocles says.[*](Empedocles, frag. B 27 (i, pp. 323. 11-324. 4 [DielsKranz]), where the ὠκέα γυῖα given by Simplicius is adopted instead of Plutarch’s ἀγλαὸν εἶδος. Bignone, however, who prints the lines given by Plutarch as frag. 26 a and those given by Simplicius as frag. 27, is probably right in taking this to be one of the lines which were repeated with a different ending in two different parts of the poem (Empedocle, studio critico, pp. 220 ff., 421, 599 ff.). Certainly Plutarch represents his quotation as describing the period when Strife has completely separated the four roots, whereas Simplicius says that his comes from the description of the Sphere, when all were thoroughly intermingled.) Earth had no part in heat, water no part in air; there was not anything heavy above or anything light below; but the principles of all things[*](i.e. the four roots, earth, air, fire, and water, for the separation of which by Strife cf. Empedocles, frags. B 17. 8-10 and B 26. 6-9 (i, p. 316. 2-4 and p. 323. 4-7 [DielsKranz]).) were untempered and unamiable[*](From this Mullach manufactured for Empedocles the verse that he numbered 174 (Frag. Phil. Graec. i, p. 5). Stein took only ἄκρατοι καὶ ἄστοργοι to be a quotation. The word ἄστοργος appears nowhere in the fragments of Empedocles (though στοργή does in frag. B 109 [i, p. 351. 22, DielsKranz]), whereas Plutarch uses it several times in other connections (Amatorius, 750 F, Quaest. Nat. 917 D, Sollertia Animalium, 970 B).) and solitary, not accepting combination or association with one another, but avoiding and shunning one another and moving with their own peculiar and arbitrary motions[*](cf. Clara Millerd, On the Interpretation of Empedocles, p. 54, and Cherniss, Aristotle’s Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, p. 175, n. 130. Plutarch’s circumstantial account of the motion of the four roots during the complete dominance of Strife is coloured by the passage of Plato to which he refers.) they were in the state in which, according to Plato,[*](Timaeus, 53 B; cf. Defectu Oraculorum, 430 D, and An. Proc. in Timaeo, 1016 F.) everything is from which God is absent, that is to say in which bodies are when mind or soul is wanting. So they were until desire came over nature providentially, for Affection arose or Aphrodite or Eros, as Empedocles says and Parmenides and Hesiod,[*](cf.Amatorius, 756 D - F, where Empedocles, frag. B 17. 20-21 (i, p. 317. 1-2 [Diels-Kranz]), and Parmenides, frag. B 13 (i, p. 243. 16 [Diels-Kranz]) are quoted, and Hesiod, Theogony, 120 is referred to; and cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 984 B 23 985 A 10. With Plutarchs εκ προνοιάς contrast Aristotles criticism of Empedocles (Metaphysics, 1000 B 1217) and cf. Empedocles, frags. B 17. 29 and B 30 (i, p. 317. 10 and p. 325. 10-12 [Diels-Kranz]). By εκ προνοιάς here Plutarch prepares the way for his use in the next paragraph of the Stoic doctrine of providence against the Stoic doctrine of natural place.) in order that by changing position and interchanging functions and by being constrained some to motion and some to rest and compelled to give way and shift from the natural to the better [the bodies] might produce a universal concord and community.