De Facie Quae in orbe Lunae Apparet

After all, in what sense is earth situated in the middle and in the middle of what? The sum of things is infinite; and the infinite, having neither beginning nor limit, cannot properly have a middle, for the middle is a kind of limit too but infinity is a negation of limits. He who asserts that the earth is in the middle not of the sum of things but of the cosmos is naive if he supposes that the cosmos itself is not also involved in the very same difficulties.[*](cf. Defectu Oraculorum, 424 D, where καθ’ ὅυς δ’ ἔστιν (scil, τὸ κενόν) refers to the Stoics (for whose distinction between the pa=n and the κόσμος see note c on 924 E supra), and Stoicorum Repugnantiis, 1054 B - D, where as here Plutarch uses against the Stoics a weapon taken from their own arsenal.) In fact, in the sum of things no middle has been left for the cosmos either, but it is without hearth and habitation,[*](cf.Gracchi, ix. 5. 828 D: ἄοικοι καὶ ἀνίδρυτοι.) moving in infinite void to nothing of its own; [or], if it has come to rest because it has found some other reason for abiding, not because of the nature of its location,[*](cf.S. V. F. ii, pp. 174-175, frags. 552 and 553; Stoicorum Repugnantiis, 1054 F 1055 B.) similar inferences are permissible in the cases of both earth and moon, that the former is stationary

here and the latter is in motion there by reason of a different soul or nature rather [than] a difference [of location]. Besides this, consider whether they[*](The Stoics.) have not overlooked an important point. If anything in any way at all off the centre of the earth is up, no part of the cosmos is down; but it turns out that the earth and the things on the earth and absolutely all body surrounding or enclosing the centre are up and only one thing is down, that incorporeal point[*](cf.S. V. F. ii, p. 169. 9-11, frag. 527: τῆς γῆς περὶ τὸ μέσον σημεῖον τoῦ κόσμου κειμένης, ὅ δὴ τοῦ παντός ἐστι κάτω, ἄνω δὲ τὸ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ κύκλῳ πάντῃ.) which must be in opposition to the entire nature of the cosmos, if in fact down and up are natural opposites.[*](cf.S. V. F. ii, p. 176, frag. 556: τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω οὐ κατὰ σχέσιν φύσει γὰρ διάφορα ταῦτα. ) This, moreover, does not exhaust the absurdity. The cause of the descent of heavy objects and of their motion to this region is also abolished, for there is no body that is down towards which they are in motion and it is neither likely nor in accordance with the intention of these men that the incorporeal should have so much influence as to attract all these objects and keep them together around itself.[*](See note d on 924 B supra, and cf. Defectu Oraculorum, 424 E against Aristotle.) On the contrary, it proves to be entirely unreasonable and inconsistent with the facts for the whole cosmos to be up and nothing but an incorporeal and unextended limit to be down; but that statement of ours is reasonable, that ample space and broad has been divided between up and down.

All the same, let us assume, if you please, that

the motions of earthy objects in the heaven are contrary to nature; and then let us calmly observe without any histrionics and quite dispassionately that this indicates not that the moon is not earth but that she is earth in an unnatural location. For the fire of Aetna too is below earth unnaturally, but it is fire; and the air confined in skins,[*](cf. 928 B s.v.. Plutarch probably has in mind inflated skins used for floats; cf. Aristotle, Physics, 217 A 2 - 3, 255 B 26, Caelo, 311 B 9 - 13.) though by nature it is light and has an upward tendency, has been constrained to occupy an unnatural location. As to the soul herself, I said, by Zeus, is her confinement in the body not contrary to nature, swift as she is and fiery, as you say,[*](cf.S. V. F. ii, p. 217, frag. 773: οἱ μὲν γὰρ Στωϊκοὶ πνεῦμα λέγουσιν αὐτὴν ἔνθερμον καὶ διάπυρον. ) and invisible in a sluggish, cold, and sensible vehicle? Shall we then on this account deny that there is soul in body or that mind, a divine thing, though it traverses instantaneously in its flight all heaven and earth and sea,[*](For this commonplace of the flight of the mind through the universe cf. R. M. Jones, Class. Phil. xxi (1926), pp. 97-113.) has passed into flesh and wines and marrow under the influence of weight and density and countless qualities that attend liquefaction?[*](This is a reference to the Stoic notion that the embodiment of soul was a process of condensation or liquefaction. cf. Stoicorum Repugnantiis, 1053 B - C ( = S. V. F. ii, frag. 605) and for the qualities that would attend liquefaction S. V. F. ii, p. 155. 34: γῆς τε καὶ ὕδατος, παχνμερῶν καὶ βαρέων καὶ ἀτόνων ὅντων. ) This Zeus of yours too, is it not true that, while in his own nature he is single, a great and continuous fire, at present he is slackened and subdued and transformed, having become and continuing to become everything in the course of his mutations?[*](= S. V. F. ii, p. 308, frag. 1045. Zeus in his own nature is the state of the universe in the ecpyrosis, while at present he is the universe in the state of diacosmesis; cf. Placitis, 881 F 882 A (= Aëtius, i. 7. 33 = S. V. F. ii, frag. 1027), Diogenes Laertius, vii. 137 ( = S. V. F. ii, frag. 526), Stoicorum Repugnantiis, 1052 C ( = S. V. F. ii, frags. 1068 and 604), Communibus Notitiis 1075 A - C ( = S. V. F. ii, frag. 1049), and S. V. F. ii, frags. 1052, 1053, and 1056.) So look out and reflect, good sir, lest in rearranging and removing each thing to its natural location you contrive a dissolution of the cosmos and bring upon things the Strife of Empedocles — or rather lest you arouse against nature the ancient Titans and Giants[*](The Strife of Empedocles is connected with the mythical war of the Giants by Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem Comment. p. 849, 13-15 (ed. Cousin, Paris, 1864) = p. 659 (ed. Stallbaum).) and long to look upon that legendary and dreadful disorder and discord [when you have separated] all that is heavy and [all] that is light.

The suns bright aspect is not there descried, No, nor the shaggy might of earth, nor sea

as Empedocles says.[*](Empedocles, frag. B 27 (i, pp. 323. 11-324. 4 [DielsKranz]), where the ὠκέα γυῖα given by Simplicius is adopted instead of Plutarch’s ἀγλαὸν εἶδος. Bignone, however, who prints the lines given by Plutarch as frag. 26 a and those given by Simplicius as frag. 27, is probably right in taking this to be one of the lines which were repeated with a different ending in two different parts of the poem (Empedocle, studio critico, pp. 220 ff., 421, 599 ff.). Certainly Plutarch represents his quotation as describing the period when Strife has completely separated the four roots, whereas Simplicius says that his comes from the description of the Sphere, when all were thoroughly intermingled.) Earth had no part in heat, water no part in air; there was not anything heavy above or anything light below; but the principles of all things[*](i.e. the four roots, earth, air, fire, and water, for the separation of which by Strife cf. Empedocles, frags. B 17. 8-10 and B 26. 6-9 (i, p. 316. 2-4 and p. 323. 4-7 [DielsKranz]).) were untempered and unamiable[*](From this Mullach manufactured for Empedocles the verse that he numbered 174 (Frag. Phil. Graec. i, p. 5). Stein took only ἄκρατοι καὶ ἄστοργοι to be a quotation. The word ἄστοργος appears nowhere in the fragments of Empedocles (though στοργή does in frag. B 109 [i, p. 351. 22, DielsKranz]), whereas Plutarch uses it several times in other connections (Amatorius, 750 F, Quaest. Nat. 917 D, Sollertia Animalium, 970 B).) and solitary, not accepting combination or association with one another, but avoiding and shunning one another and moving with their own peculiar and arbitrary motions[*](cf. Clara Millerd, On the Interpretation of Empedocles, p. 54, and Cherniss, Aristotle’s Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, p. 175, n. 130. Plutarch’s circumstantial account of the motion of the four roots during the complete dominance of Strife is coloured by the passage of Plato to which he refers.) they were in the state in which, according to Plato,[*](Timaeus, 53 B; cf. Defectu Oraculorum, 430 D, and An. Proc. in Timaeo, 1016 F.) everything is from which God is absent, that is to say in which bodies are when mind or soul is wanting. So they were until desire came over nature providentially, for Affection arose or Aphrodite or Eros, as Empedocles says and Parmenides and Hesiod,[*](cf.Amatorius, 756 D - F, where Empedocles, frag. B 17. 20-21 (i, p. 317. 1-2 [Diels-Kranz]), and Parmenides, frag. B 13 (i, p. 243. 16 [Diels-Kranz]) are quoted, and Hesiod, Theogony, 120 is referred to; and cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 984 B 23 985 A 10. With Plutarchs εκ προνοιάς contrast Aristotles criticism of Empedocles (Metaphysics, 1000 B 1217) and cf. Empedocles, frags. B 17. 29 and B 30 (i, p. 317. 10 and p. 325. 10-12 [Diels-Kranz]). By εκ προνοιάς here Plutarch prepares the way for his use in the next paragraph of the Stoic doctrine of providence against the Stoic doctrine of natural place.) in order that by changing position and interchanging functions and by being constrained some to motion and some to rest and compelled to give way and shift from the natural to the better [the bodies] might produce a universal concord and community.

If not a single one of the parts of the cosmos ever got into an unnatural condition but each one is naturally situated, requiring no transposition or rearrangement and having required none in the beginning either, I cannot make out what use there is of providence[*](On the importance of providence in Stoic doctrine and its ubiquity in Stoic writings cf. Stoicorum Repugnantiis, 1050 A - B ( = S. V. F. ii, frag. 937), 1051 E ( = S. V. F. ii, frag. 1115); Communibus Notitiis, 1075 E ( = S. V. F. ii, frag. 1126), 1077 D - E ( = S. V. F. ii, frag. 1064); Cicero, Natura Deorum, iii. 92 ( = S. V. F. ii, frag. 1107); Diogenes Laertius, vii. 138-139 ( = S. V. F. ii, frag. 634).) or of what Zeus, the master-craftsman[*](Plutarch ascribes to Pindar this epithet of Zeus in Quaest. Conviv 618 B, Sera Numinis Vindicta, 550 A, Communibus Notitiis, 1065 E, and in Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae, 807 C uses it of the statesman; cf. Pindar, frag. 48, Bowra = 57, Bergk and Schroeder = 66, Turyn.)

is maker and father-creator.[*](This terminology is more Platonic than Stoic: cf. Quaest. Conviv 720 B - C, An. Proc. in Timaeo, 1017 A; cf. Timaeus, 28 C and contrast S. V. F. ii, frag. 323 a.) In an army, certainly, tacticians are useless if each one of the soldiers should know of himself his post and position and the moment when he must take and keep them. Gardeners and builders are useless too if here water all of itself naturally moves to the things that require it and irrigates them with its stream, and there bricks and timbers and stones by following their natural inclinations and tendencies assume of themselves their appropriate position and arrangement. If, however, this notion eliminates providence forthwith and if the arrangement of existing things pertains to God and [the] distributing of them too,[*](cf.Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1075 A 11-15, and Diogenes Laertius, vii. 137 ( = S. V. F. ii, frag. 526): (θεός) δημιουργὸς ὣν τῆς διακοσμήσεως.) what wonder is there that nature has been so marshalled and disposed that here in our region there is fire but the stars are yonder and again that earth is here but the moon is established on high, held fast by the bonds of reason which are firmer than the bonds of nature?[*](Wyttenbach’s correction is assured by Timaeus, 41 B 4-6, of which this is meant to be an echo.) For, if all things really must follow their natural inclinations and move with their natural motions, you must order the sun not to revolve and Venus too and every other star as well, for light and fiery bodies move naturally upwards and not in a circle.[*](The Stoics held that the heavenly bodies consist of fire, which, though they call it αἰθήρ, is not a fifth essence like Aristotle’s (cf. Diogenes Laertius, vii. 137 = S. V. F. ii, frag. 580; S. V. F. ii, frag. 682). In Stoicorum Repugnantiis, 1053 E Plutarch quotes Chrysippus to the effect that τὸ πῦρ ἀβαρὲς ὂν ἀνωφερς εἶναι ( = S. V. F. ii, frag. 434). In accordance with this, he here argues, the Stoics are not justified in explaining the circular motion of the heavenly bodies as natural in the way that Aristotle did.) If, however, nature includes such variation in accordance with location that fire, though it is seen to move upwards here, as soon as it has reached the heavens revolves along with their rotation, what wonder is there that the same thing has happened to heavy and earthy bodies that have got there and that they too have been reduced by the environment to a different kind of motion? For it certainly cannot be that heaven naturally deprives light objects of their upward motion but is unable to master objects that are heavy and have a downward inclination; on the contrary, by [whatever] influence it rearranged the former it rearranged the latter too and employed the nature of both of them for the better.

What is more, if we are finally to throw off the habits [and] opinions that have held our minds in thrall and fearlessly to say what really appears to be the case, no part of a whole all by itself seems to have any order, position, or motion of its own which could be called unconditionally natural. [*](cf. Plutarch, frag. vii. 15 (Bernardakis, vol. vii, p. 31. 6 ff. = Olympiodorus, In Phaedonem, p. 157. 22-25 [Norvin]).) On the contrary, each and every such part, whenever its motion is usefully and properly accommodated to that for the sake of which the part has come to be and which is the purpose of its growth or production, and whenever it acts or is affected or disposed so that it contributes to the preservation or beauty or function

of that thing, then, I believe, it has its natural position and motion and disposition. In man, at any rate, who is the result of natural process if any being is, the heavy and earthy parts are above, chiefly in the region of the head, and the hot and fiery parts are in the middle regions; some of the teeth grow from above and some from below, and neither set is contrary to nature; and it cannot be said that the fire which flashes in the eyes above is natural whereas that in the bowels and heart is contrary to nature, but each has been assigned its proper and useful station. Observe, as Empedocles says, [*](The two lines here quoted and the line that preceded them are quoted together in support of the same contention in Quaest. Conviv 618 B = Empedocles, frag. B 76 (i, p. 339. 9-11 [Diels-Kranz]).) the nature of Tritons and tortoises with hides of stone and of all testaceans, Thoult see earth there established over flesh; and the stony matter does not oppress or crush the constitution[*](For ἕξις = the bodily constitution cf. Quaest. Conviv. 625 A - B, 680 D, 681 E; Amatorius, 764 C.) on which it is superimposed, nor on the other hand does the heat by reason of lightness fly off to the upper region and escape, but they have been somehow intermingled and organically combined in accordance with the nature of each.