De Heroditi malignate
Plutarch
Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals, Vol. IV. Goodwin, William W., editor; A.G., translator. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company; Cambridge: Press of John Wilson and Son, 1874.
Moreover, those who will directly speak ill of any one incur the reproach of moroseness, rashness, and madness, unless they keep within measure. But they who send forth calumnies obliquely, as if they were shooting arrows out of corners, and then stepping back think to conceal themselves by saying they do not believe what they most earnestly desire to have believed, whilst they disclaim all malice, condemn themselves also of farther disingenuity.
Next to these are they who with their reproaches intermix some praises, as did Aristoxenus, who, having termed Socrates unlearned, ignorant, and libidinous, added, Yet was he free from injustice. For, as they who flatter artificially and craftily sometimes mingle light reprehensions with their many and great praises, joining this liberty of speech as a sauce to their flattery; so malice, that it may gain belief to its accusations, adds also praise.
We might here also reckon up more notes; but these are sufficient to let us understand the nature and manners of Herodotus.