Praecepta gerendae reipublicae

This essay is addressed to Menemachus, a young man who has asked Plutarch for advice concerning public life. Nothing further is known of the young man, except that Pardalas of Sardis is mentioned as his fellow-citizen (813 f; 825 d); but some of those to whom Plutarch’s various essays are addressed are known to be real persons, and it is, therefore, probable that Menemachus also actually existed. Plutarch held at different times various public offices, and moreover he was highly regarded by his fellowcitizens and many others as a guide, philosopher, and friend; it is, therefore, not unnatural that a young man who was thinldng of entering upon a political career should appeal to him for advice and counsel, though it is also possible that Plutarch wrote the essay without being asked to do so and addressed it to Menemachus merely as a matter of form.

There is nothing profoundly philosophical and very little purely theoretical to be found here. Greece, like most of the known world, was a part of the Roman Empire, and the exercise of statecraft on a large scale was virtually limited to Romans. The ancient Greek city-states retained, however, their local self-government, subject to the supervision of the proconsul; they could enter into agreements with each other, and could send envoys to Rome if

occasion arose. A man could, therefore, find useful and honourable occupation in public life, as Plutarch himself did. Although he frequently uses the great men of the great days of Greece as examples, Plutarch gives the sort of advice which would be useful to one engaged insuch political activity as was open to a Greek in his time. Some of his advice is applicable only to his own times and its conditions, but the politician or statesman of any age may recognize many of his precepts as common sense, the application of which is limited to no time or place. The essay is, then, of interest, not only because it throws a sidelight upon the conditions in Greece in Plutarch’s time, but also on account of its own inherent value.

The reference to troubles which took place recently under Domitian (815 d, Chapter 19) may indicate that the essay was written not long after a.d. 96, the date of Domitian’s death.

If, Menemachus, it is suitable to apply to anything at all the saying

1. No one of all the Achaeans finds fault with the words thou hast uttered,
2. Nor will oppose them in speech; and yet thou hast reached no conclusion,[*](Homer, Il. ix. 55; cf. Moralia, 795 b.)

it may be applied to those philosophers who urge people to take lessons from them, but give no real instruction or advice; for they are like those who trim the lamps, but fail to pour in oil. Therefore, seeing that the desire has been aroused in you a

Speaker of speeches to be, and also a doer of actions[*](Homer, Il. ix. 443; cf. Moralia, 795 e.)

in your native State, as befits your noble birth, since you have not time to gain an understanding of a philosopher’s life in the open among affairs of State and public conflicts or to be a spectator of examples worked out in deed, not merely in word, and since you ask for some precepts of statecraft, I think it is not at all fitting that I should refuse, and I pray that the result may be worthy of your zeal and of my goodwill; and, as you requested, I have made use of a rather large variety of examples.

First, then, at the base of political activity there

must be, as a firm and strong foundation, a choice of policy arising from judgement and reason, not from mere impulse due to empty opinion or contentiousness or lack of other activities. For just as those who have no useful occupation at home spend most of their time in the market-place, even if there is nothing they need there, just so some men, because they have no business of their own that is worth serious attention, throw themselves into public affairs, treating political activity as a pastime, and many who have become engaged in public affairs by chance and have had enough of them are no longer able to retire from them without difficulty; they are in the same predicament as persons who have gone aboard a vessel to be rocked a bit and then have been driven out into the open sea; they turn their gaze outside, seasick and much disturbed, but obliged to stay where they are and endure their present plight.

1. Over the bright calm sea
2. The fair-faced loves went past them to the mad
3. Outrage of the ship’s oars that plough the deep.[*](Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec. iii. p. 396, ascribed to Simonides.)

These men cast the greatest discredit upon public life by regretting their course and being unhappy when, after hoping for glory, they have fallen into disgrace or, after expecting to be feared by others on account of their power, they are drawn into affairs which involve dangers and popular disorders. But the man who has entered upon public life from conviction and reasoning, as the activity most befitting him and most honourable, is not frightened by any of these things, nor is his conviction changed. For neither is it right to enter upon public life as a gainful trade, as Stratocles and Dromocleides and their set used to invite each other to come to the golden harvest (for so they called the orators’ platform in jest); nor ought we to enter upon it as if wTe were suddenly seized by an onset of strong emotion, as Gaius Gracchus did, who, when his brother’s misfortunes were still fresh, withdrew so far as possible from public affairs and then, inflamed by anger because certain persons insulted and reviled him, rushed into public life. And although he was quickly satiated with public affairs and fame, yet when he tried to stop and wished for a change and a quiet life, he found that his power was too great to be laid down but before he could lay it down he perished. And those who make themselves up for political competition or the race for glory, as actors do for the stage, must necessarily regret their action, since they must either serve those whom they think they should rule or offend those whom they wish to please. On the contrary, I believe that those who, like men who fall into a well, stumble into public life by mere chance and unexpectedly must be cast into confusion and regret their course, whereas those who enter into it quietly, as the result of preparation and reflection, will be moderate in their conduct of affairs and will not be discomposed by anything, inasmuch as they have honour itself and nothing else as the purpose of their actions.

So, after thus determining their choice in their own minds and making it invariable and unchangeable, statesmen must apply themselves to the understanding of the character of the citizens, which shows itself as in the highest degree a compound of all their individual characters and is powerful. For any attempt

on the part of the statesman to produce by himself at the very outset a change of character and nature in the people will not easily succeed, nor is it safe, but it is a matter that requires a long space of time and great power. But just as wine is at first controlled by the character of the drinker but gradually, as it warms his whole body and becomes mingled therewith, itself forms the drinker’s character and changes him, just so the statesman, until he has by his reputation and by public confidence in him built up his leadership, must accommodate himself to the people’s character as he finds it and make that the object of his efforts, knowing by what things the people is naturally pleased and led. For example, the Athenian populace is easily moved to anger, easily turned to pity, more willing to suspect quickly than to be informed at leisure; as they are readier to help humble persons of no reputation, so they welcome and especially esteem facetious and amusing speeches; while they take most delight in those who praise them, they are least inclined to be angry with those who make fun of them; they are terrible even to their chief magistrates, then kindly even to their enemies. Quite different is the character of the Carthaginian people; it is bitter, sullen, subservient to their magistrates, harsh to their subjects, most abject when afraid, most savage when enraged, stubborn in adhering to its decisions, disagreeable and hard in its attitude towards playfulness and urbanity. Never would these people, if a Cleon had asked them to postpone the meeting of the assembly on the ground that he had made sacrifice and had guests to entertain,[*](The story of the adjournment of the assembly is told by Plutarch in the Life of Nicias, chap. vii. p. 527.) have adjourned the meeting amid laughter and the clapping of hands; nor would they, when a quail escaped from Alcibiades’ cloak while he was speaking, have joined eagerly in hunting it down and then have given it back to him[*](See Life of Alcibiades, chap. x. p. 195.); no, they would have put them both to death for their insolence and their flippancy, seeing that they banished Hanno on the charge of aspiring to be tyrant, because he used a lion on his campaigns to carry his luggage! And I do not believe that the Thebans either, if they had obtained control of their enemies’ letters, would have refrained from reading them, as the Athenians, when they captured Philip’s mail-carriers with a letter addressed to Olympias, refrained from breaking the seal and making known an affectionate private message of an absent husband to his wife. Nor, on the other hand, do I believe that the Athenians would have borne with good temper the contemptuous pride of Epameinondas, when he refused to reply to the accusation against him but rose from his seat and went out from the theatre through the assembly to the gymnasium. And I think, too, that the Spartans would have been far from enduring the insolence and buffoonery of Stratocles, who persuaded the Athenians to make sacrifices on the ground that they had won a victory, and then, after a true report of their defeat had been received, when they were angry with him, asked the people what wrong he had done them seeing that, thanks to him, they had been happy for three days.[*](Cf. Life of Demetrius, chap. xi.) Now court flatterers, like bird-catchers, by imitating the voices of kings and assimilating themselves to them, insinuate themselves deeply into their good graces and decoy them by deceit; but for the statesman it is fitting, not to imitate the character of his people, but to understand it and to employ for each type those means by which it can be brought under his control. For ignorance of their characters leads to no less serious mistakes and failures in free States than in the friendships of kings.

So, then, the statesman who already has attained to power and has won the people’s confidence should try to train the character of the citizens, leading them gently towards that which is better and treating them with mildness; for it is a difficult task to change the multitude. But do you yourself, since you are henceforth to live as on an open stage, educate your character and put it in order; and if it is not easy wholly to banish evil from the soul, at any rate remove and repress those faults which are most flourishing and conspicuous. For you know the story that Themistocles, when he was thinking of entering upon public life, withdrew from drinking-parties and carousals; he was wakeful at night, was sober and deeply thoughtful, explaining to his friends that Miltiades’ trophy[*](Militiades was the victorious general at Marathon, 490 b.c.) would not let him sleep. And Pericles also changed his personal habits of life, so that he walked slowly, spoke gently, always showed a composed countenance, kept his hand under his cloak, and trod only one path - that which led to the assembly and the senate. For a populace is not a simple and easy thing for any chance person to subject to that control which is salutary; but one must be satisfied if the multitude accept authority without shying, like a suspicious and capricious beast, at face or voice. Since, then, the statesman must not treat even these matters carelessly, ought he to neglect the things which affect his life and character,

that they may be clear of blame and ill report of every kind? For not only are men in public life held responsible for their public words and actions, but people busy themselves with all their concerns: dinner, love affair, marriage, amusement, and every serious interest. What need is there, for instance, to speak of Alcibiades, who, though he was most active of all the citizens in public affairs and was undefeated as general, was ruined by his audacious and dissolute habits in private life, and, because of his extravagance and lack of restraint, deprived the State of the benefit of his other good qualities? Why, the Athenians blamed Cimon for wine-drinking, and the Romans, having nothing else to say, blamed Scipio[*](cf. Moralia, 972 f.) for sleeping; and the enemies of Pompey the Great, observing that he scratched his head with one finger, reviled him for it.[*](cf. Moralia, 89 e, with note a in Babbitt’s translation (L.C.L.), where the habit is spoken of as a mark of effeminacy and licentiousness.) For, just as a mole or a wart on the face is more unpleasant than brandmarks, mutilations, or scars on other parts of the body, so small faults appear great when observed in the lives of leaders and statesmen on account of the opinion which the majority has of governing and public office, regarding it as a great thing which ought to be clean of all eccentricities and errors. With good reason, therefore, did Livius Drusus the tribune gain inreputation because, when many parts of his house were exposed to the view of his neighbours and an artisan promised to turn them the other way and change their position for only five talents, Drusus replied, Take ten and make the whole house open to view, that all the citizens may see how I live. For he was a man of temperate and well-ordered life. And perhaps he had no need of that exposure to the public view; for the people see through the characters, counsels, acts, and lives of public men, even those that seem to be very thickly cloaked; they love and admire one man and dislike and despise another quite as much for his private as for his public practices.

But, you say, do not States put in office men who live licentiously and wantonly? They do, and pregnant women often long for stones, and seasick persons for salt pickles and the like, which then a little later they spew out and detest. So the people of democracies, because of the luxury of their own lives or through sheer perversity, or for lack of better leaders, make use of those who happen to turn up, though they loathe and despise them, then take pleasure in hearing such things said about them as the comic poet Plato puts into the mouth of the People itself:

1. Take, take my hand as quickly as you can;
2. I’m going to choose Agyrrhius general[*](Kock, Com. Att. Frag. i. p. 652, no. 185; on Agyrrhius cf. Aristophanes, Plutus, 176.);

and again, when he makes the People ask for a basin and a feather in order to vomit and then say,

Beside my platform Mantias takes his stand,[*](From the same play as the preceding.)

and

It feeds foul Cephalus, most hateful pest.[*](From the same play as the preceding.)

And the Roman people, when Carbo promised something and confirmed his promise with an oath and a curse, unanimously took a counter-oath that it did not trust him. And at Lacedaemon, when a dissolute man named Demosthenes made a desirable motion, the people rejected it, but the ephors chose by lot one of the elders and told him to make that same motion, in order that it might be made acceptable to the people, thus pouring, as it were, from a dirty vessel into a clean one. So great is the importance, in a free State, of confidence or lack of confidence in a man’s character.

However, we should not on this account neglect the charm and power of eloquence and ascribe everything to virtue, but, considering oratory to be, not the creator of persuasion but certainly its coworker, we should correct Menander’s line,

The speaker’s nature, not his speech, persuades,[*](Kock, Com. Att. Frag. iii. p. 135, no. 472.)

for both his nature and his speech do so; unless, indeed, one is to affirm that just as the helmsman, not the tiller, steers the ship, and the rider, not the rein, turns the horse, so political virtue, employing, not speech, but the speaker’s character as tiller or rein, sways a State, laying hold of it and directing it, as it were, from the stern, which is, in fact, as Plato says,[*](Critias, 109 c only it was not our bodies that they [the gods] constrained by bodily force, like shepherds guiding ther flocks by stroke of staff, but they directed from the stern, where the living creature is easiest to turn about (ᾗ μάλιστα εὔστροφον ζῷον), laying hold on the soul by persuasion, as by a rudder, according to their own disposition (trans. R. G. Bury in L.C.L.).) the easiest way of turning an animal about. For those great and, as Homer calls them, Zeus-descended kings pad themselves out with purple robes and sceptres and guards and divine oracles, and although they enslaved the multitude by their grandeur, as if they were superior beings, they wished nevertheless to be speakers of words and they did not neglect the charm of speech,

Nor the assemblies in which men make themselves greatly distinguished,[*](Homer, Il. ix. 441.)

and they worshipped not only Zeus of the Council, Ares Enyalius, and Athena of War, but they invoked also Calliopê,

who accompanies reverend monarchs,[*](Hesiod, Theog. 80.)

softening by persuasion and overcoming by charms the fierce and violent spirit of the people. How, then, is it possible that a private person of ordinary costume and mien who wishes to lead a State may gain power and rule the multitude unless he possesses persuasion and attractive speech? Now the pilots of ships employ others to give orders to the rowers, but the statesman needs to have in himself the mind that steers and also in himself the speech that gives orders, that he may not require some other man’s voice and be obliged to say, as Iphicrates did when defeated through the eloquence of Aristophon’s orators, My opponents’ actor is better, but superior my play, and may not often need those lines of Euripides,

Oh that the seed of wretched men were mute,[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. p. 678, no. 987.)

and

1. Ah, would that deeds of men possessed a voice,
2. That clever speakers might become as naught[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. p. 494, no. 439, from the first Hippolytus.);

for these sayings ought perhaps to be granted as a refuge to Alcamenes, Nesiotes, Ictinus,[*](Alcamenes and Nesiotes were sculptors of the fifth century b.c. Ictinus was architect of the Parthenon.) and all artisans and craftsmen if they take an oath that they are no speakers; as once at Athens, when two architects were being questioned with a view to a public work, one of them, a wheedling and elegant speaker, moved the people by declaiming a prepared speech about the construction of it, but the other, who was a better architect but lacked the power of speech, came forward and said: Men of Athens, what he has said, I will do. For, as Sophocles says,[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. p. 309, no. 760, perhaps from the satyr drama Pandora.) only those are servants of the goddess of artistry who on the anvil with a heavy hammer and with blows work the yielding and inanimate material of their art. But the spokesman for Athena of the City and Themis of Counsel,

She who dismisses assemblies of men and who also convenes them,[*](Homer, Od. ii. 69.)

employing speech as his only instrument, moulding and adapting some things and softening and smoothing off those which are hindrances to his work, such as would be knots in wood or flaws in iron,[*](cf. Plato, Sophist, 267 e.) is an ornament to the city. For this reason the government in Pericles’ time was in name, as Thucydides says,[*](Thucydides, ii. 65. 8.) a democracy, but in fact the rule of the foremost man, because of his power of speech. For Cimon also was a good man, as were Ephialtes and Thucydides, but when the last named was asked by Archidamus King of the Spartans whether he or Pericles was the better wrestler, he replied, Nobody can tell; for whenever I throw him in wrestling, he says he was not thrown and wins by persuading the onlookers. And this brought not only reputation to Pericles but safety to the State; for while it was swayed by him it preserved its existing prosperity and refrained from foreign entanglements. But Nicias, whose policy was the same, but who lacked such power of persuasion and tried to rein in the people with speech as easy as a snaffle, could not restrain or master it, but against his will went off to Sicily on its back and together with it came a cropper. The wolf, they say, cannot be held by the ears; but one must lead a people or a State chiefly by the ears, not, as some do who have no practice in speaking and seek uncultured and inartistic holds upon the people, pulling them by the belly by means of banquets or gifts of money or arranging ballet-dances or gladiatorial shows, by which they lead the common people or rather curry favour with them, tor leadership of a people is leadership of those who are persuaded by speech; but enticing the mob by such means as have just been mentioned is exactly like catching and herding irrational beasts.

The speech of the statesman, however, must not be juvenile and theatrical, as if he were making a speech for show and weaving a garland of delicate and flowery words; on the other hand it must not, as Pytheas said of the speech of Demosthenes, smell of the lamp and elaborate literary labour, with sharp arguments and with periods precisely measured by rule and compass. No, just as musicians demand that the touch upon the strings exhibit feeling,

not mere technique, so the speech of the statesman, counsellor, and ruler must not exhibit shrewdness or subtlety, and it must not be to his credit to speak fluently or artistically or distributively,[*](These seem to be somewhat technical words employed by the rhetoricians.) but his speech must be full of unaffected character, true high-mindedness, a father’s frankness, foresight, and thoughtful concern for others. His speech must also have, in a good cause, a charm that pleases and a winning persuasiveness; in addition to nobility of purpose it must possess grace arising from stately diction and appropriate and persuasive thoughts. And political oratory, much more than that used in a court of law, admits maxims, historical and mythical tales, and metaphors, by means of which those who employ them sparingly and at the proper moment move their audiences exceedingly; as did he who said Do not make Hellas one-eyed,[*](cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, iii. 1017, p. 1411 a; said by the Athenian orator Leptines, in opposing the destruction of Sparta, one of the eyes of Greece. ) and Demades when he said he was governing the wreck of the State,[*](Cf. Life of Phocion, chap. i.) and Archilochus saying

1. Nor let the stone of Tantalus
2. Hang o’er the head of this our isle,[*](Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec. ii. p. 396.)

and Pericles when he bade the Athenians to remove the eyesore of the Peiraeus,[*](Cf. Life of Pericles, chap. viii. The references is to Aegina, whose thriving commerce threatened the prosperity of the Peiraeus.) and Phocion when he said with reference to the victory of Leosthenes that the furlong race of the war was good, but he was fearful about the long-distance race.[*](Cf. Life of Phocion, chap. xxiii.) And, in general, loftiness and grandeur of style are more fitting for political speech; examples are the Philippics and among the speeches in Thucydides that of the ephor Sthenelaïdas, that of King Archidamns at Plataea, and that of Pericles after the pestilence.[*](Thucydides, i. 86; ii. 72; ii. 60.) But as for the rhetorical efforts and grand periods of Ephorus, Theopompus, and Anaximenes, which they deliver after they have armed and drawn up the armies, it can be said of them,

None talks so foolishly when near the steel.[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. p. 441, l. 22; from the Autolycus of Euripides.)

It is true, however, that derision and ridicule are sometimes proper parts of the statesman’s speech if employed, not as insults or buffoonery, but for needful reproof and disparagement. That sort of thing is most laudable in rejoinders and replies; for when employed of set purpose and without provocation, it makes the speaker appear to be a clown and carries with it a suspicion of malice, such as was attached to the ridicule in the speeches of Cicero, Cato the Elder, and Aristotle’s pupil Euxitheüs, all of whom frequently employed ridicule without previous provocation. But for one who employs it in self-defence the occasion makes it pardonable and at the same time pleasing, as when Demosthenes, in reply to a man who was suspected of being a thief and who mocked him for writing at night, said, I am aware that I offend you by keeping a light burning, and to Demades who shouted, Demosthenes would correct me - the sow correcting Athena, he replied, Yes, your Athena was caught in adultery last year Athena was a proverbial expression; cf. Theocritus, Idyl, v. 23. As sus (docet) Minervam the proverb was current in Latin; cf. Festus, p. 310 Müller, p. 408 Lindsay; Cicero, Ad Familiares, ix. 18. 3; Academica, i. 4. 18; De Oratore, ii. 57. 233.) Witty too was Xenaenetus’s rejoinder to the citizens who reviled him for running away when he was general, Yes,

to keep you company, my dears. But in jesting one must guard against going too far and against offending one’s hearers by jesting at the wrong moment or making the speaker appear ignoble and mean-spirited, as Democrates did; for he went up into the assembly and said that he, like the State, had little strength but much bluster, and at the time of the disaster at Chaeroneia he came forward among the people and said, I wish the State had not met with so great a misfortune as to make you listen even to me as adviser, for this remark showed him to be mean-spirited, the other to be crazy, and neither is becoming to a statesman. But in Phocion conciseness of speech was admired. At any rate Polyeuctus declared that Demosthenes was the greatest orator, but Phocion the cleverest in speaking, because his speech contained the most meaning in the fewest words. And Demosthenes, though he despised the other orators, used to say when Phocion rose to speak, The cleaver of my speeches is getting up.

Most of all, then, try to employ in addressing the people well-considered, not empty, speech, and to use precaution, knowing that even the great Pericles used to pray before making a public speech that no single utterance foreign to the matter in hand might occur to him. But nevertheless the orator must always keep his speech nimble and in good practice for making apt rejoinders; for occasions arise quickly and often bring with them in public affairs sudden developments. That is why Demosthenes was inferior to many, as they say, because he drew back and hesitated when the occasion called for the opposite course. And Theophrastus tells us that Alcibiades,[*](Cf. Life of Alcibiades, chap. x.) because he planned, not only to say

the right thing, but to say it in the right way, often while actually speaking would search for words and arrange them into sentences, thereby causing hesitation and failure. But the man who is so moved by the events which take place and the opportunities which offer themselves that he springs to his feet is the one who most thrills the crowd, attracts it, and carries it with him. So it was, for example, with Leo[*](The name Leo, lion, made the little man seem ridiculous.) of Byzantium; he once came to address the Athenians when they were in political discord, and when they laughed at him because he was a little man, he said, What if you should see my wife, who hardly comes up to my knee? Then when they laughed louder, And yet, he said, little as we are, when we quarrel with each other, the city of Byzantium is not big enough to hold us. So also when Pytheas the orator was speaking in opposition to the granting of honours to Alexander and someone said to him, Do you, at your age, dare to speak on such important matters? he replied: And yet Alexander is younger than I, and you are voting to make him a god.

And the statesman must bring to the struggle of statecraft - a struggle which is not unimportant, but calls for all one’s fighting power - speech which is severely trained in firmness of voice and strength of lungs, that he may not be frequently so weary and burnt out as to be defeated by some

Rapacious bawler with a torrent’s voice.[*](Aristophanes, Knights, 137. The reference is to Cleon.)

Cato, when he had no hope of winning his cause by persuasion because the popular assembly or the senate was gained over beforehand by favours and interests, used to get up and speak the whole day, thus destroying his opponents’ opportunity. On the subject, then, of the preparation of one’s speech and the way to use it these remarks are enough for one who has the ability to go on and discover the conclusions to be drawn from them.

There are two entrances to public life and two paths leading to it: one the quick and brilliant road to reputation, by no means without risk, the other more prosaic and slower, but safer. For some men launch out at once into political life with some conspicuous, great, and daring action, like men who launch a vessel from a promontory that juts out into the sea; they think Pindar is right in saying

1. To a work’s beginning we needs must set
2. A front that shines afar,[*](Od. vi. 4. The translation is adapted from that of Sir John Sandys (L.C.L.).)

for the masses are more ready to accept the beginner because they are so palled and surfeited with those to whom they are accustomed, just as spectators at a show are glad to accept a new performer; and authority and power that has a brilliant and rapid growth takes envy’s breath away. For, as Ariston says, fire does not cause smoke, nor reputation envy, if it blazes up quickly at the start, but those who grow great gradually and slowly are attacked one from one side, another from another; hence many men before coming to full bloom as public speakers have withered away. But if, as is said of Ladas,

The noise o’ the barrier’s fall was in his ears[*](Paton’s translation (in L.C.L.) of the phrase in Anth. Pal. xi. 86 on Pericles, quoted from the earlier epigram on Ladas, a famous runner of Sparta. The sudden cutting or loosening of the taut rope stretched across the starting-line was accompanied by an audible sound. See E. N. Gardiner, Jour. Hell. Studies xxiii. p. 262.)

even when he has been crowned for Ms brilliant success on an embassy, for a notable triumph, or for achievement as a general, in such instances neither those who envy a man nor those who despise him have so much power as before. In this way Aratus arrived at fame, beginning his public life with the destruction of the tyrant Nicocles; so Alcibiades, by making the Mantinean alliance against the Lacedaemonians. Pompey demanded a triumph although he had not yet been admitted to the senate, and when Sulla voted against it, he said, More worship the rising than the setting sun; and Sulla, when he heard this, withdrew his opposition. And take the case of Cornelius Scipio; it was not because of any chance beginning that the Roman people suddenly and contrary to law appointed him consul when he wTas a candidate for the aedileship, but rather because they admired his victorious single combat in Iberia when he was a mere youth, and his deeds a little later at Carthage as military tribune, about which Cato the Elder exclaimed

He and he only has sense, the rest are mere flickering shadows.[*](Homer, Od. xi. 495 (slightly changed).)

Nowadays, then, when the affairs of the cities no longer include leadership in wars, nor the overthrowing of tyrannies, nor acts of alliances, what opening for a conspicuous and brilliant public career could a young man find? There remain the public lawsuits and embassies to the Emperor, which demand a man of ardent temperament and one who possesses both courage and intellect. But there are many excellent lines of endeavour that are neglected in our cities which a man may take up, and also many practices resulting from evil custom, that have insinuated themselves to the shame or injury of the city, which a man may remove, and thus turn them to account for himself. Indeed in past times a just verdict gained in a great suit, or good faith in acting as advocate for a weak client against a powerful opponent, or boldness of speech in behalf of the right against a wicked ruler, has opened to some men a glorious entrance into public life. And not a few also have grown great through the enemies they have made by attacking men whose position made them enviable or caused them to be feared; for when such a man is overthrown his power passes at once, and with better reputation, to the man who overcame him. For attacking, through motives of envy, a good man who, on account of his virtue, is leader of the state, as Pericles was attacked by Simmias, Themistocles by Alcmeon, Pompey by Clodius, and Epameinondas by Menecleides the orator, is neither conducive to a good reputation nor advantageous in any other way; for when the people have committed a wrong against a good man and then (which happens quickly) repent of their anger, they think the easiest way to excuse themselves for this offence is the most just, namely, to destroy the man who was the author of it and persuaded them to commit it. On the other hand, to revolt against a bad man who by shameless audacity and cunning has made the city subject to himself, such as Cleon and Cleophon were at Athens, and to pull him down and humble him provides a glorious entrance upon the stage of public life. And I am not ignorant of the fact that some men by curtailing the power of an oppressive and oligarchical senate, as Ephialtes did at Athens and Phormio at Elis, have gained at the same time both power and glory; but to one who is just entering upon public life there is a great risk in this. Therefore Solon made a better beginning, when the State was divided into three factions called the Diacrians (hillfolk), the Pedieans (plainsfolk), and the Paralians (coastfolk); for he entangled himself with none of them, but acted for all in common and said and did everything to bring about concord among them, so that he was chosen lawgiver to reconcile their differences and in this way established his rule.[*](cf. Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, chap. v.) So many, then, and of such kinds are the more conspicuous ways of entering upon a public career.

But the safe and leisurely way has been chosen by many famous men - Aristeides, Phocion, Pammenes the Theban, Lucullus at Rome, Cato, the Lacedaemonian Agesilaüs. For just as ivy rises by twining itself about a strong tree, so each of these men, by attaching himself while still young to an older man and while still obscure to a man of reputation, being gradually raised up under the shelter of his power and growing great with him, fixed himself firmly and rooted himself in the affairs of State. For Aristeides was made great by Cleisthenes, Phocion by Chabrias, Lucullus by Sulla, Cato by Maximus, Epameinondas aided Pammenes, and Lysander Agesilaüs. But Agesilaüs through untimely ambition and jealousy of Lysander’s reputation insulted and quickly cast aside the guide of his actions; but the others in noble and statesmanlike fashion cherished their teachers until

the end and joined in honouring them, enhancing in turn with their own radiance, and illuminating, like the heavenly bodies that face the sun, that which caused themselves to shine. Certainly Scipio’s detractors said that he was the actor, but his friend Laelius the real author of his deeds; Laelius, however, was not puffed up by any of those sayings but continued always eagerly to exalt Scipio’s virtue and renown. And Pompey’s friend Afranius, even though he was of humble station, nevertheless expected to be elected consul, but when Pompey favoured other candidates, he relinquished his ambition, saying that gaining the consulship would be to him not so much glorious as painful and troublesome, if it were against Pompey’s will and without his co-operation; and so after waiting only one year he both gained the office and retained the friendship.[*](Cf. Life of Pompey, chap. xliv., where another story concerning the friendship of Pompey for Afranius is told.) Those who are thus led to renown by the hand of others gain favour with many, and at the same time, if anything unpleasant happens, are less disliked; and that is why Philip advised Alexander to gain friends as long as he could while another man was king by having pleasant intercourse with others and maintaining friendly relations with them.

But anyone who is entering upon a public career should choose as his leader a man who is not merely of established reputation and powerful, but one who is all this on account of real worth. For just as not every tree will accept and support the grape-vine which entwines itself about it, but some trees stifle and ruin its growth, so in States, the men who are not lovers of what is noble, but merely lovers of honours and of office, do not afford young men opportunities for public activities, but through

envy repress them and, to speak figuratively, wither them up by depriving them of glory, their natural nourishment. So Marius, after having achieved many successes in Libya and again in Gaul with the help of Sulla, ceased to employ him and cast him off, being angered by his growth in power, but using the incident of the seal as a pretext. For Sulla, when Marius was general and he was quaestor[*](Equivalent here to adjutant.) in Libya, was sent by Marius to Bocchus and took Jugurtha prisoner; and being a young man who had just had his first taste of glory, he did not bear his good fortune with moderation, but had a seal engraved with a representation of his deed - Jugurtha surrendering to him - and wore it.[*](Cf. Life of Marius, chap. x., and Life of Sulla, chap. iii.) Marius threw this up against him and cast him off. And Sulla, transferring his allegiance to Catulus and Metellus, worthy men and opposed to Marius, quickly drove Marius out and broke his power in the civil war after he had almost overthrown Rome. Sulla, however, exalted Pompey from the time of his youth, rising up and uncovering his head when he came near; and also by giving the other young men opportunities for acts of leadership and even by urging some on against their will, he filled his armies with ambition and eagerness; and he gained power over them all by wishing to be, not the only great man, but first and greatest among many great ones. Such, then, are the men to whom young statesmen should attach themselves and cling closely, not snatching glory away from them, like Aesop’s wren who was carried up on the eagle’s shoulders, then suddenly flew out and got ahead of him, but receiving it from them in goodwill and friendship, knowing that no one can ever command well who has not first learned rightly to obey, as Plato says.[*](Laws, 762 e.)

Next after this comes the decision to be made concerning friends, and here we approve neither the idea of Themistocles nor that of Cleon. For Cleon, when he first decided to take up political life, brought his friends together and renounced his friendship with them as something which ofter weakens and perverts the right and just choice of policy in political life. But he would have done better if he had cast out from his soul avarice and love of strife and had cleansed himself of envy and malice; for the State needs, not men who have no friends or comrades, but good and self-controlled men. As it was, he drove away his friends,

But a hundred heads of cursed flatterers circling fawned[*](Aristophanes, Peace, 756. The poet refers to Cleon.)

about him, as the comic poets say; and being rough and harsh to the better classes he in turn subjected himself to the multitude in order to win its favour,

Its old age tending, dosing it with pay,[*](Quoted by Plutarch, Life of Nicias, chap. ii. p. 524. A parody by an unknown comic poet (unless it be by Aristophanes) of a line from the Peleus of Sophocles, Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. 447, p. 239. See Kock, Com. Att. Frag. iii. p. 400.)

and making the basest and most unsound element of the people his associates against;he best. But Themistocles on the other hand, when someone said that he would govern well if he showed himself equally impartial to all, replied: May I never take my seat on such a throne that my friends shall not have more from me than those who are not my friends! He also was wrong; for he put the government under pledge to his friendship, subordinating the affairs of the community and the public to private favours and interests. And yet when Simonides asked for something that was not just, he said to him: Neither is he a good poet who sings contrary to metre, nor is he an equitable ruler who grants favours contrary to law. For truly it is an outrageous and abominable thing if a pilot selects sailors and a ship-captain selects a pilot

1. Well knowing how at the stern to hold steady the tiller and also
2. How to stretch taut the yard ropes when rises the onrushing tempest,[*](cf. Callimachus, Frag. 382, p. 787, ed. Schneider.)

and an architect chooses subordinates and handicraftsmen who will not spoil his work but will co-operate to perfect it, whereas the statesman, who is, as Pindar says,[*](Pindar, Frag. 57, p. 403 Schroeder.) the best of craftsmen and the maker of lawfulness and justice, does not immediately choose friends whose convictions are I ke his own, who will aid him and share his enthusiasm for what is noble, but rather those who are always wrongfully and by violent means trying to divert him to various other uses. Such a statesman will be found to be no better than a builder or a carpenter who through ignorance and error makes use of such squares and rulers and levels as are sure to make his work crooked. For friends are the living and thinking tools of the statesman, and he ought not to slip with them when they go wrong, but he must be on the watch that they do not err even through ignorance. In fact, it was this that disgraced Solon and brought him into disrepute among the citizens; for when he made up his mind to lighten debts and to introduce the Seisachtheia[*](The cancellation of debts was one of the chief features of Solon’s reorganization of the government of Athens in the sixth century b.c. The popular term means shaking off burdens. This incident is discussed by Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, chap. vi., where Solon’s innocence of wrongdoing is maintained.) (that was the nickname for the cancellation of debts), he told his friends about it, and they did a very wrong thing; they secretly borrowed a great deal of money before the law was published, and a little later, after its publication, they were found to have bought splendid houses and much land with the money they had borrowed, and Solon, who was wronged, was accused of sharing in their wrongdoing. Agesilaüs, too, showed himself very weak and poor-spirited in dealing with his friends’ solicitations and, like Pegasus in Euripides’ drama,

Crouched down and yielded more if more he wished,[*](Euripides, Bellerophon, Frag. 309, p. 451 Nauck. Quoted in part, Moralia 529 e.)

and by too great eagerness in aiding them when in misfortunes he made himself seem like them in wrongdoing; for example, when Phoebidas was on trial for seizing the Cadmeia without orders, he got him off by saying that such things were bound to happen of their own accord; and when Sphodrias was being tried for an illegal and frightful act (for he had invaded Attica when the Athenians were friends and allies), he brought about his acquittal, being softened by the amorous pleadings of his son. And a note of his to a certain ruler is quoted as follows: If Nicias is innocent, let him go; if he is guilty, let him go for my sake; anyway, let him go.[*](cf. Moralia, 209 f.) But Phocion did not even appear in support of his son-in-law Charicles when he was accused in connexion with the Harpalus affair; he merely said: I made you my son-in-law for nothing but what is right and went away. And Timoleon of Corinth,[*](Cf. Life of Timoleon, chaps. iv., v., pp. 237, 238.) when he was unable either by instruction or by entreaty to make his brother give up his tyranny, joined with those who destroyed him. For a statesman ought, by stopping short of being a party to perjury, not to be a friend as far as the altar,[*](A proverbial expression (Latin usque ad aras) equivalent to our to the bitter end; cf. Moralia, 531 d.) as Pericles once said, but only so far as conforms to any law, equity, or advantage the neglect of which leads to great public injury, as did the failure to punish Sphodrias and Phoebidas, for they did a great deal to make Sparta enter into the Leuctrian war. For the principles that govern a statesman’s conduct do not force him to act with severity against the moderate errors of his friends; on the contrary, they make it possible for him, after he has once made the chief public interests safe, out of his abundant resources to assist his friends, take his stand beside them, and help them out of their troubles. And there are also favours which arouse no ill-will, such as aiding a friend to gain an office, putting into his hands some honourable administrative function or some friendly foreign mission, for example one which includes honours to a ruler or negotiations with a State concerning friendship and concord; and if some public activity be laborious, but conspicuous and important, the statesman can first appoint himself to the post and then choose his friend as assistant, just as Diomedes did:

1. So if you tell me myself to choose another as comrade,
2. How in that case could I e’er be forgetful of godlike Odysseus?[*](Homer, Il. x. 242.)

And Odysseus again fittingly returns the compliment:

1. Now these horses, old sir, these new ones, of which thou inquirest,
2. Thracian they are, but their master was slain by the brave Diomedes,
3. Slain and beside him his comrades, twelve comrades and all of the noblest.[*](Homer, Il. x. 558.)

For such concession to one’s friends adorns those who give praise no less than those who receive it; but self-conceit, says Plato,[*](Plato, Letters, iv. 321 b.) dwells with loneliness. Then, besides, a man ought to ascribe to his friends a share in his own good and kindly acts of favour; he should tell those who have been benefited to praise and show them affection as the originators and advisers of the favours. But base and absurd requests he should reject, not harshly but gently, informing the askers by way of consolation that the requests are not in accord with their own excellence and reputation. Epameinondas exemplifies this most admirably: after refusing to let the pedlar out of prison at Pelopidas’s request and then letting him out a little later when his mistress asked it, he said, Favours of that sort, Pelopidas, are fit for courtesans to receive, but not for generals. But Cato acted harshly and arbitrarily when he was quaestor, and Catulus the censor, one of his most intimate friends, asked for the acquittal of a man who was being tried, by saying: It is a disgrace that you, whose duty it is to train us young men to honourable conduct, have to be thrown out by our servants. For he might, while refusing the favour in fact, have avoided harshness and bitterness of speech, by producing the impression that the offensive quality of his action was not due to his own will, but was forced upon him by law and justice. There ai’e also in public life ways which are not dishonourable of helping friends who need money to acquire it; as, for example, when after the battle Themistocles saw a corpse wearing a golden bracelet and necklace, he himself passed it by, but turned to his friend and said, Take these things, for you are not, as I am, Themistocles. For the administration of affairs frequently gives the man in public life this sort of chance to help his friends; for not every man is a Menemachus.[*](The friend to whom this essay is addressed.) Hand over to one friend a case at law which will bring in a good fee as advocate in a just cause, to another introduce a rich man who needs legal oversight and protection, and help another to get some profitable contract or lease. Epameinondas even told a friend to go to a certain rich man and ask for a talent, saying that it was he who bade him give it; and when the man who had been asked for it came and asked him the reason, he replied: Because this man is a good man and poor, but you are rich since you have appropriated much of the State’s wealth. And Xenophon[*](Xenophon, Ages. 4.) says that Agesilaiis delighted in enriching his friends, he being himself above money.

But since, to quote Simonides,[*](Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec. iii. p. 418, no. 68.) all larks must grow a crest, and every public career bears its crop of enmities and disagreements, the public man must give especial consideration to these matters. So most people commend Themistocles and Aristeides who, whenever they went on an embassy or in command

of an army, laid down their private enmity at the frontier, then took it up again later. And some people also are immensely pleased by the conduct of Cretinas of Magnesia. He was a political opponent of Hermeias, a man who was not powerful but was of ambitious spirit and brilliant mind, and when the Mithridatic war broke out, seeing that the State was in danger, he told Hermeias to take over the command and manage affairs, while he himself withdrew; or, if Hermeias wished him to be general, then Hermeias should remove himself, that they might not by ambitious strife with one another destroy the State. The challenge pleased Hermeias, and saying that Cretinas was more versed in war than himself, he went away with his wife and children. And as he was departing Cretinas escorted him, first giving him out of his own means such things as were more useful to exiles than to people besieged in a city, after which by his excellent military leadership he saved the State unexpectedly when it was on the brink of destruction. For if it is a noble thing and the mark of an exalted spirit to exclaim

I love my children, but I love my country more,[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. p. 918, no. 411. Probably from the Erechtheus of Euripides and spoken by Praxithes, wife of Erechtheus.)

would it not have been easier for each of them to say, I hate so-and-so and wish to do him harm, but I love my country more? For to be unwilling to make peace with a personal enemy for the sake of those things for which we ought even to give up a friend is shockingly uncivilized and as low as the beasts. Certamly Phoeion and Cato and their like acted much better, for they would allow no personal enmity to have any bearing whatsoever upon political differences, but were stern and inexorable only in public contests against sacrificing what was for the common good; yet in private matters they treated kindly and without anger their political opponents. For the statesman should not regard any fellow-citizen as an enemy, unless some man, such as Aristion, Nabis, or Catiline, should appear who is a pest and a running sore to the State. Those who are in other ways out of harmony he should, like a skilful musician, bring into unison by gently tightening or relaxing the strings of his control, not attacking angrily and insultingly those who err, but making an appeal designed rather to make a moral impression, as Homer does:

Truly, my friend, I did think you surpassed other men in your wisdom[*](Homer, Il., xvii. 171.);

and

Knowledge thou hast to devise other speech that is better than this was.[*](Homer, Il. vii. 358.)

But if they say or do anything good, he should not be vexed by their honours, nor should he be sparing of complimentary words for their good actions; for if we act in this way our blame, where it is needed, will be thought justified, and we shall make them dislike evil by exalting virtue and showing through comparison that good actions are more worthy and fitting than the other kind. And I think also that the statesman should give testimony in just causes even for his opponents, should aid them in court against the malicious prosecutors, and should discredit calumnies about them if such accusations are alien to the principles they profess; just as the infamous Nero, a little before he put Thrasea to death, whom he hated and feared intensely, nevertheless when someone accused him of a bad and unjust decision in court, said: I wish Thrasea were as good a friend to me as he is a most excellent judge.

And it is not a bad method for confounding persons of a different kind, men who are naturally vicious and prone to evil conduct, to mention to them some enemy of theirs who is of finer character and to say: He would not have said that or done that. And some men, too, when they do wrong, should be reminded of their excellent fathers, as Homer says:

Truly not much like his sire is the son who was gotten by Tydeus[*](Homer, Il. v. 800, referring to Diomedes.);

And Appius, when competing with Scipio Africanus[*](Scipio Africanus the younger (185-129 b.c.) was the son of Lucius Aemilius Paulus.) in the elections, said: O Paulus, how you would groan in the lower world if you saw that when your son was standing for the censorship Philonicus the publican acted as his bodyguard! Such sayings serve at once to rebuke wrongdoers and to add lustre to those who administer the rebuke. And the Nestor of Sophocles, too, made a statesmanlike reply when reviled by Ajax:

I blame thee not; for good thy acts, though ill thy speech.[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. p. 312, no. 771.)

And Cato, although he had opposed Pompey in the violent measures which he and Caesar applied to the State, when war broke out between them advised handing over the leadership to Pompey, saying: The men who can bring about great evils can also end them. For blame wThich is mingled with praise and contains nothing insulting but merely frankness of speech, and arouses not anger but a pricking of the conscience and repentance, appears both kindly and healing; but abusive speech is not at all fitting for statesmen. Observe the things that were said by Demosthenes against Aeschines and by Aeschines against him and again those which Hypereides wrote against Demades, and ask yourself if a Solon or a Pericles or Lycurgus the Lacedaemonian or Pittacus the Lesbian would have said them. And yet even Demosthenes employs abuse only in his speeches before a court of law; the Philippics are free from all jeering and scurrility. For such things bring disgrace upon the speakers rather than upon those spoken of, and moreover they bring confusion into the conduct of affairs and they disturb councils and assemblies. Therefore Phocion did well when he stopped speaking and yielded the floor to a man who was reviling him, and then, when the fellow had at last become silent, came forward again saying: Well, then, about the cavalry and the heavy infantry you have heard already; it remains for me to discuss the light infantry and the targeteers. But since many men find it hard to endure that sort of thing quietly, and abusive speakers are often, and not without general benefit, made to shut their mouths by the retorts they evoke, let the reply be brief in wording, showing no temper and no extreme rancour, but urbanity mingled with playfulness and grace which somehow or other has a sting in it. Retorts which turn his own words back upon the speaker are especially good in this way. For just as things which are thrown and return to the thrower seem to do this because they are driven back by some force and firmness of that against which they are thrown, so that which is spoken seems through the force and intellect of him who has been abused to turn back upon those who uttered the abuse. For example, the retort of Epameinondas to Callistratus, who reproached the Thebans and the Argives because Oedipus killed his f ither and Orestes killed his mother: When we had driven out the doers of those deeds, you took them in, and that of Antalcidas the Spartan to the Athenian who said We have often chased you away from the Cephissus, Yes, but we have never had to chase you from the Eurotas. And Phocion also made a witty retort, when, after Demades had screamed The Athenians will put you to death, he replied, Yes, if they are crazy; but you are the one whom t ley will execute, if they are sane. And Crassus the orator, when Domitius said to him, It was you. was it not, who wept when a lamprey died that you kept in a tank? retorted with the question, It was you, was it not, who buried three wives without shedding a tear? Apt replies of this sort, however,;ire of some use also in life in general.

There are men who enter upon every kind of public service, as Cato did, claiming that the good citizen ought, so far as in him lies, tc omit no trouble or diligence; and they commend Epameinondas because, when through envy and is an insult he had been appointed telmarch[*](No such official as telearchos is mentioned elsewhere, and the word itself describes no function. On the other hand, telmarchos or telmatarchos, conjectured independently by Winckelmann and van Herwerden, although not found elsewhere, gives a meaning which accords with Plutarch’s description, official of stagnant pools, or a special kind of collector of refuse and other nuisances from the streets, very like the koprologoi of Athens.) by the Thebans, he did not neglect his duties, but saying thit not only does the office distinguish the man, but also the man the

office, he advanced the telmarchy to a position of great consideration and dignity, though previously it had been nothing but a sort of supervision of the alleys for the removal of dung and the draining off of water in the streets. And no doubt I myself seem ridiculous to visitors in our town when I am seen in public, as I often am, engaged in such matters. But I am helped by the remark of Antisthenes which has been handed down to memory; for when someone expressed surprise that he himself carried a dried fish through the market-place, he said, Yes, but it’s for myself; but I, on the other hand, say to those who criticize me for standing and watching tiles being measured or concrete or stones being delivered, that I attend to these things, not for myself, but for my native place. Yes, for there are many other things in regard to which a man would be petty and sordid who managed them for himself and attended to them for his own sake, but if he does it for the public and for the State’s sake, he is not ignoble, on the contrary his attention to duty and his zeal are all the greater when applied to little things. But there are others who think the conduct of Pericles was more dignified and splendid, one of whom is Critolaiis the Peripatetic, who clsims that just as the Salaminia and the Paralus, ships at Athens, were not sent out to sea for every service, but only for necessary and important missions, so the statesman should employ himself for the most momentous and important matters, as does the King of the Universe,

1. For God great things doth take in hand,
2. But small tilings passing by he leaves to chance,[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. p. 675, no. 974. From an unknown play, quoted also Moralia, 464 a.)

according to Euripides,

Neither do we commend the ambition and contentiousness of Theagenes who, after being victorious, not only in the circuit of festivals,[*](Refers to the four great festivals: the Olympic, the Pythian, the Isthmian, and the Nemean games.) but in many other contests besides, not only in the pancratium, but also in boxing and long-distance running,[*](The length was twenty stadia, slightly more than two and a quarter miles.) at last, when at certain commemorative funeral ceremonies he was partaking of the feast to honour the deceased as a hero, and all present had, as was the custom, their several portions already set before them, sprang up and performed a whole pancratium, as if it were wrong for anyone else to be a victor when he was present; for he had collected by such means twelve hundred head-bands, most of which might be regarded as rubbish. Now there is no difference between him and those who strip for every political activity; they soon cause themselves to be criticized by the multitude; they become unpopular and arouse envy when they are successful, but joy when they meet with failure; and that which was admired in them when they began to hold office results at last in mockery and ridicule. Such are the lines:

1. Metiochus, you see, is general, Metiochi s inspects the roads,
2. Metiochus inspects the bread, and Metiochus inspects the flour,
3. Metiochus takes care of all things, Metiochus will come to grief.[*](From a poet of the Old Comedy, Kock, Com. Att. Frag. iii. p. 629, no. 1325.)

He was one of Pericles’ followers and seems to have used the power gained through him in such a way as to arouse odium and disgust. Far the statesman ought, as they say, to find the people fond of him when he comes to them and to leave a longing for him when he is not there; which Scipio Africanus accomplished by spending much of his time in the country, thereby at one and the same time removing the weight of envy and giving a breathing-space to those who thought they were oppressed by his glory. But Timesias of Clazomenae was in other respects a good man in his service to the State, but by doing everything himself he had aroused rancour and hatred; but of this he was unaware until the following incident took place: - Some boys were knocking a knuckle-bone out of a hole when he was passing by; and some of them said it was still in the hole, but the boy who had struck at it said: I’d like to knock the brains out of Timesias as truly as this has been knocked out of the hole. Timesias, hearing this and understanding that dislike of him had permeated all the people, returned home and told his wife what had happened; and directing her to pack up and follow him, he went immediately away from his house and out from the city. And it appears that Themistocles, when he met with some such treatment from the Athenians, said, Why, my dear people, are you tired of receiving repeated benefits?

Now of such sayings some are well said, others are not. For so far as goodwill and solicitude for the common weal are concerned, a statesman should not hold aloof from any part of public affairs, but should pay attention to them all and infoim himself about all details; nor should he, as the ship’s gear called sacred[*](Meaning the largest anchor, held in reserve and used only in a crisis; cf. below, 815 d and Lucian, Iuppiter Tragoedus, chap. li. and scholium.) is stowed apart, hold himself aloof, waiting for the extreme necessities and fortunes of the State; but just as pilots do some things wit i their own hands but perform other duties by means of different instruments operated by different agents, thus giving

a turn or a twist to the instruments while they sit apart, and they make use of sailors, look-out men, and boatswains, some of whom they often call to the stern and entrust with the tiller, just so it is fitting that the statesman should yield office to others and should invite them to the orators’ platform in a gracious and kindly manner, and he should not try to administer all the affairs of the State by his own speeches, decrees, and actions, but should have good, trustworthy men and employ each of them for each particular service according to his fitness. So Pericles made use of Menippus for the position of general, humbled the Council of the Areopagus by means of Ephialtes, passed the decree against the Megarians[*](Passed in 432 b.c. excluding Megara from commerce with Athens and her allies.) by means of Charinus, and sent Lampon out as founder of Thurii. For, when power seems to be distributed among many, not only does the weight of hatreds and enmities become less troublesome, but there is also greater efficiency in the conduct of affairs. For just as the division of the hand into fingers does not make it weak, but renders it a more skillful instrument for use, so the statesman who gives to others a share in the government makes action more effective by co-operation. But he who through insatiable greed of fame or power puts the whole burden of the State upon himself and sets himself even to tasks for which he is not fitted by nature or by training (as Cleon set himself to leading armies, Philopoemen to commanding ships, and Hannibal to haranguing the people) - such a man has no excuse when he makes mistakes, but will have to hear Euripides quoted to boot,

1. A joiner thou, yet didst a task essay
2. That was no carpentry.[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. p. 678, no. 988.)

So, being no persuasive speaker, you went on an embassy, or being easy-going you undertook administration, being ignorant of accounting you were treasurer, or when old and feeble you took command of an army. Rut Pericles divided the power with Cimon so that he should himself be ruler in the city and Cimon should man the ships and wage war against the barbarians; for one of them was more gifted for civic government, the other for war. And Eubulus the Anaphlystian also is commended because, although few men enjoyed so much confidence and power as he, yet he administered none of the Hellenic affairs[*](Negotiations with other Greek states.) and did not take the post of general, but applied himself to the finances, increased the revenues, and did the State much good thereby. But Iphicrates was jeered at when he did exercises in speaking at his home in the presence of many hearers; for even if he had been a good speaker, and not, as he was, a poor one, he ought to have been contented with glory in arms and to have left the school to the sophists.

But since there is in every democracy a spirit of malice and fault-finding directed against men in public life, and they suspect that many desirable measures, if there is no party opposition and no expression of dissent, are done by conspiracy, and this subjects a man’s associations and friends to calumny, statesmen ought not to let any real enmity or disagreement against themselves subsist, as Onomademus the popular leader of the Chians did when, after his victory in the factional strife, he refused to have all his opponents banished from the city, that we may not, he said begin to quarrel with our friends when we have altogether got rid of our enemies. Now that was silly; but when the populace

are suspicious about some important and salutary measure, the statesmen when they come to the assembly ought not all to express the same opinion, as if by previous agreement, but two or three of the friends should dissent and quietly speak on the other side, then change their position as if they had been convinced; for in this way they draw the people along with them, since they appear to be influenced only by the public advantage. In small matters, however, which do not amount to much, it is not a bad thing to let one’s friends really disagree, each following his own reasoning, that in matters of the highest importance their agreement upon the best policy may not seem to be prearranged.

Now the statesman is always by nature ruler of the State, like the leader[*](The Greeks did not know that the most important bee in the hive was female - the queen bee.) bee in the hive, and bearing this in mind he ought to keep public matters in his own hands; but offices which are called authorities and are elective he ought not to seek too eagerly or often, for love of office is neither dignified nor popular; nor should he refuse them, if the people offer them and call him to them in accordance with the law, but even if they be too small for a man of his reputation, he should accept them and exercise them with zeal; for it is right that men who are adorned with the highest offices should in turn adorn the lesser, and that statesmen should show moderation, giving up and yielding some part of the weightier offices, such as the generalship at Athens, the prytany at Rhodes, and the Boeotarchy here, and should add to the minor offices dignity and grandeur, that we may not be despised in connexion with the latter, nor envied on account of the former. And when entering upon any office whatsoever, you

must not only call to mind those considerations of which Pericles reminded himself when he assumed the cloak of a general: Take care, Pericles; you are ruling free men, you are ruling Greeks, Athenian citizens, but you must also say to yourself: You who rule are a subject, ruling a State controlled by proconsuls, the agents of Caesar; these are not the spearmen of the plain,[*](Sophocles, Trachiniae, 1058.) nor is this ancient Sardis, nor the famed Lydian power. You should arrange your cloak more carefully and from the office of the generals keep your eyes upon the orators’ platform, and not have great pride or confidence in your crown, since you see the boots of Roman soldiers just above your head. No, you should imitate the actors, who, while putting into the performance their own passion, character, and reputation, yet listen to the prompter and do not go beyond the degree of liberty in rhythms and metres permitted by those in authority over them.[*](In Greece of Plutarch’s time those in authority in political matters were the Romans.) For to fail in one’s part in public life brings not mere hissing or catcalls or stamping of feet, but many have experienced

The dread chastiser, axe that cleaves the neck,[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. p. 918, no. 412; from an unknown play.)

as did your countryman Pardalas and his followers when they forgot their proper limitations. And many another, banished to an island, has become, as Solon says,[*](Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec. ii. p. 34.)

1. Pholegandrian or Sicinete,
2. No more Athenian, having changed his home.

Furthermore when we see little children trying playfully to bind their fathers’ shoes on their feet or fit their crowns upon their heads, we only laugh, but the officials in the cities, when they foolishly urge the people to imitate the deeds, ideals, and actions of their ancestors, however unsuitable they may be to the present times and conditions, stir up the common folk and, though what they do is laughable, what is done to them is no laughing matter, unless they are merely treated with utter contempt. Indeed there are many acts of the Greeks of former times by recounting which the statesman can mould and correct the characters of our contemporaries, for example, at Athens by calling to mind, not deeds in war, but such things as the decree of amnesty after the downfall of the Thirty Tyrants, the fining of Phrynichus for presenting in a tragedy the capture of Miletus, their decking their heads with garlands when Cassander refounded Thebes; how, when they heard of the clubbing at Argos, in which the Argives killed fifteen hundred of their own citizens, they decreed that an expiatory sacrifice be carried about in the assembly; and how, when they were searching the houses at the time of Harpalus’s frauds,[*](The Thirty Tyrants at Athens were overthrown in 403 b.c.; Phrynichus presented the tragedy shortly after Miletus was captured by the Persians in 494 b.c.; Cassander refounded Thebes in 316-315 b.c., ten years after its destruction by Alexander; the clubbing of aristocrats at Argos by the mob took place in 370 b.c.; Harpalus, Alexander’s treasurer, brought to Athens in 329 b.c. funds stolen from Alexander and was supposed to have bribed many prominent Athenians, one of whom was Demosthenes.) they passed by only one, that of a newly married man. By emulating acts like these it is even now possible to resemble our ancestors, but Marathon, the Eurymedon, Plataea, and all the other examples which make the common folk vainly to swell with

pride and kick up their heels, should be left to the schools of the sophists.

And not only should the statesman show himself and his native State blameless towards our rulers,[*](i.e. the Romans.) but he should also have always a friend among the men of high station who have the greatest power as a firm bulwark, so to speak, of his administration; for the Romans themselves are most eager to promote the political interests of their friends; and it is a fine thing also, when we gain advantage from the friendship of great men, to turn it to the welfare of our community, as Polybius and Panaetius, through Scipio’s goodwill towards them, conferred great benefits upon their native States.[*](Arcadia and Rhodes respectively. Polybius was a statesman and historian, Panaetius a Stoic philosopher.) And Caesar,[*](Augustus Caesar is meant. For a further account of his treatment of Areius see Life of Antony, chap. lxxx.) when he took Alexandria, drove into the city holding Areius by the hand and conversing with him only of all his friends, then said to the Alexandrians, who were expecting the most extreme measures and were begging for mercy, that he pardoned them on account of the greatness of their city and for the sake of its founder Alexander, and thirdly, said he, as a favour to my friend here. Is there any comparison between such a favour and the procuratorships and governorships of provinces from which many talents may be gained and in pursuit of which most public men grow old haunting the doors of other men’s houses[*](This refers to the Roman custom of greeting at the front door.) and leaving their own affairs uncared for?

Or should we correct Euripides[*](Euripides in Phoenissae, 524 f. represents Eteocles as saying - εἴπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή, τυραννίδος πέρικάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν. If wrong be ever right, for the throne’s sake Were wrong most right. (Way’s translation.) If Plutarch quotes this passage, correcting it to suit his purpose, he simply substitutes ἀγρυπνεῖν for ἀδικεῖν and πατρίδος for τυραννίδος. And the sentiment about equality, as the basis of true friendship, seems to be an echo of 535 f. of the same play. This method of dealing with passages from the poets is not infrequently employed by Plutarch.) when he chants the sentiment that if a man must spend sleepless nights and haunt another mans court and subject himself to an intimacy with a great man, it is best to do so for the sake of his native land, but otherwise it is best to welcome and hold fast friendships based on equality and justice?

However, the statesman, while making his native State readily obedient to its sovereigns, must not further humble it; nor, when the leg has been fettered, go on and subject the neck to the yoke, as some do who, by referring everything, great or small, to the sovereigns, bring the reproach of slavery upon their country, or rather wholly destroy its constitutional government,making it dazed, timid, and powerless in everything. For just as those who have become accustomed neither to dine nor to bathe except by the physician’s orders do not even enjoy that degree of health which nature grants them, so those who invite the sovereign’s decision on every decree, meeting of a council, granting of a privilege,[*](This doubtless refers to honorary citizenship, crowns, statues, and the like.) or administrative measure, force their sovereign to be their master more than he desires. And the cause of this is chiefly the greed and contentiousness of the foremost citizens; for either, in cases in which they are injuring their inferiors, they force them into exile from the State, or, in matters concerning which they differ among themselves, since they are unwilling

to occupy an inferior position among their fellow-citizens, they call in those who are mightier; and as a result senate, popular assembly, courts, and the entire local government lose their authority. But the statesman should soothe the ordinary citizens by granting them equality and the powerful by concessions in return, thus keeping them within the bounds of the local government and solving their difficulties as if they were diseases, making for them, as it were, a sort of secret political medicine; he will prefer to be himself defeated among his fellow-citizens rather than to be successful by outraging and destroying the principles of justice in his own city and he will beg everyone else to do likewise, and will teach them how great an evil is contentiousness. But as it is, not only do they not make honourable and gracious compromises with their fellow-citizens and tribesmen[*](The citizens of most ancient states were divided into tribes or clans.) at home and with their neighbours and colleagues in office, but they carry their dissensions outside to the doors of professional orators and put them in the hands of lawyers, to their own great injury and disgrace. For when physicians cannot entirely eradicate diseases, they turn them outwards to the surface of the body; but the statesman, if he cannot keep the State entirely free from troubles, will at any rate try to cure and control whatever disturbs it and causes sedition, keeping it meanwhile hidden within the State, so that it may have as little need as possible of physicians and medicine drawn from outside. For the policy of the statesman should be that which holds fast to security and avoids the tumultuous and mad impulse of empty opinion, as has been said. In his disposition, however, high spirit and

1. courage must be, full of daring,
2. Dauntless, and such as inspires all men who for weal of their country
3. ’Gainst men of hostile intent[*](Homer, Il. xvii. 156 ff.)

and against difficult conditions and times stand firm in resistance and struggle to the end. For he must not create storms himself, and yet he must not desert the State when storms fall upon it; he must not stir up the State and make it reel perilously, but when it is reeling and in danger, he must come to its assistance and employ his frankness of speech as a sacred anchor[*](See note on 812 b above.) heaved over in the greatest perils. Such were the troubles which overtook the Pergamenes under Nero and the Rhodians recently under Domitian and the Thessalians earlier under Augustus, when they burned Petraeus alive.

Then slumb’ring thou never wouldst see him,[*](Homer, Il. iv. 223. Spoken of Agamemnon.)

nor cowering in fear, the man who is really a statesman, nor would you see him throwing blame upon others and putting himself out of danger, but you will see him serving on embassies, sailing the seas and saying first not only

Here we have come, the slayers; avert thou the plague, O Apollo,[*](Callimachus, p. 787 ed. Schneider.)

but, even though he had no part in the wrongdoing of the people, taking dangers upon himself in their behalf. For this is noble; and besides being noble, one man’s excellence and wisdom by arousing admiration has often mitigated anger which has been aroused against the whole people and has dissipated the threatened terror and bitterness. Something of that sort seems to have happened to the Persian king in the case of Boulis and Sperchis[*](The story of these two is told in Moralia, 235 f, 236.) the Spartans, and happened to Pompey in the case of Sthenno,[*](See Moralia, 203 d, where the name is Sthennius, and Life of Pompey, chap. x.) when, as he was going to punish the Mamertines for revolting, Sthenno told him that he would be doing wrong if he should destroy many innocent men for the fault of one; for, he said, it was he himself who had caused the city to revolt by persuading his friends and compelling his enemies. This so affected Pompey that he let the city go unpunished and also treated Sthenno kindly. But Sulla’s guest-friend, practising virtue of the same sort but not having to do with the same sort of man, met with a noble end. For when Sulla, after the capture of Praenestê, was going to slaughter all the rest of the citizens but was letting that one man go on account of his guest-friendship, he declared that he would not be indebted for his life to the slayer of his fatherland, and then mingled with his fellow-citizens and was cut down with them. However, we must pray to be spared such crises and must hope for better things.