De Virtute Morali

If the present essay is the work of Plutarch, [*](The only recent attempt, that of Hartman, to show that it is not, relies on the looseness of the reasoning, the tediousness of the argumentation, and the absence of anything that might be called structure. But all three of these are by no means unusual in admittedly genuine works. The language and phraseology appear to the present editor, at any rate, to be Plutarchean.) we may, perhaps, be surprised at the diffuseness with which the author permits himself to wander at leisure over the preserves of Aristotelian psychology, while almost completely neglecting the promises made in such high-sounding terms in his first sentence. The purpose of the essay is apparently to refute certain tenets of Stoic psychology, and these are, to be sure, attacked with some spirit, but at such length and with so little attention to logic or to their intended meaning, that complete success is not to be expected. The point which is continually belaboured is that there are two parts of the soul, the Rational and the Irrational; for Moral Virtue to arise, the Rational must control the Irrational. So much our author has gleaned from Aristotle and to this he adds very little; nor can he apply his vast reading in poetry and philosophy with much effect to the demolition of Stoic dogma, which he appears in several points to have misunderstood. On the whole,

A word on the terminology is necessary: Aristotelian usage is probably intended throughout the greater part of the w ork. I have, therefore, followed most English Aristotelians in my rendering of many terms, with δύναμις capacity or faculty or power, φρόνησις prudence, and the like. ἕξις I have rendered acquired state, but πάθος and its forms and derivatives I have translated emotions, passions, experiences, according to my interpretation of the context.[*](See Mr. H. Rackham’s very just remarks in the preface to his recent (L.C.L., 1935) edition of the Atheniensium Respublica.)

It is interesting to notice that Pope in the Essay on Man (ii. 51 if.) has apparently drawn his philosophy from Plutarch’s diluted Aristotelianism rather than from the fountain head.[*](Cf. T. Sinko (Eos, xv. 1909, pp. 119-122), who further holds this essay to be the product of Plutarch’s youth, comparing the more mature attitude toward the passions to be found in De Cohibenda Ira and De Tranquillitate Animi.)

The ms. tradition is fairly good. The work has been well edited by Mr. Pohlenz in the Teubner series; from this edition most of the critical notes and the parallel passages have been taken.

The work is No. 72 in Lamprias’s catalogue of Plutarch’s writings.

It is my purpose to speak of that virtue which is called moral and reputed to be so, which differs from contemplative virtue chiefly in that it has as its material the emotions of the soul and as its form reason, and to inquire what its essential nature is and how, by its nature, it subsists; whether, also, that part of the soul which receives it is equipped with its own reason, or does but share in the reason of some other part; and if the latter, whether it does this after the manner of elements that are mingled with what is better than themselves, or rather, whether this portion of the soul is guided and governed by another part and in this sense may be said to share in that governing part’s power. For that it is possible for virtue also to have come into being and to remain entirely independent of matter and free from all admixture with it, I think is quite obvious. It is better, however, to run summarily through the opinions of the philosophers holding opposing views, not so much for the sake of inquiring into them as that my own opinions may become clearer and more firmly established when those of the philosophers in question have been presented.

In the first place, Menedemus of Eretria deprived the virtues of both plurality and differences by asserting that virtue is but one, though it goes under

Yet all of these men agree[*](Cf. von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., i. pp. 49, 50: iii. p. 111.) in supposing virtue to be a certain disposition of the governing portion of the soul and a faculty engendered by reason, or rather to be itself reason which is in accord with virtue and is firm and unshaken. They also think that the passionate and irrational part of the soul is not distinguished from the rational by any difference or by its nature, but is the same part, which, indeed, they term intelligence and the governing part; it is, they say, wholly transformed and changes both during its emotional states and in the alterations brought about in accordance with an acquired disposition or condition and thus becomes both vice and virtue; it contains nothing irrational within itself, but is called irrational whenever, by the overmastering power of our impulses, which have become strong and prevail, it is hurried on to something outrageous which contravenes the convictions of reason.[*](For the phrase Cf. Plato, Parmenides, 141 d: Marcus Aurelius, ii. 5.) Passion, in fact, according to them, is a vicious and intemperate reason, formed from an evil

But it seems to have eluded all these philosophers in what way each of us is truly two-fold and composite.[*](cf.Moralia, 943 a and 1083 c.) For that other two-fold nature of ours they have not discerned, but merely the more obvious one, the blend of soul and body. But that there is some element of composition, some two-fold nature and dissimilarity of the very soul within itself, since the irrational, as though it were another substance, is mingled and joined with reason by some compulsion of Nature-this, it is likely, was not unknown even to Pythagoras, if we may judge by the mans enthusiasm for the study of music, which he introduced to enchant and assuage the soul,[*](Cf. Plato, Euthydemus, 290 a.) perceiving that the soul has not every part of itself in subjection to discipline and study, and that not every part can be changed from vice by reason, but that the several parts have need of some other kind of persuasion to co-operate with them, to mould them, and to tame them, if they are not to be utterly intractable and obstinate to the teaching of philosophy.

Plato,[*](Timaeus, 35 a ff.; Cf. also the treatise De Animae Procreatione in Timaeo (Moralia, 1012 b ff.).) however, comprehended clearly, firmly, and without reservation both that the soul of this universe of ours is not simple nor uncompounded nor uniform, but that, being compounded of the potentialities of sameness and otherness, in one part it is ever governed in uniformity and revolves in but one and the same order, which maintains control, yet in another part it is split into movements and circles which go in contrariety to each other and wander about, thus giving

Aristotle[*](Cf.448 a, infra, and the note.) at first made use of these principles to a very great extent, as is obvious from his writings. But later[*](Cf.De Anima, iii. 9 (432 a 25); Magna Moralia, i. 1 (1182 a 24); Ethica Eudemia, ii. 1. 15 (1219 b 28); Ethica Nicomachea, i. 13. 9 (1102 a 29); Iamblichus, Protrepticus, 7 (p. 41 ed. Pistelli).) he assigned the spirited to the appetitive part, on the ground that anger is a sort of appetite

Those who wonder how it is that this part is irrational, yet subservient to reason, do not seem to me to reflect thoroughly upon the power of reason,

How great it is, how far it penetrates,[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. 2, p. 648, Euripides, Frag. 898.)

1. Thus were her fair cheeks wet with tears, as she
2. Wept for her lord, though he sat by. In heart
3. Odysseus pitied his lamenting wife,
4. But kept his eyes firm-fixed within their lids
5. Like horn or iron: with guile he hid his tears.
6. Under such subjection to his judgement did he keep
7. his breathing and his blood and his tears.

An evident proof of this is also the shrinking and withdrawal of the private parts, which hold their peace and remain quiet in the presence of such beautiful maidens and youths as neither reason nor law allows us to touch. This is particularly the case with those who first fall in love and then hear that they have unwittingly become enamoured of a sister or a daughter; for lust cowers as reason asserts itself and, at the same time, the body brings its parts into decent conformity with the judgement. Indeed, very often with foods and meat, when men have partaken of them with gusto, if they then perceive or come to know that they have eaten something unclean or unlawful, not only is this judgement of theirs attended by displeasure and remorse, but the body itself, revolted and sharing the mind’s disgust, falls a prey to the retchings and vomitings of nausea.

But I fear that I shall be thought to be rounding out my discourse with instances which are altogether seductive and exotic, if I recount in full how harps and

But, letting these subjects pass, I would gladly learn from my opponents whether, when they see dogs, horses, and domestic birds, through habituation, breeding, and teaching, uttering intelligible sounds and moving and assuming postures in subordination to reason, and acting in a manner conformable to due proportion and our advantage; and when they hear Homer declaring that Achilles

Urged on both horses and men[*](Adapted from Il., xvi. 167.)

Therefore, also, ethical, or moral, virtue (ethos) is well named,[*](cf.Moralia, 3 a, 551 e; Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, ii. 1. 1 (1103 a 17).) for ethical virtue is, to but sketch the subject, a quality of the irrational, and it is so named because the irrational, being formed by reason, acquires this quality and differentiation by habit (ethos), since reason does not wish to eradicate passion completely (for that would be neither possible[*](Cf. 452 b, infra.) nor expedient), but puts upon it some limitation and order and implants the ethical virtues, which are not the absence of passion but a due proportion and measure therein; and reason implants them by using prudence to develop the capacity for passion into a good acquired disposition. For these three things the soul is said to possess[*](Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, ii. 5 (1105 b 19); Stobaeus, Eclogae, ii. 7. 20 (vol. ii. p. 139 ed. Wachsmuth).): capacity, passion, acquired state. Now capacity[*](The capacities are the faculties in virtue of which we can be said to be liable to the emotions, for example, capable of feeling anger or fear [mss. read pain] or pity. (Aristotle, l.c., Rackham’s translation adapted.)) is the starting-point, or raw material, of passion, as, for instance, irascibility, bashfulness, temerity. And passion is a kind of stirring or movement of the capacity, as anger, shame, boldness. And finally, the acquired state is a settled force and condition of the capacity of the irrational, this settled condition being bred by habit and becoming on the one hand vice, if the passion has been educated badly, but virtue, if educated excellently by reason.

But inasmuch as philosophers do not make virtue as a whole a mean nor apply to it the term moral, we must discuss the difference, starting with first principles. Now in this world things

But since a mean [*](Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, ii. 6. 4-9 (1106 a 24).) is capable of various interpretations (for that which is a compound is a mean between the simple uncompounded substances, as grey is of white and black; and that which contains and is contained is a mean between the contained and the container, as eight of twelve and four; and that which partakes of neither of the extremes is a mean, as the indifferent is a mean between good and bad), in none of these ways can virtue be called a mean, for it is not a mixture of the vices, nor, encompassing what falls short of due measure, is it encompassed by that which is in excess of it; nor is it entirely exempt from the impulses of the passions, wherein are found excess and deficiency. But it is a mean, and is said to be so, in a sense very like that which obtains in musical sounds and harmonies. For there the mean or mese, a properly-pitched note[*](cf.Moralia, 1007 e ff., 1014 c, and 451 f, infra.) like the neti and

In this last instance, indeed, the irrational seems, with particular clearness, to allow us to observe the difference between itself and the rational, and to show that passion is essentially quite a different thing from reason. For self-control[*](Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, vii. 9. 6 (1151 b 33).) would not differ from temperance, nor incontinence from intemperance, as regards the pleasures and desires, if it were the same part of the soul that we naturally use for desiring as for forming judgements. But the fact is that temperance belongs to the sphere where reason guides and manages the passionate element, like a gentle animal obedient to the reins, making it yielding in its desires and willingly receptive of moderation and propriety;

Lest he let fall from his hands the crimson thongs,

1. The city reeks with burning incense, rings
2. Alike with prayers for health and cries of woe[*](Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus, 4-5; quoted also in Moralia, 95 c, 169 d, 623 c.)

So also the difference between them is not less manifest in their words than in their actions. These are, for instance, the sayings of intemperate persons:

1. What pleasure can there be, what joy, without
2. The golden Aphrodite? May I die
3. When things like these no longer comfort me.[*](Mimnermus, Frag. 1, vv. 1-2 (ed. Bergk and ed. Diehl); Edmonds, Elegy and Iambic, i. p. 89.)

1. To eat, to drink, to have one’s way in love[*](Alexis, Frag. 271 ed. Kock, vv. 4-5; the whole fragment is quoted in Moralia, 21 d.):
2. All other things I call accessory,

Leave me to die, for that is best for me,

But the sayings of incontinence are otherwise and different:

A mind I have, but Nature forces me[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. 2 p. 634, Euripides, Frag. 840 = Aeschylus, Frag. 262 ed. Smyth (L.C.L.).);

1. Alas I from God this evil comes to men
2. When, knowing what is good, they do it not[*](Euripides, Frag. 841; quoted also in Moralia, 33 e. Cf. St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, vii. 19, in the King James Version; Ovid, Metamorphoses, vii. 21: video meliora proboque, | deteriora sequor.);

1. The spirit yields and can resist no more,
2. Like anchor-hook in sand amid the surge.[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. 2, p. 911, ades. 379; quoted also in Moralia, 782 d. Some ascribe this and the following quotation to Euripides.)

1. I, like some ship, am tied by ropes to shore,
2. And when winds blow, our cables do not hold.

1. The Cynic might of Anaxarchus seemed
2. Steadfast and bold, wherever he wished, to spring;
3. Well did he know the truth, they said, and yet
4. Was bad: for Nature smote him with desire
5. And led him back from truth - ’twas Nature’s dart,
6. Before whom trembles many a Sophist heart.

Such, then, are the differences between incontinence and intemperance; and again between continence and temperance, these differences being the counterpart of the former. For continence is not yet free from remorse and pain and indignation; but in the soul of the temperate man there is serenity on all occasions, freedom from violent changes, and sanity, by which the irrational is harmonized and blended

1. Then, indeed, ceased the gale; a windless calm
2. Arose; some god had laid the waves to rest,[*](Homer, Od., xii. 168.)

As new-weaned foal beside his mother runs,[*](Semonides, Frag. 5; cf.Moralia, 84 d 136 a, 790 f, 997 d; Bernardakis, vol. vii. p. 150 (=Stobaeus, vol. v. p. 1024 ed. Hense).)

It is quite obvious, then, that there is in the soul a perception of some such distinction and difference as regards the desires, as though some force were fighting against them and contradicting them. But some affirm[*](Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., iii. p. 111.) that passion is not essentially different from reason, nor is there quarrelling between the

But this doctrine is, in the first place, contrary to the clear evidence of our perceptions. For no one ever perceives in himself a change from desiring to judging, nor again a change from judging to desiring; nor does the lover cease loving when he reasons that he must restrain his love and fight against it, and then give up again the process of reasoning and judging when he is softened by desire and yields to love; but both while by reason he still continues to oppose passion, he continues in the passion, and again, when mastered by passion, he plainly sees his error by the light of reason: and neither through passion has he done away with reason, nor through reason is he rid of passion, but being borne back and forth from one to the other he lies between them and

What then? they object. Is it not true that man’s deliberative faculty also is often divided and distracted toward contrary opinions regarding what is expedient, but that it is yet one and the same? Quite so, we shall say, but the process is not parallel. For the intellectual part of the soul does not here oppose itself,but, using one and the same faculty, applies itself to different lines of reasoning; or rather, there is but one single reason, which functions on things essentially different, as though on different matters. Therefore neither is pain present in reasoning where passion is absent, nor are men forced, as it were, to choose a course contrary to reason, unless indeed some emotion is furtively attached, as it were, to one pan of the balances. This, in fact, happens often: when it is not reasoning that opposes reasoning, but ambition or contentiousness or the pursuit of

To refuse they were ashamed, but feared to accept;

1. To die is dreadful, yet it brings fair fame;
2. Not to die is craven, yet there’s pleasure there.[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. 2, p. 638, Euripides, Frag. 854.)

It is not only from their dissension, however, but no less from their agreement, that one can perceive that the source of passion is essentially different from that of reason. For since it is equally possible to love a noble youth, well-formed by nature for virtue, and to love an evil and profligate one, and since it happens that one both becomes angry irrationally against one’s own children or parents, and angry justly on behalf of parents and children against enemies and despots; just as in the one case there is perception of struggle and dissension of passion against reason, so in the other there is perception of persuasion and agreement on the part of passion, which inclines the scales, as it were, in favour of reason and increases its power. Yet again, when a good man has lawfully married a wife, his intention is to treat her respectfully and consort with her honourably and soberly; but as time goes on, his intimacy with her has given birth to passion, when he perceives that his love and affection increases by the exercise of his reason. So again, when young men happen upon cultivated teachers, they follow them and admire them at first because of their usefulness; but later they come to feel affection for them also, and in place of familiar companions and pupils they are called lovers and are actually so. The same thing happens also in people’s relations to good magistrates in cities and good neighbours and

1. And modesty. Two kinds there are: the one
2. Not bad, the other burdening our homes,

But my opponents, though forced to concede in a manner these arguments because of their obvious truth, yet persist in calling shame modesty, [*](cf.Moralia, 529 d; von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., iii. p. 107.) pleasure joy, and fears precautions. No one would blame them for this euphemism if they would but call these same emotions by these soft names when they attach themselves to reason, and call them by those harsher names when the emotions oppose and offer violence to reason. But when, convicted by their tears and tremblings and changes of colour, in place of grief and fear they call these emotions compunctions and perplexities and gloss over the desires with the term eagernesses, they seem to be devising casuistic, not philosophic, shifts and escapes from reality through the medium of fancy names.

And yet these very men,[*](Ibid. iii. pp. 105-108.) to cite another instance, call those joys, volitions, and precautions of

Now if, by positing[*](Ibid. iii. p. 119.) that all errors and faults are equal, they are in some other way overlooking the truth, this present discourse is not the proper occasion to confute them; but in the case of the

So to elude these and similar difficulties my opponents[*](The Stoics, as generally throughout the essay; Cf. von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., iii. p. 119.) deny that these intensities and violences of the emotions come into existence in accordance with the judgement, in which lies the liability to error; but maintain that the irritations, contractions, and diffusions admit of increase and diminution through the operations of the irrational element. Yet there obviously are differences in judgements also; for some adjudge poverty not to be an evil, others to be a great evil, still others to be the greatest evil, so that they even hurl themselves down from precipices[*](cf.Moralia, 165 a, 1039 f, 1069 d; Theognis, 173-178, and the references cited by Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus, i. p. 249, note 5.) or throw themselves into the sea. Some think death to be an evil merely because it deprives them of the good things of life, others because there are eternal torments and horrible punishments beneath the earth. By some the health of the body is cherished because it is in accordance with Nature and useful, to others it appears the greatest good in the world; for neither do they value

Joy in wealth or children,

In that kingly rule that makes man like to gods[*](Ariphron, Paean to Health, vv. 3-4 (Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec., iii. p. 597, or Edmonds, Lyra Graeca, iii. p. 401); cf.Moralia, 497 a, infra.)

This doctrine, however, need not be confuted at present, but that other point maybe assumed from this discussion: that my opponents themselves also concede that the irrational part is essentially different from judgement, the irrational, in accordance with which they say that emotion becomes greater and more violent; their contention is concerning the name and the expression, but they really surrender the point at issue to those who assert that the passionate and irrational element is different from the reasoning and judging. In his book On the Failure to Lead a Consistent Life Chrysippus [*](Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., iii. p. 94; the title was interpreted by Xylander as De Dissensione Partium Animi.) has said, Anger is a blind thing: often it prevents our seeing obvious matters, and often it obscures matters which are already apprehended; and, proceeding a little further, he says, For the passions, when once raised, drive out the processes of reasoning and all things that appear otherwise than they would have them be, and push forward with violence to actions contrary to reason. He then uses as evidence the words of Menander[*](Frag. 567, Kock, Comic. Att. Frag., iii. p. 173 (Allinson, p. 497).):

1. Ah woe, alas for me! Where ever were
2. My wits awandering in my body then
3. When I made choice to do not this, but that?

Why, it would be ridiculous, as Plato[*](Republic, 430 e.) says, for a man to say that he is now better than himself and again worse than himself, and sometimes master of himself and sometimes not.

For how is it possible for the same man to be both better and worse than himself, or to be master of himself and at the same time be mastered, if in some way or other each man were not by nature double and had not both the worse and the better within himself? This being the case, he who holds the worse in subjection to the better is Iself-controlled and better than himself, but he who permits the better part to follow and be in subjection to the intemperate and irrational part of his soul is called worse than himself and incontinent and in a state contrary to Nature.

For, in accordance with Nature, it is proper that reason, which is divine, should lead and rule the irrational, which derives its origin directly from the body to which Nature has designed that it should bear a resemblance and share in the body’s passions and be contaminated by it, since it has entered into the body and has become merged with it; that this is so is shown by our impulses,[*](Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 86 b.) which arise and are set in motion toward corporeal objects and become violent or relax in keeping with the changes of the body. For this reason young men are swift and impetuous and fiery in their appetites, and stung by madness, as it were, through the abundance and heat of their blood; but in old men the source of desire, which is seated about the liver,[*](Ibid. 71 a.) is in the process of being extinguished and becoming small and weak, whereas

And in general, both as my opponents[*](The Stoics; Cf. von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., ii. p. 150.) themselves admit and as is quite obvious, in this world some things are governed by an acquired disposition, others by a natural one, some by an irrational soul, others by a rational and intellectual one; and in practically

The horse is meet for the chariot,

1. the ox for the plough;
2. But if you think to slay a boar, you must find a stout-hearted hound.

1. A valiant man will never change his hue,
2. Nor will his fear be over-great,

1. So did he speak and breathed great might
2. Into the shepherd of the people[*](Il., xv. 262: Apollo to Hector.);

1. Not without some god does he
2. These deeds of madness[*](Il., v. 185; of Diomedes.);

Indeed we may see these very opponents of mine often inciting young men with praise and often chastising them with admonitions; and of these, in the first case pleasure is the consequence, in the second pain (in fact, admonition and rebuke engender repentance and shame, of which the first is a kind of pain, the second a kind of fear[*](Cf. von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag., iii. pp. 98 f.)); and of these methods they make particular use to improve their charges. As Diogenes[*](Cf. Archidamus’s remark on Charillus, Moralia, 55 e, 218 b, 537 d.) also remarked, when Plato was being praised, What is there so august about one who has spent so much time talking philosophy, yet has never caused anyone pain? For surely studies could not so properly be called, to use Xenocrates’[*](Cf. Diogenes Laertius, iv. 10.) words, the grips of philosophy, as could the emotions of young men: shame, desire, repentance, pleasure, pain, ambition. On these if reason and law obtain a suitable and salutary grip, they efficaciously set the young man upon the path that he should take. Therefore the