De Defectu Oraculorum

Regarding the rites of the Mysteries, in which it is possible to gain the clearest reflections and adumbrations of the truth about the demigods, let my lips be piously sealed, as Herodotus[*](Herodotus, ii. 171; cf. Moralia, 607 c and 636 d.) says; but as for festivals and sacrifices, which may be compared with ill-omened and gloomy days, in which occur the eating of raw flesh, rending of victims, fasting, and beating of breasts, and again in many places scurrilous language at the shrines, and

1. Frenzy and shouting of throngs in excitement
2. With tumultuous tossing of heads in the air,[*](Pindar, Frag. 208 (ed. Christ). Cf.Moralia, 623 b and 706 e.)

I should say that these acts are not performed for any god, but are soothing and appeasing rites for the averting of evil spirits. Nor is it credible that the gods demanded or welcomed the human sacrifices of ancient days, nor would kings and generals have endured giving over their children and submitting them to the preparatory rites and cutting their throats to no purpose save that they felt they were propitiating and offering satisfaction to the wrath and sullen temper of some harsh and implacable avenging deities, or to the insane and imperious passions of some who had not the power or desire to seek satisfaction in a natural and normal way. But as Heracles laid siege to Oechalia for the sake of a maiden,[*](Iolê; cf. e.g. Sophocles, Trachiniae, 475-478.) so powerful and impetuous divinities, in demanding a human soul which is incarnate within a mortal body, bring pestilences and failures of crops upon States and stir up wars and civil discords, until they succeed in obtaining what they desire. To some, however, comes the opposite; for example, when I was spending a considerable time in Crete, I noted an extraordinary festival being celebrated there in which they exhibit the image of a man without a head, and relate that this used to be Molus,[*](A son of Deucalion.) father of Meriones, and that he violated a young woman; and when he was discovered, he was without a head.

As for the various tales of rapine and wanderings of the gods, their concealments and banishment and servitude, which men rehearse in legend and in song, all these are, in fact, not things that were done to the gods or happened to them, but to the demigods; and they are kept in memory because of the virtues and power of these beings; nor did Aeschylus[*](Aeschylus, Supplices, 214.) speak devoutly when he said

Holy Apollo, god from heaven banned;

nor Admetus in Sophocles,[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. p. 311, Sophocles, no. 767 (no. 851 Pearson).)

My cock it was that sent him to the mill.

But the greatest error in regard to the truth is that of the theologians of Delphi who think that the god once had a battle here with a serpent for the possession of the oracle, and they permit poets and prose-writers to tell of this in their competitions in the theatres, whereby they bear specific testimony against the most sacred of the rites that they perform.

At this Philip the historian, who was present, expressed surprise, and inquired against what hallowed rites Cleombrotus thought that the competition bore testimony. These, said Cleombrotus, which have to do with the oracle here, and in which the city recently initiated all the Greeks west of Thermopylae and extended the rites as far as Tempê. For the structure which is erected here near the threshing-floor[*](At the right of the second section of the sacred way, as one progresses upwards toward the temple of Apollo.) every eight years[*](See Moralia, 293 b-e.) is not a nest-like serpent’s den, but a copy of the dwelling of a despot or king.[*](That is, a copy of the primitive circular house.) The onset upon it, which is made in silence through the way called Dolon’s Way, by which the Labyadae with lighted torches conduct the boy, who must have two parents living, and, after, applying fire to the structure and upsetting the table, flee through the doors of the temple without looking back; and finally the wanderings and servitude of the boy and the purifications that take place at Tempê — all prompt a suspicion of some great and unholy deed of daring. For it is utterly ridiculous, my good friend, that Apollo, after slaying a brute creature, should flee to the ends of Greece in quest of purification and, after arriving there, should offer some libations and perform those ceremonies which men perform in the effort to placate and mollify the wrath of spirits whom

men call the unforgetting avengers, as if they followed up the memories of some unforgotten foul deeds of earlier days. And as for the story which I have heard before about this flight and the removal to another place, it is dreadfully strange and paradoxical, but if it has any vestige of truth in it, let us not imagine that what was done in those days about the oracle was any slight or common affair. But that I may not seem to be doing what is described by Empedocles[*](Diels, Frag. der Vorsokratiker, i. p. 235, Empedocles, no. b 24.) as

1. Putting the heads of myths together,
2. Bringing no single path to perfection,

permit me to add to what was said at the outset the proper conclusion, for we have already come to it. Let this statement be ventured by us, following the lead of many others before us, that coincidently with the total defection of the guardian spirits assigned to the oracles and prophetic shrines, occurs the defection of the oracles themselves; and when the spirits flee or go to another place, the oracles themselves lose their power, but when the spirits return many years later, the oracles, like musical instruments, become articulate, since those who can put them to use are present and in charge of them.

When Cleombrotus had expounded these matters, Heracleon said, There is no unsanctified or irreligious person present, or anyone who holds opinions about the gods that are out of keeping with ours; but let us ourselves be stringently on our guard lest we unwittingly try to support the argument with extraordinary and presumptuous hypotheses. That is a very good suggestion, said Philip,

but which of the theses of Cleombrotus makes you the most uncomfortable?

That it is not the gods, said Heracleon, who are in charge of the oracles, since the gods ought properly to be freed of earthly concerns; but that it is the demigods, ministers of the gods, who have them in charge, seems to me not a bad postulate; but to take, practically by the handful, from the verses of Empedocles[*](Cf. Diels, Frag. der Vorsokratiker, i. p. 267, Empedocles, no. b 115.) sins, rash crimes, and heaven-sent wanderings, and to impose them upon the demigods, and to assume that their final fate is death, just as with men, I regard as rather too audacious and uncivilized.

Cleombrotus was moved to ask Philip who the young man was and whence he carne; and after learning his name and his city he said, It is not unwittingly, Heracleon, that we have become involved in strange arguments; but it is impossible, when discussing important matters, to make any progress in our ideas toward the probable truth without employing for this purpose important principles. But you unwittingly take back what you concede; for you agree that these demigods exist, but by your postulating that they are not bad nor mortal you no longer keep them; for in what respect do they differ from gods, if as regards their being they possess immortality and as regards their virtues freedom from all emotion or sin ?

As Heracleon was reflecting upon this in silence, Philip said, Not only has Empedocles bequeathed to us bad demigods, Heracleon, but so also have Plato, Xenocrates, and Chrysippus[*](Cf. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ii. 1104 (p. 321).); and,

in addition, Demolitus,[*](Cf. Diels, Frag. der Vorsokratiker, ii. p. 94, Democritus, no. 166; and Life of Timoleon, chap. i. (235 b).) by his prayer that he may meet with propitious spirits, clearly recognized that there is another class of these which is perverse and possessed of vicious predilections and impulses.

As for death among such beings, I have heard the words of a man who was not a fool nor an impostor. The father of Aemilianus the orator, to whom some of you have listened, was Epitherses, who lived in our town and was my teacher in grammar. He said that once upon a time in making a voyage to Italy he embarked on a ship carrying freight and many passengers. It was already evening when, near the Echinades Islands, the wind dropped, and the ship drifted near Paxi. Almost everybody was awake, and a good many had not finished their after-dinner wine. Suddenly from the island of Paxi was heard the voice of someone loudly calling Thamus, so that all were amazed. Thamus was an Egyptian pilot, not known by name even to many on board. Twice he was called and made no reply, but the third time he answered; and the caller, raising his voice, said, When you come opposite to Palodes, announce that Great Pan is dead. On hearing this, all, said Epitherses, were astounded and reasoned among themselves whether it were better to carry out the order or to refuse to meddle and let the matter go. Under the circumstances Thamus made up his mind that if there should be a breeze, he would sail past and keep quiet, but with no wind and a smooth sea

about the place he would announce what he had heard. So, when he came opposite Palodes, and there was neither wind nor wave, Thamus from the stern, looking toward the land, said the words as he had heard them: Great Pan is dead. Even before he had finished there was a great cry of lamentation, not of one person, but of many, mingled with exclamations of amazement. As many persons were on the vessel, the story was soon spread abroad in Rome, and Thamus was sent for by Tiberius Caesar. Tiberius became so convinced of the truth of the story that he caused an inquiry and investigation to be made about Pan; and the scholars, who were numerous at his court, conjectured that he was the son born of Hermes and Penelopê.[*](Cf. Herodotus, ii. 145.)

Moreover, Philip had several witnesses among the persons present who had been pupils of the old man Aemilianus.

Demetrius said that among the islands lying near Britain[*](Presumably the Scilly islands; cf. Moralia, 941 a - 942 a.) were many isolated, having few or no inhabitants, some of which bore the names of divinities or heroes. He himself, by the emperor’s order, had made a voyage for inquiry and observation to the nearest of these islands which had only a few inhabitants, holy men who were all held inviolate by the Britons. Shortly after his arrival there occurred a great tumult in the air and many portents; violent winds suddenly swept down and lightning-flashes darted to earth. When these abated, the people of the island said that the passing of someone of the mightier souls had befallen. For, said they, as

a lamp when it is being lighted has no terrors, but when it goes out is distressing to many,[*](Cf. the interesting account which Plutarch gives in Moralia, 941 a ff., and Lucretius’s statement that a smouldering lamp may cause apoplexy.) so the great souls have a kindling into life that is gentle and inoffensive, but their passing and dissolution often, as at the present moment, fosters tempests and storms, and often infects the air with pestilential properties. Moreover, they said that in this part of the world there is one island where Cronus is confined, guarded while he sleeps by Briareus; for his sleep has been devised as a bondage for him, and round about him are many demigods as attendants and servants.

Cleombrotus here took up the conversation and said, I too have similar stories to tell, but it is sufficient for our purpose that nothing contravenes or prevents these things from being so. Yet we know, he continued, that the Stoics[*](Cf. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ii. 1049 (p. 309).) entertain the opinion that I mention, not only against the demigods, but they also hold that among the gods, who are so very numerous, there is only one who is eternal and immortal, and the others they believe have come into being, and will suffer dissolution.

As for the scoffing and sneers of the Epicureans[*](H. Usener, Epicurea (Leipzig, 1887), 394.) which they dare to employ against Providence also, calling it nothing but a myth, we need have no fear. We, on the other hand, say that their Infinity is a myth, which among so many worlds has not one that is directed by divine reason, but will have them all produced by spontaneous generation and concretion. If there is need for laughter in philosophy, we should laugh at those spirits, dumb, blind, and soulless, which

they shepherd for boundless cycles of years, and which make their returning appearance everywhere, some floating away from the bodies of persons still living, others from bodies long ago burned or decayed, whereby these philosophers drag witlessness and obscurity into the study of natural phenomena; but if anyone asserts that such demigods exist, not only for physical reasons, but also for logical reasons, and that they have the power of self-preservation and continued life for a long time, then these philosophers feel much aggrieved.

After these remarks Ammonius said, It seems to me that Theophrastus was right in his pronouncement. What, in fact, is there to prevent our accepting an utterance that is impressive and most highly philosophical? For if it be rejected, it does away with many things which are possible but cannot be proved; and if it be allowed as a principle, it brings in its train many things that are impossible or non-existent.[*](Some editors would insert a negative in the last sentence.) The one thing that I have heard the Epicureans say with reference to the demigods introduced by Empedocles[*](Diels, Frag. der Vorsokratiker, i. 267, Empedocles, no. b 115.) is that it is not possible, if they are bad and sinful, that they should be happy and of long life, inasmuch as vice has a large measure of blindness and the tendency to encounter destructive agencies, so that argument of theirs is silly. For by this reasoning Epicurus will be shown to be a worse man than Gorgias the sophist, and Metrodorus worse than Alexis the comic poet; for Alexis lived twice as long as Metrodorus and Gorgias more than a third as long again as Epicurus. It is in another

sense that we speak of virtue as something strong, and vice as something weak, not with reference to permanence or dissolution of the body. For example, many of the animals that are sluggish in movement and slow in their reactions and many that are lascivious and ungovernable live a longer time than the quick and the clever. Therefore they do not well who make God’s eternal existence to be the result of watchfulness and the thrusting aside of destructive agencies. No, immunity from emotion and destruction ought to reside in the blessed Being, and should require no activity on His part. Perhaps, however, to speak thus with reference to people that are not present does not show great consideration. So it is right that Cleombrotus should resume the topic which he discontinued a few moments ago about the migration and flight of the demigods.

Then Cleombrotus continued, I shall be surprised if it does not appear to you much more strange than what has already been said. Yet it seems to be close to the subject of natural phenomena and Plato[*](Cf. 421 f, infra.) has given the key-note for it, not by an unqualified pronouncement, but as the result of a vague concept, cautiously suggesting also the underlying idea in an enigmatic way; but, for all that, there has been loud disparagement of him on the part of other philosophers. But there is set before us for general use a bowl of myths and stories combined, and where could one meet with more kindly listeners for testing these stories, even as one tests coins from foreign lands? So I do not hesitate to favour you with a narrative about a man, not a Greek, whom I had great difficulty in finding, and then only by dint of long wanderings,

and after paying large sums for information. It was near the Persian Gulf that I found him, where he holds a meeting with human beings once every year; and there I had an opportunity to talk with him and met with a kindly reception. The other days of his life, according to his statement, he spends in association with roving nymphs and demigods. He was the handsomest man I ever saw in personal appearance and he never suffered from any disease, inasmuch as once each month he partook of the medicinal and bitter fruit of a certain herb. He was practised in the use of many tongues; but with me, for the most part, he spoke a Doric which was almost music. While he was speaking, a fragrance overspread the place, as his mouth breathed forth a most pleasant perfume. Besides his learning and his knowledge of history, always at his command, he was inspired to prophesy one day in each year when he went down to the sea and told of the future. Potentates and kings’ secretaries would come each year and depart. His power of prophecy he referred to the demigods. He made most account of Delphi and there was none of the stories told of Dionysus or of the rites performed here of which he had not heard; these too he assert ed were the momentous experiences of the demigods and so, plainly, were those which had to do with the Python. And upon the slayer of that monster was not imposed an exile of eight full years,[*](Cf.Moralia, 293 b-c.) nor, following this, was he exiled to Tempê; but after he was expelled, he fared forth to another world, and later, returning from there, after eight cycles of the Great Years, pure and truly the Radiant One, he took over the oraele which had been guarded during this time by Themis. Such also, he said, were the stories about Typhons and Titans[*](Cf. 360 f, supra.); battles of demigods against demigods had taken place, followed by the exile of the vanquished, or else judgement inflicted by a god upon the sinners, as, for example, for the sin which Typhon is said to have committed in the case of Osiris, or Cronus in the case of Uranus; and the honours once paid to these deities have become quite dim to our eyes or have vanished altogether when the deities were transferred to another world. In fact, I learn that the Solymi, who live next to the Lycians, paid especial honour to Cronus. But when lie had slain their rulers, Arsalus, Dryus, and Trosobius, he fled away from that place to some place or other, where they cannot say; and then he ceased to be regarded, but Arsalus and those connected with him are called the stern gods, and the Lycians employ their names in invoking curses both in public and in private. Many accounts similar to these are to be had from theological history. But, as that man said, if we call some of the demigods by the current name of gods, that is no cause for wonder; for each of them is wont to be called after that god with whom he is allied and from whom he has derived his portion of power and honour. In fact, among ourselves one of us is Dïus, another Athenaeus, another Apollonius or Dionysius or Hermaeus; but only some of us have, by chance, been rightly named; the majority have received names derived from the gods which bear no relation to the persons, but are only a travesty.

Cleombrotus said nothing more, and his account appeared marvellous to all. But when Heraeleon inquired in what way this was related to Plato and how he had given the key-note for this topic, Cleombrotus said, You well remember that he summarily decided against an infinite number of worlds, but had doubts about a limited number; and up to five[*](Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 55 c-d; Moralia, 389 f, supra, and 430 b, infra.) he conceded a reasonable probability to those who postulated one world to correspond to each element, but, for himself, he kept to one. This seems to be peculiar to Plato, for the other philosophers conceived a fear of plurality,[*](Cf. Aristotle, De Caelo, i. 8 (276 a 18).) feeling that if they did not limit matter to one world, but went beyond one, an unlimited and embarrassing infinity would at once fasten itself upon them.

But, said I, did your far-away friend set a limit to the number of worlds, as Plato did, or did you not go so far as to sound him on this point when you had your interview with him ?

Was it not likely, said Cleombrotus, that on anything touching these matters, if on nothing else, I should be an inquisitive and eager listener, when he so graciously put himself at my disposal and gave me the opportunity? He said that the worlds are not infinite in number, nor one, nor five, but one hundred and eighty-three,[*](Cf. Proclus on Plato, Timaeus, p. 138 b.) arranged in the form of a triangle,

each side of the triangle having sixty worlds; of the three left over each is placed at an angle, and those that are next to one other are in contact and revolve gently as in a dance. The inner area of the triangle is the common hearth of all, and is called the Plain of Truth, in which the accounts, the forms, and the patterns of all things that have come to pass and of all that shall come to pass rest undisturbed; and round about them lies Eternity, whence Time, like an ever-flowing stream, is conveyed to the worlds. Opportunity to see and to contemplate these things is vouchsafed to human souls once in ten thousand years if they have lived goodly lives; and the best of the initiatory rites here are but a dream of that highest rite and initiation; and the words of our philosophic inquiry are framed to recall these fair sights there — else is our labour vain. This, said he, is the tale I heard him recite quite as though it were in some rite of mystic initiation, but without offering any demonstration or proof of what he said.

Then I, addressing Demetrius, said, How do the verses about the suitors run, when they are marvelling at Odysseus as he handles the bow? And when Demetrius had recalled them to my mind, I said, It occurs to me to say this of your far-away friend:

Surely he liked to see, or else was given to filching[*](Homer, Od. xxi. 397.)

beliefs and tales of all sorts. He had ranged widely in literature and was no foreigner, but a Greek by birth, and replete with Greek culture to a high degree. The number of his worlds convicts him, since it is not Egyptian nor Indian, but Dorian and from Sicily, being the idea of a man of Himera named Petron. Petron’s own treatise I have never read nor am I sure that a copy is now extant; but Hippys[*](Frag. 6, Müller, Frag. Hist. Graec. vol. ii. p. 14.) of Rhegium, whom Phanias[*](Frag. 22, Müller, Frag. Hist. Graec. vol. ii. p. 300.) of Eresus mentions, records that this was the opinion and the account of it given by Petron: that there are one hundred and eighty-three worlds in contact with one another according to element; but what this is, to be in contact according to element, he does not explain further nor subjoin any plausible proof.

Demetrius, joining in, said, What plausible proof could there be in matters of this sort in which even Plato, without stating anything reasonable or plausible, simply set down his own account?

But, said Heracleon, we hear you grammarians attributing this view to Homer on the ground that he distributed the universe into five worlds[*](Cf. 390 c, supra; Homer, Il. xv. 187.): the heavens, the water, the air, the earth, and Olympus. Of these he leaves two to be held in common, the earth for all below and Olympus for all above, and the three that lie between were assigned to the three gods. In this wise Plato[*](Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 31 a, and 55 c; Moralia, 390 a and 887 b.) also, apparently, associated the fairest and foremost forms and figures with the different divisions of the universe, and called them five worlds, one of earth, one of water, one of air, one of fire, and last of all, the one which includes all these, the world of the dodecahedron, of wide expanse and many turnings, to which he assigned a form appropriate to the cycles and movements of the soul.

Why, said Demetrius, do we call up Homer in the present instance? Enough of legends! Plato, however, is very far from calling the five different divisions of the world five different worlds; and in those passages again, in which he contends against those who postulate an infinite number of worlds, he says that his opinion is that this world is the only-begotten and beloved of God, having been created out of the corporeal whole, entire, complete, and sufficient unto itself. Wherefore one might well be surprised that he, in stating the truth himself, has supplied others with a source for a doctrine that is unconvincing and lacking in reason. For not to defend the idea of a single world implied somehow an assumption of the infinity of the whole universe; but to make the worlds definitely just so many, neither more nor less than five, is altogether contrary to reason and devoid of all plausibility — unless, he added, with a glance at me, you have anything to say.

It appears, said I, that we have already discontinued our discussion about oracles, feeling it to be completed, and are now taking up another topic just as large.

Not discontinued that topic, said Demetrius, but not passing over this one which claims our attention. We will not spend much time on it, but only touch upon it long enough to inquire into its plausibility; and then we will follow up the original proposition.

In the first place, then, said I, the considerations that prevent our making an infinite number of worlds do not preclude our making more than one. For it is possible for God and prophecy

and Providence to exist in more worlds than one, and for the incidence of chance to be reduced to the very smallest limits, while the vast majority of things and those of the highest importance attain to genesis and transmutation in a quite orderly sequence, none of which things does infinity, by its nature, admit. Then again it is more consistent with reason that the world should not be the only-begotten of God and quite alone. For He, being consummately good, is lacking in none of the virtues, and least of all in those which concern justice and friendliness; for these are the fairest and are fitting for gods. Nor is it in the nature of God to possess anything to no purpose or for no use. Therefore there exist other gods and other worlds outside, in relation with which He exercises the social virtues. For not in relation with Himself nor with any part of Himself is there any exercise of justice or benevolence or kindness, but only in relation with others. Thus it is not likely that this world, friendless, neighbourless, and unvisited, swings back and forth in the infinite void, since we see that Nature includes individual things in classes and species, like seeds in pods and envelopes. For there is nothing in the whole list of existing things for which there is not some general designation, nor does anything that does not possess certain qualities, either in common with others or solely by itself, obtain such an appellation. Now the world is not spoken of as having qualities in common with others. It has its qualities, therefore, solely by itself, by virtue of the difference when it is compared with other things which are akin to it and similar in appearance, since it has been created with such qualities as it possesses. If in all creation such a thing as one man, one horse, one star, one god, one demigod does not exist, what is there to prevent creation from having, not one world, but more than one? For he who says that creation has but one land and one sea overlooks a matter which is perfectly plain, the doctrine of similar parts[*](); for we divide the earth into parts which bear similar names, and the sea likewise. A part of the world, however, is not a world, but something combined from the differing elements in Nature.

Again, as for the dread which some people especially have felt, and so use up the whole of matter on the one world, so that nothing may be left over outside to disturb the structure of it by resisting or striking it—this fear of theirs is unwarranted. For if there are more worlds than one, and each of them has received, as its meet portion, substance and matter having a restricted measure and limit, then there will be nothing left unplaced or unorganized, an unused remnant, as it were, to crash into them from the outside. For the law of reason over each world, having control over the matter assigned to each, will not allow anything to be carried away from it nor to wander about and crash into another world, nor anything from another world to crash into it, because Nature has neither unlimited and infinite magnitude nor irrational and disorganized movement. Even if any emanation is carried from some worlds to others, it is certain to be congenial, agreeable, and to unite peaceably with all, like the rays of starlight and

their blending; and the worlds themselves must experience joy in gazing at one another with kindly eyes; and for the many good gods in each, they must provide opportunities for visits and a friendly welcome. Truly in all this there is nothing impossible or fabulous or contrary to reason unless, indeed, because of Aristotle’s[*](Cf. Aristotle, De Caelo, i. 7 (276 a 18).) statements some persons shall look upon it with suspicion as being based on physical grounds. For if each of the bodies has its own particular place, as he asserts, the earth must of necessity turn toward the centre from all directions and the water be above it, settling below the lighter elements because of its weight. If, therefore, there be more worlds than one, it will come to pass that in many places the earth will rest above the fire and the air, and in many places below them; and the air and the water likewise, in some places existing in positions in keeping with nature and in other places in positions contrary to nature. As this, in his opinion, is impossible, the inference is that there are neither two worlds nor more, but only this one, composed of the whole of matter and resting firmly in keeping with Nature, as befits the diversity of its bodies.

All this, however, has been put in a way that is more plausible than true. Look at it in this way, my dear Demetrius, said I; when he says of the bodies that some have a motion towards the centre and downwards, others away from the centre and upwards, and others around the centre and in a circular path, in what relation does he take the centre?[*](Cf.Moralia, 925 b and 1054 b.) Certainly not in relation to the void, for according to him it does not exist. And according to those for whom it does exist, it has no centre, just as it has no point where it begins or where it ends;

for these are limitations, and the infinite has no limitations. And if a man could force himself, by reasoning, to dare the concept of a violent motion of the infinite, what difference, if referred to this, is created for the bodies in their movements? For in the void there is no power in the bodies, nor do the bodies have a predisposition and an impetus, by virtue of which they cling to the centre and have a universal tendency in this one direction. It is equally difficult, in the case of inanimate bodies and an incorporeal and undifferentiated position, to conceive of a movement created from the bodies or an attraction created by the position. Thus one conclusion is left: when the centre is spoken of it is not with reference to any place, but with reference to the bodies. For in this world of ours, which has a single unity in its organization from numerous dissimilar elements, these differences necessarily create various movements towards various objects. Evidence of this is found in the fact that everything, when it undergoes transformation, changes its position coincidently with the change in its substance. For example, dispersion distributes upwards and round about the matter rising from the centre and condensation and consolidation press it down towards the centre and drive it together.