Quaestiones Romanae
Plutarch
Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals, Vol. II. Goodwin, William W., editor; Chauncy, Isaac translator. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company; Cambridge: Press of John Wilson and Son, 1874.
Question 79. Why was it lawful to bring the bones of one that had triumphed (after he was dead and burnt) into the city and lay them there, as Pyrrho the Liparaean hath told us?
Solution. Was it for the honor they had for the deceased? For they granted that not only generals and other eminent persons, but also their offspring, should be buried in the market-place, for example, Valerius and Fabricius. And they say, when the posterity of these persons died, they were brought into the market-place, and a burning firebrand was put under them and immediately taken away; and thus all that might have caused envy was avoided, and the right to the honor was fully confirmed.
Question 80. Why did they that publicly feasted the triumphers humbly request the consuls, and by messengers sent beseech them, not to come to their supper?
Solution. Was it that it was necessary to give the supreme place and most honorable entertainment to the triumpher, and wait upon him home after supper; whereas, the consuls being present, they might do such things to none other but them?
Question 81. Why did not the tribune of the people wear a purple garment, whenas each of the other magistrates wore one?
Solution. What if the tribune is not a magistrate at all? For he neither hath lictors, nor sitting in tribunal doth he determine causes; neither do the tribunes, as the rest, enter upon their office at the beginning of the year,
nor do they cease when a dictator is chosen; but as if they translated all magistratic power to themselves, they continue still, being (as it were) no magistrates, but holding another kind of rank. And as some rhetoricians will not have a prohibition to be judicial proceeding, seeing it doth something contrary to judicial proceeding,—for the one brings in an action at law and gives judgment upon it, but the other nonsuits it and dismisseth the cause,— after the like manner they are of opinion that tribuneship is rather a curb to magistracy, and that it is an order standing in opposition to government rather than a piece of government itself; for the tribune’s office and authority is to withstand the magistrate’s authority, even to curtail his extravagant power. Perhaps these and similar reasons may be mere ingenious devices; but in truth, since tribuneship takes its original from the people, popularity is its stronghold, and it is a great thing not to carry it above the rest of the people, but to be like the citizens they have to do with in gesture, habit, and diet. State indeed becomes a consul and a praetor; but as for a tribune (as Caius Curio saith), he must be one that even is trampled upon, not grave in countenance, nor difficult of access, nor harsh to the rabble, but more tractable to them than to others. Hence it was decreed that the tribune’s doors should not be shut, but be open night and day as a haven and place of refuge for distressed people. And the more condescending his outward deportment is, by so much the more doth he increase in his power; for they dignify him as one of public use, and to be resorted to of all sorts even as an altar; therefore by the reverence they give him, he is sacred, holy, and inviolable; and when he makes a public progress, it is a law that every one should cleanse and purify the body as defiled.