Consolatio ad Apollonium

Plutarch

Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. II. Babbitt, Frank Cole, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1928 (printing).

Wherefore, over those who die men of good sense ought not to be carried away by sorrow beyond the natural and moderate limit of grief, which so affects the soul, into useless and barbarian

mourning, and they ought not to wait for that outcome which has already been the lot of many in the past, the result of which is that they terminate their own lives in misery before they have put off their mourning, and gain nothing but a forlorn burial in their garments of sorrow, as their woes and the ills born of their unreasonableness follow them to the grave, so that one might utter over them the verse of Homer: [*](Combined from Il. xxiii. 109, and Od. i. 423 (=Od. xviii. 306).) While they were weeping and wailing black darkness descended upon them.

We should therefore often hold converse with ourselves after this fashion and say: What ? Shall we some day cease grieving, or shall we consort with unceasing misery to the very end of our life ? For to regard our mourning as unending is the mark of the most extreme foolishness, especially when we observe how those who have been in the deepest grief and greatest mourning often become most cheerful under the influence of time, and at the very tombs where they gave violent expression to their grief by wailing and beating their breasts, they arrange most elaborate banquets with musicians and all the other forms of diversion. It is accordingly the mark of a madman thus to assume that he shall keep his mourning permanently. If, however, men should reason that mourning will come to an end after some particular event, they might go on and reason that it will come to an end when time, forsooth, has produced some effect; for not even God can undo what has been done. So, then, that which in the present instance has come to pass contrary to our expectation and contrary to our opinion has only demonstrated what is wont, through

the very course of events, to happen in the case of many men. What then ? Are we unable, through reason, to learn this fact and draw the conclusion, that
Full is the earth now of evils, and full of them too is the ocean,[*](Hesiod, Works and Days, 101; cf. 105 E supra. )
and also this:
Such woes of woes for mortal men, And round about the Fates throng close; There is no vacant pathway for the air ?[*](From an unknown lyric poet; Cf. Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec. iii. p. 689.)

Not merely now, but long ago, as Crantor [*](Mullach, Frag. Philos. Graec. iii. p. 149.) says, the lot of man has been bewailed by many wise men, who have felt that life is a punishment and that for man to be born at all is the greatest calamity. Aristotle [*](Cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, i. 48 (114), and Aristotle, Frag. No. 44 Rose.) says that Silenus when he was captured declared this to Midas. It is better to quote the very words of the philosopher. He says, in the work which is entitled Eudemus, or Of the Soul, the following: Wherefore, O best and blessedest of all, in addition to believing that those who have ended this life are blessed and happy, we also think that to say anything false or slanderous against them is impious, from our feeling that it is directed against those who have already become our betters and superiors. And this is such an old and ancient belief with us that no one knows at all either the beginning of the time or the name of the person who first promulgated it, but it continues to be a fixed belief for all time.[*](Cf. Sophocles, Antigone 466.)

And in addition to this you observe how the saying, which is on the lips of all men, has been passed from mouth to mouth for many years.What is this ? said he. And the other, again taking up the discourse, said: That not to be born is the best of all, and that to be dead is better than to live. And the proof that this is so has been given to many men by the deity. So, for example, they say that Silenus, after the hunt in which Midas of yore had captured him, when Midas questioned and inquired of him what is the best thing for mankind and what is the most preferable of all things, was at first unwilling to tell, but maintained a stubborn silence. But when at last, by employing every device, Midas induced him to say something to him, Silenus, forced to speak, said: Ephemeral offspring of a travailing genius and of harsh fortune, why do you force me to speak what it were better for you men not to know ? For a life spent in ignorance of one’s own woes is most free from grief. But for men it is utterly impossible that they should obtain the best thing of all, or even have any share in its nature (for the best thing for all men and women is not to be born); however, the next best thing to this, and the first of those to which man can attain, but nevertheless only the second best, is, after being born, to die as quickly as possible. [*](Cf. Theognis, 425; Bacchylidies, v. 160; Sophocles, Oed. Col. 1225; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, i. 48 (115).) It is evident, therefore, that he made this declaration with the conviction that the existence after death is better than that in life. One might cite thousands and thousands of examples under this same head, but there is no need to be prolix.