Consolatio ad Apollonium

Socrates [*](Plato, Apology, p. 40 C.) said that death resembles either a very deep sleep or a long and distant journey, or, thirdly, a sort of destruction and extinction of both the body and the soul, but that by no one of these possibilities is it an evil. Each of these conceptions he pursued further, and the first one first. For if

death is a sleep, and there is nothing evil in the state of those who sleep, it is evident that there is likewise nothing evil in the state of those who are dead. Nay, what need is there even to state that the deepest sleep is indeed the sweetest ? For the fact is of itself patent to all men, and Homer [*](Od. xiii. 80.) bears witness by saying regarding it:

Slumber the deepest and sweetest, and nearest to death in its semblance.

In another place [*](Il. xiv. 231.) also he says:

Here she chanced to encounter the brother of Death, which is Slumber,

and

Slumber and Death, the twin brothers,[*](Il. xvi. 672, 682.)

thereby indicating their similarity in appearance, for twins show most similarity. And again somewhere [*](Il. xi. 241.) he says that death is a brazen sleep, in allusion to our insensibility in it. And not inelegantly did the man [*](Mnesimachus. Cf. Kock, Com. Att. Frag. ii. p. 422, Mnesimachus, No. 11. Initiation into the lesser mysteries (celebrated at Agrae, near Athens, in March) was required before one could be admitted to the great Eleusinian festival in September.) seem to put the case who called sleep the Lesser Mysteries of death; for sleep is really a preparatory rite for death. Very wise was the remark of the cynic Diogenes, who, when he had sunk into slumber and was about to depart this life, was roused by his physician, who inquired if anything distressed him. Nothing, he said, for the one brother merely forestalls the other. [*](Cf. a similar remark attributed to Gorgias of Leontini in Aelian, Varia Historia, ii. 35.)

If death indeed resembles a journey, even so

it is not an evil. On the contrary, it may even be a good. For to pass one’s time unenslaved by the flesh and its emotions, by which the mind is distracted and tainted with human folly, would be a blessed piece of good fortune. For the body, says Plato, [*](Phaedo, p. 66 B.) in countless ways leaves us no leisure because of its necessary care and feeding. Moreover, if any diseases invade it, they hinder our pursuit of reality, and it fills us with lusts and desires and fears and all manner of fancies and folly, so that, as the saying goes, because of it we really have no opportunity to think seriously of anything. It is a fact that wars and strifes and battles are brought about by nothing else except the body and its desires; for all wars are waged for the acquisition of property, and property we are forced to acquire because of the body, since we are slaves in its service; and the result is that, because of these things, we have no leisure for study. And the worst of all is, that even if we do gain some leisure from the demands of the body, and turn to the consideration of some subject, yet at every point in our investigation the body forces itself in, and causes tumult and confusion, and disconcerts us, so that on account of it we are unable to discern the truth. Nay, the fact has been thoroughly demonstrated to us that, if we are ever going to have any pure knowledge, we must divest ourselves of the body, and with the soul itself observe the realities. And, as it appears, we shall possess what we desire and what we profess to long for—and that is wisdom—only, as our reasoning shows, after we are dead, but not while we are alive. For if it is impossible in company with the body to have any pure knowledge, then one of two things is true: either it is not possible to attain knowledge anywhere, or else only after death. For then the soul will be quite by itself, separate from the body, but before that time never. And so, while we live, we shall, as it appears, be nearest to knowledge if, as far as possible, we have no association or communion with the body, except such as absolute necessity requires, and if we do not taint ourselves with its nature, but keep ourselves pure of it until such time as God himself shall release us. And thus, being rid of the irrationality of the body, we shall, in all likelihood, be in the company of others in like state, and we shall behold with our own eyes the pure and absolute, which is the truth; since for the impure to touch the pure may well be against the divine ordinance.

So, even if it be likely that death transports us into another place, it is not an evil; for it may possibly prove to be a good, as Plato has shown. Wherefore very wonderful were the words which Socrates [*](Plato, Apology, p. 29 A.) uttered before his judges, to this effect: To be afraid of death, Sirs, is nothing else than to seem to be wise when one is not; for it is to seem to know what one does not know. For in regard to death nobody knows even whether it happens to be for mankind the greatest of all good things, yet they fear it as if they knew well that it is the greatest of evils. From this view it seems that the poet does not dissent who says:

Let none fear death, which is release from toils,[*](Author unknown; cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Adespota, No. 371.)

—ay, and from the greatest of evils as well.