De fortuna

In default of any information regarding Plutarch’s short essay on Chance, we can only guess that it may have been delivered as a lecture, although Hartman denies such a possibility. The arguing of such subjects has always had a certain attraction for mankind until comparatively recent times, but the development of a more exact knowledge regarding psychology has in later years checked such discussions. Yet a knowledge of psychology will not detract from the interest and enjoyment of anyone who will read this essay.

Man’s ways are chance and not sagacity.[*](From Chaeremon: Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag.p. 782. Cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, v. 9 (25).)

If self-control, justice, and bravery exist, how is it possible to reason that intelligence does not exist; and if intelligence exists, must not sagacity exist also? For self-control is a kind of intelligence, they say, and justice requires the presence of intelligence.[*](Cf. Moralia, 441 A and 1034 C.) Or rather, that particular sagacity and intelligence which render men virtuous in the midst of pleasures we call continence and self-control, in perils and labours we call it perseverance and fortitude, in private dealings and in public life we call it equity and justice. Wherefore, if we impute the works of sagacity to chance, let the works of justice and of self-control be also ascribed to chance, and, by Heaven, let thieving, stealing purses, and licentious living all be ascribed to chance, and let us abandon all our reasoning processes and resign ourselves to chance, to be driven and carried, as dust or rubbish by a violent wind, hither and thither. If, then, sagacity does not exist, it is a fair inference that there can be no sagacious planning about what is to be done, and no consideration or searching for what is to the best advantage, but Sophocles [*](Oedipus Tyrannus, 110.) indulged in idle talk when he said:

Whatever is pursued May be achieved; neglected it escapes;

What can be taught I learn; what can be found I seek; but God I ask to answer prayer.

Yet, suppose someone among us should say that the act of seeing is chance and not vision nor the use of light-bringing orbs, as Plato [*](In the Timaeus, p. 45 B.) calls the eyes, and that the act of hearing is chance and not a faculty apperceptive of a vibration in the air which is carried onward through ear and brain.[*](Cf. Plato, Timaeus, p. 67 B.) If such were the case, it were well for us, as it appears, to beware of trusting our senses! But, as a matter of fact, Nature has conferred upon us sight, hearing, taste, smell, and our other members and their faculties to be ministers of sagacity and intelligence, and

Mind has sight and mind has hearing; all the rest is deaf and blind. [*](From Epicharmus; cited by Plutarch also in Moralia, 33 B and 961 A. Cf. Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, i. p. 123.)

Which gives the foal of horse and ass, and get Of bull, to serve us and assume our tasks,

But as for hedgehogs Growing upon their backs sharp darts of spines stand bristling,[*](Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, i. p. 252.)

Yet by one gift all this she mitigates,[*](Author unknown, but perhaps Euripides; cf.Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag.,Adespota, No. 367; cited again by Plutarch, Moralia, 959 D.)

Slight, of a truth, is the strength of man; and yet By his mind’s resourcefulness Doth he subjugate the monsters Of the deep, and the purposes Of the denizens of earth and air.[*](From the Aeolus of Euripides; Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 27.)

No, we are not invincible either in boxing or wrestling, Nor are we swift in the race.[*](Adapted from Homer, Od. viii. 246.)

Moreover, under the head of man’s ways [*](Cf. the first line of chap. i. supra.) would fall, no doubt, the activities of carpenters, copper-smiths, builders, and statuaries, wherein we see nothing brought to a successful conclusion accidentally or as it chances. That chance may sometimes contribute slightly to their success, [*](From Epicurus; cf. the quotation in Diogenes Laertius, x. 144.) but

Into the highway come, all craftsmen folk, Who worship Labour, stern-eyed child of Zeus, With sacred baskets placed about.[*](Perhaps from Sophocles; cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No. 760. )Ἐργάνη is an epithet applied to Athena as patron of the arts.)

It is therefore amazing how, if the arts have no need of chance to accomplish their own ends, the greatest and most perfect art of all, the consummation of the high repute and esteem to which man can attain, can count for nothing! But in the tightening and loosening of strings there is involved a certain sagacity, which men call music, and also in the preparation of food, to which we give the name of cookery, and in the cleaning of clothes, which we call fulling; and we teach our children to put on their shoes and clothes, and to take their meat with the right hand and hold their bread in the left, on the assumption that even these things do not come by chance, but require oversight and attention.[*](Cf.Moralia, 5 A and 440 A.) But can it be that those things which are most important and most essential for happiness do not call for intelligence, nor have any part in the processes of reason and forethought ? But nobody wets clay with water and leaves it, assuming that by chance and accidentally there will be bricks, nor after providing himself with wool and leather does he sit down with a prayer to Chance that they turn into a cloak and shoes for him; and when a man has amassed much gold and silver and a multitude of slaves, and has surrounded himself with spacious suites of rooms, and, in addition, has furnished them with costly couches and tables,[*](Cf.Moralia, 100 C, infra.) does he imagine that these things, without the presence of intelligence in himself, will be happiness and a blissful life, free from grief and secure from change?

Somebody asked Iphicrates [*](This story also in Moralia, 187 B and 440 B.) the general, as though undertaking to expose him, who he was, since he was neither a man-at-arms, nor archer, nor targeteer; and he answered, I am the man who

Intelligence is not gold or silver or repute or wealth or health or strength or beauty. What then is it? It is the something which is able to make good use of all these, and something through whose agency each of these is made pleasant, noteworthy, and profitable. Without it they are unserviceable, fruitless, and harmful, and they burden and disgrace their possessor. It is surely excellent advice that Hesiod’s [*](In the Works and Days, 86.) Prometheus gives to Epimetheus:

Never to welcome Any gifts from Zeus of Olympus, but always return them,