De amicorum multitudine

Plutarch’s essay on friendship may possibly have been offered on some occasion as a lecture, but there is nothing to prove or disprove this assumption. From what we know of Plutarch’s relations to his friends we can well believe that he was singularly happy in his friendships, and hence well fitted to speak on the subject. He was familiar, too, with the literature dealing with friendship, and the result is an essay well worth reading. Cicero’s essay on friendship (De amicitia) may profitably be compared with Plutarch’s.

Two or three emendations of a more radical nature have been adopted in the text, in the effort to make it intelligible: for example, in 96 a the translation probably gives the right sense of the passage, as Wyttenbach seemed to see, but whether the emendation is right is more doubtful. Even more doubtful is Paton’s προσεντείνειν, based on an even more dubious emendation of ἐντείνασθαι in the quotation from Euripides; for Plutarch would not be apt to refer to an aorist middle by a present active form. In these matters Plutarch was more careful than Paton.

Meno,[*](Plato, Meno 71 E.) the Thessalian, who felt that he had had a good training in debating, and, to quote Empedocles’ familiar expression, was

Haunting the lofty heights of wisdom, [*](From a longer fragment; cf. Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, i. p. 225.)

If he but have the shadow of a friend.

One thing which stands out among many others, as particularly antagonistic to our acquisition of friendship, is the craving for numerous friends, which is like that of licentious women, [*](Cf. Lucian, Tozaris, 37.) for because of our frequent intimacies with many different persons we cannot keep our hold on our earlier associates, who are neglected and drift away. A better comparison, perhaps, is the nursling of Hypsipyle, who seated himself in the meadow, and

One after another caught up Handfuls of flowers with joyful heart, But with childhood’s yearning unsated.[*](Presumably from the Hypsipyle of Euripides, cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 754. Cf. also Plutarch, Moralia, 661 F.)

In the first place, then, let us begin at the hearthstone, as the saying is, with the story of men’s lives which history [*](Plutarch is considering Greek history only.) has left us regarding steadfast friends, and let us take as witness and counsellor in our discussion the long and distant ages in which are mentioned, as paired in the bond of friendship, Theseus and Peirithoüs, Achilles and Patroclus,

We do not maintain that our friend should be the only one, but along with others let there be some child of our eld and late-begotten, as it were, who has consumed with us in the course of time the proverbial bushel of salt, [*](Cf.Moralia, 482 B; Cicero, De amicitia, 19 (67); Aristotle, Eth. Nicom. viii. 3.) not as is the fashion nowadays, by which many get the name of friend by drinking a single glass together, or by playing ball or gambling together, or by spending a night under the same roof, and so pick up a friendship from inn, gymnasium, or market-place.

In the houses of rich men and rulers, the people see a noisy throng of visitors offering their greetings and shaking hands and playing the part of armed retainers, and they think that those who have so many friends must be happy. Yet they can see a far greater number of flies in those persons’ kitchens. But the flies do not stay on after the good food is gone, nor the retainers after their patron’s usefulness is gone. But true friendship seeks after three things above all else: virtue as a good thing, intimacy as a pleasant thing, and usefulness as a necessary thing, for a man ought to use judgement before accepting a friend, and to enjoy being with him and to use him when in need of him, and all these things stand in the way of one’s having many friends; but most in the way is the first (which is the most important)—the approval through judgement. Therefore we must, in the first place, consider whether it is possible in a brief period of time to test dancers who are to dance together, or rowers who are to pull together, or servants who are to be guardians of property or attendants of children, let alone the testing of a multitude of friends who are to strip for a general contest with every kind of fortune, each one of whom

Puts his successes with the common store, And shares in bad luck, too, without distress.[*](Author unknown; cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Adespota, No. 366.)

Those who are bereft rejoice, And those who have them pray for some escape.[*](From some play of Sophocles; it is cited again by Plutarch in Moralia, 768 E; cf.Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No. 779.)

We ought therefore not to accept readily chance acquaintances, or attach ourselves to them, nor ought we to make friends of those who seek after us, but rather we should seek after those who are worthy of friendship. For one should by no means take what can be easily taken. In fact we step over or thrust aside bramble and brier, which seize hold upon us, and make our way onward to the olive and the vine.[*](Cf.Moralia, 709 E.) Thus it is always an excellent thing not to make an intimate acquaintance of the man who is ready with his embraces, but rather, of our own motion, to embrace those of whom we approve as worthy of our attention and useful to us.

Just as Zeuxis,[*](Cf. Plutarch, Life of Pericles, chap. xiii. (p. 159 D).) when some persons charged him with painting slowly, retorted by saying, Yes, it takes me a long time, for it is to last long, so it is necessary to preserve friendship and intimacy by

Never in life again shall we take counsel together Sitting apart from our comrades.[*](Homer, Il. xxiii. 77; the words are spoken by the ghost of Patroclus to Achilles.)

Else there were nothing Which could have parted us twain in the midst of our love and enjoyment; No, not till Death’s dark cloud had wrapped its shadow around us.[*](Homer, Od. iv. 178; Plutarch quoted the first two lines in Moralia, 54 F.)

In divers men solicitude excites conduct diverse.[*](Bergk, Peirithoüs iii. p. 721, Adespota, No. 99.)

But if all our friends want the same things at the same time, it is hard to satisfy all, in either their counsels, their public life, their ambitions, or their dispensing of hospitality. And if at one and the same time they chance to be occupied in diverse activities and experiences, and call upon us at the same instant, one to join him on a voyage to foreign parts, another to help him in defending a suit, another to sit with him as judge, another to help him in managing his buying and selling, another to help him to celebrate his wedding, another to mourn with him at a funeral, [*](The language here seems to be an amplification of Aristotle, Ethica Nicom. ix. 10.) The city is with burning incense filled; Full too of joyous hymns and doleful groans [*](Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus, 4; cited by Plutarch also in Moralia, 169 D, 445 D, and 623 C.) is the possession of a host of friends. It is impossible to be with them all, and unnatural to be with none, and yet to do a service to one alone, and thus to offend many, is a source of vexation; For fond affection does not brook neglect.[*](A line from Menander, cited also in Moralia, 491 C; cf. Kock, Com. Attic. Frag. iii. p. 213.)

Yet people are more tolerant of acts of negligence and remissness on the part of their friends, and they accept from them without anger such excuses as I forgot, I didn’t know. But the man who says, I did not appear with you when your case was in court, for I was appearing with another friend, and I did not come and see you when you had fever, for I was busy helping so-and-so to entertain some friends, thus alleging, as the reason for his inattention, his attention to others, does not absolve himself from blame, but only aggravates the trouble by arousing jealousy. But most people, apparently, look at the possession of a host of friends merely from the point of view of what such friendships are able to bestow, and overlook what these demand in return, forgetting that he who accepts the services of many for his needs must in turn render like service to many in their need. Therefore, just as Briareus in purveying for fifty bellies with an hundred hands had no advantage over us who manage one stomach with what two hands provide, so in making use of many friends is involved also serving many, and sharing in their anxieties, preoccupations, and troubles. For no credence is to be given to Euripides [*](Hippolytus, 253.) when he says:

In the friendship which mortals with each other form Moderation should rule, and it never should reach To the soul’s inmost marrow; and easy to loose Should the spells ever be that are laid on the mind So to thrust them aside or to draw them close,

There is truth in the remark of the wise Chilon,[*](Cf.Moralia, 86 C, and Aulus Gellius, i. 3.) who, in answer to the man who boasted of having no enemy, said, The chances are that you have no friend either. For enmities follow close upon friendships, and are interwoven with them, inasmuch as

it is impossible for a friend not to share his friend’s wrongs or disrepute or disfavour; for a man’s enemies at once look with suspicion and hatred upon his friend, and oftentimes his other friends are envious and jealous, and try to get him away. As the oracle given to Timesias [*](Cf. the story told of Timesias by Plutarch, Moralia, 812 A.) about his colony prophesied:

Soon shall your swarms of honey-bees turn out to be hornets,

Yoked fast in duty’s bonds not forged by man,[*](A line of Euripides, probably from the Peirithoüs, cited by Plutarch also in Moralia, 482 A, 533 A, and 763 F. Cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 595.)

For these reasons it is not a fit thing to be thus unsparing of our virtue, uniting and intertwining it now with one and now with another, but rather only with those who are qualified to keep up the same participation, that is to say, those who are able, in a like manner, to love and participate. For herein plainly is the greatest obstacle of all to having a multitude of friends, in that friendship comes into

What man is there, then, so indefatigable, so changeable, so universally adaptable, that he can assimilate and accommodate himself to many persons, without deriding the advice of Theognis [*](Verses 215-6, cited by Plutarch also in Moralia, 916 C and 978 E.) when he says:

Copy this trait of the cuttle-fish, which changes its colour So as to seem to the eye like to the rock where it clings?