De capienda ex inimicis utilitate

Plutarch

Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. II. Babbitt, Frank Cole, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1928 (printing).

The essay on turning even one’s enemies to some profitable use was an extempore address which was afterwards reduced to writing. It still retains, however, some of the marks of its extempore character in an occasional asyndeton or anacoluthon, in a few repetitions, and in such little slips as reversing the positions of Domitius and Scaurus (91 d). But minor matters of this sort cannot obscure the excellence of the essay as a whole, which contains much good advice, many wholesome truths, and much common sense. To cite but one example, the statement (91 b) that many things which are necessary in time of war, but bad under other conditions, acquire the sanction of custom and law, and cannot be easily abolished, even though the people are being injured by them, will appeal to everybody except the confirmed militarist. The essay was written some time after the essay entitled Advice to Statesmen, which in turn must be placed shortly after the death of Domitian (a.d. 96).

This is one of the moral essays of Plutarch which so impressed Christians that they were translated into Syriac in the sixth or seventh centuries. The translation of this essay is rather an adaptation, many details being omitted as unessential, but even so it gives light on the Greek text in a few places. The Syriac translation is published in Studia Sinaitica, No. IV (London 1894)

I observe, my dear Cornelius Pulcher,[*](Presumably Cn. Cornelius Pulcher, who was procurator in Achaea towards the close of Plutarch’s life. He also held various other offices. Cf.Corpus Inscr. Graec. i. 1186.) that you have chosen the mildest form of official administration, in which you are as helpful as possible to the public interests while at the same time you show yourself to be very amiable in private to those who have audience with you. Now it may be possible to find a country, in which, as it is recorded of Crete,[*](This tradition in regard to Crete is found in several ancient writers. Cf. for example Pliny, Nat. Hist. viii. 83.) there are no wild animals, but a government which has not had to bear with envy or jealous rivalry or contention—emotions most productive of enmity—has not hitherto existed. For our very friendships, if nothing else, involve us in enmities. This is what the wise Chilon [*](The same remark is quoted by Plutarch in Moralia 96 A. Cf. also Aulus Gellius, i. 3.) had in mind, when he asked the man who boasted that he had no enemy whether he had no friend either. Therefore it seems to me to be the duty of a statesman not only to have thoroughly investigated the subject of enemies in general, but also in his reading of Xenophon [*](In Oeconomicus 1. 15.) to have given more than passing attention to the remark that it is a trait of the man of sense to derive profit even from his enemies. Some thoughts, therefore, on this subject, which I recently had occasion to express, I have put together in practically the same words, and now send them to you, with the omission, so far

as possible, of matter contained in my Advice to Statesmen,[*](This work has been preserved; it is to be found in the Moralia 798 A-825 F.) since I observe that you often have that book close at hand.

Primitive men were quite content if they could escape being injured by strange and fierce animals, and this was the aim and end of their struggles against the wild beasts; but their successors, by learning, as they did, how to make use of them, now profit by them through using their flesh for food, their hair for clothing, their gall and colostrum as medicine, and their skins as armour, so that there is good reason to fear that, if the supply of wild beasts should fail man, his life would become bestial, helpless, and uncivilized.[*](Cf.Moralia 964 A.) Since, then, it is enough for most people if they can avoid suffering ill-treatment at the hands of their enemies, and since Xenophon [*](Oeconomicus 1.15; cf. also Cyropaedia, i. 6. 11.) asserts that men of sense will even derive profit from those who are at variance with them, we must not refuse him credence, but rather try to discover the system and the art through which this admirable advantage is to be gained by those who find it impossible to live without an enemy.

The farmer cannot domesticate every tree, nor can the huntsman tame every beast; and so they have sought to derive profit from these in ways to meet their other needs: the farmer from the trees that bear no fruit and the huntsman from the Wild animals. The water of the sea is unfit to drink and tastes vile; yet fish thrive in it, and it is a medium for the dispatch and conveyance of travellers everywhere. The Satyr, at his first sight of fire, wished to kiss and embrace it, but Prometheus said,

You, goat, will mourn your vanished beard,[*](From Prometheus the Fire-bearer of Aeschylus. Cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Aeschylus, No. 207.)

for fire burns him who touches it, yet it furnishes light and heat, and is an instrument of every craft for those who have learned to use it. So look at your enemy, and see whether, in spite of his being in most respects harmful and difficult to manage, he does not in some way or other afford you means of getting hold of him and of using him as you can use no one else, and so can be of profit to you. Many of the circumstances of life are unkindly and hateful and repellent to those who have to meet them; yet you observe that some have employed their attacks of bodily illness for quiet resting, and trials which have fallen to the lot of many have but strengthened and trained them. Some, too, have made banishment and loss of property a means of leisure and philosophic study, as did Diogenes[*](Cf. Diogenes Laertius, vi. 20 ff.) and Crates.[*](Ibid. vi. 85.) And Zeno,[*](The remark of Zeno is again referred to by Plutarch in Moralia, 467 D and 603 D: cf. also Diogenes Laertius, vii. 5, and Seneca, De animi tranquillitate, chap. xiii.) on learning that the ship which bore his venture had been wrecked, exclaimed, A real kindness, O Fortune, that thou, too, dost join in driving us to the philosopher’s cloak ! For just as those animals which have the strongest and soundest stomachs can eat and digest snakes and scorpions, and there are some even that derive nourishment from stones and shells (for they transmute such things by reason of the vigour and heat of their spirit), while fastidious and sickly persons are nauseated if they partake of bread and wine, so fools spoil even their friendships, while wise men are able to make a fitting use even of their enmities.

In the first place, then, it seems to me that the most harmful element in enmity may be made most profitable to those who give heed. What is this ? Your enemy, wide awake, is constantly lying in wait to take advantage of your actions, and seeking to gain some hold on you, keeping up a constant patrol about your life; and not only does his sight, like the sight of Lynceus, [*](Lynceus was gifted with superhuman powers of vision; cf. for example Moralia, 1083 D; Pindar, Nemean Odes, x. 60; Horace, Epistles, i. 1. 28, and Pausanias, iv. 2.) penetrate the oak-tree and stones and tiles, but your enemy, through every friend and servant and acquaintance as well, so far as possible, plays the detective on your actions and digs his way into your plans and searches them through and through. Oftentimes we do not learn, until too late, of the illness or the death of our friends, so careless are we and neglectful; but our curiosity about our enemies all but prompts us to pry into their dreams; sickness, debts, and conjugal disagreements are more likely to be unknown to the very persons affected than to their enemy. Especially does he try to get hold of their failings and ferret them out. And just as vultures are drawn to the smell of decomposed bodies, but have no power to discover those that are clean and healthy, so the infirmities, meannesses, and untoward experiences of life rouse the energies of the enemy, and it is such things as these that the malevolent pounce upon and seize and tear to pieces. Is this then profitable ? Assuredly it is, to have to live circumspectly, to give heed to one’s self, and not to do or say anything carelessly or inconsiderately, but always to keep one’s life unassailable as though under an exact regimen. For the circumspection which thus represses the emotions and keeps the reasoning power within bounds gives practice and purpose in living a life that

is fair and free from reproach. For just as states which are chastened by border warfare and continual campaigning become well content with good order and a sound government, so persons who have been compelled on account of enmities to practise soberness of living, to guard against indolence and contemptuousness, and to let some good purpose prompt each act, are insensibly led by force of habit to make no mistakes, and are made orderly in their behaviour, even if reason co-operate but slightly. For when men keep always ready in mind the thought that

Priam and Priam’s sons would in truth have cause for rejoicing,[*](Homer, Il. i. 255. The words are addressed by Nestor to the Greek leaders, Agamemnon and Achilles, who have quarrelled.)

it causes them to face about and turn aside and abandon such things as give their enemies occasion for rejoicing and derision. Furthermore, we observe that the Dionysiac artists[*](Actors and musicians.) often play their parts in the theatres in a listless, dispirited, and inaccurate way when they are by themselves; but when there is rivalry and competition with another company, then they apply not only themselves but their instruments more attentively, picking their strings and tuning them and playing their flutes in more exact harmony. So the man who knows that his enemy is his competitor in life and repute is more heedful of himself, and more circumspect about his actions, and brings his life into a more thorough harmony. For it is a peculiar mark of vice, that we feel more ashamed of our faults before our enemies than before our friends. This is the ground of Nasica’s remark, when some expressed their belief that the power of the Romans was now secure, inasmuch as the Carthaginians had been annihilated and

the Achaeans reduced to subjection. Nay, he said, now is our position really dangerous, since we have left for ourselves none to make us either afraid or ashamed.

Moreover, as a supplement to this take the declaration of Diogenes,[*](Quoted again in Moralia, 21 E.) which is thoroughly philosophic and statesmanlike: How shall I defend myself against my enemy ? By proving yourself good and honourable. Men are much distressed when they see their enemies’ horses winning renown or their dogs gaining approval. At the sight of a well-tilled field or a flourishing garden they groan. What, think you, would be their state of mind if you were to show yourself to be an honest, sensible man and a useful citizen, of high repute in speech, clean in actions, orderly in living,

Reaping the deep-sown furrow of your mind From which all goodly counsels spring? [*](Aeschylus Seven against Thebes, 593; quoted also in Moralia, 32 D, 186 B, and Life of Aristides, chap. iii. (p. 320 B).)

Pindar [*](Pindar, Frag. 229 (ed. Christ).) says,

The vanquished are bound In the fetters of silence profound,

not absolutely or universally, however, but only those who realize that they are outdone by their enemies in diligence, goodness, magnanimity, kindly deeds, and good works. These are the things which, as Demosthenes [*](Demosthenes, Or. xix. (De falsa legatione) 208 (p. 406).) puts it, retard the tongue, stop the mouth, constrict the throat, and leave one with nothing to say.

Be thou unlike the base; this thou canst do. [*](Euripides, Orestes, 251.)

If you wish to distress the man who hates you, do not revile him as lewd, effeminate, licentious, vulgar, [*](Pindar, Frag. 229 (ed. Christ). d Demosthenes, Or. xix. (De falsa legatione) 208 (p. 406). e Euripides, Orestes, 251.)

or illiberal, but be a man yourself, show self-control, be truthful, and treat with kindness and justice those who have to deal with you. And if you are led into reviling, remove yourself as far as possible from the things for which you revile him. Enter within the portals of your own soul, look about to see if there be any rottenness there, lest some vice lurking somewhere within whisper to you the words of the tragedian:

Wouldst thou heal others, full of sores thyself ? [*](From an unknown play of Euripides; cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 1086; Plutarch quotes the line also in Moralia 1 F, 481 A, and 1110 E.)

If you call your enemy uneducated, strive to intensify in yourself the love of learning and industry; if you call him a coward, rouse even more your selfreliance and manliness; if you call him unchaste and licentious, obliterate from your soul whatever trace of devotion to pleasure may be lurking there unperceived. For there is nothing more disgraceful or painful than evil-speaking that recoils upon its author. So reflected light appears to be the more troublesome in cases of weak eyesight, and the same is true of censures that by the truth are brought back upon the very persons who are responsible for them. For as surely the north-east wind [*](Proverbial; cf. Aristotle, Problem. 26. 1; Theophrastus, De ventis, p. 410; Pliny, Nat. Hist.ii. 48; Plutarch, Moralia, 823 B, and Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Adespota, No. 75.) brings the clouds, so surely does a bad life bring revilings upon itself.

As often as Plato [*](This remark of Plato is cited also in the Moralia, 40 D, 129 D, and 463 E.) found himself in the company of persons whose conduct was unseemly, he was wont to say to himself, Is it possible that I am like them ? But if the man who reviles another’s [*](Plutarch, Moralia, 823 b, and Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Adespota, No. 75. c This remark of Plato is cited also in the Moralia, 40 d, 129 d, and 463 e.)

life will at once carefully inspect his own, and readjust it by directing and turning it aside into the opposite course, he will have gained something useful from this reviling, which, otherwise, not only gives the impression of being useless and inane, but is so in fact.

Now most people laugh if a man who is bald or hump-backed reviles and jeers at others for being in such case; for it is altogether ridiculous to indulge in reviling and jeering at anything that affords to another the opportunity for a caustic retort. For example, Leo [*](Cf. 633 C, for a slightly different version of the story.) of Byzantium, being reviled by a humpback for the weakness of his eyes, said, You reproach me with that which can happen to any man, while you bear on your back the mark of God’s wrath! Do not therefore ever revile an adulterer when you yourself are given to unnatural lust, nor a profligate when you yourself are stingy.

Own kin are you of her who slew her spouse

are the words of Alcmeon to Adrastus. What then does Adrastus say ? He reproaches the speaker with a shameful deed which is not another’s but all his own:

But you yourself slew her who gave you birth.[*](From the Alcmaeon of Euripides; cf. Nauck, T.G.F., Adespota, No. 358. Quoted also in Moralia 35 D.)

Domitius remarked to Crassus, Did you not weep at the death of a lamprey [*](Crassus’s pet eel was famous. Plutarch speaks of it twice elsewhere: Moralia, 811 A and 976 A. Of other writers, Aelian, De natura animal. viii. 4, contains the most interesting account of it.) which was being kept for you in a fish-pond ? And the other replied, Did you not bury three wives and not shed a tear ? The man who is going to indulge in reviling need not be smart and loud-voiced and aggressive, but he must be irreproachable and unimpeachable. For upon nobody does the divine power seem so to enjoin

the precept, Know thyself, as upon him who purposes to censure another, so that such persons may not, by saying what they want to say, have to hear what they do not want to hear. For a person of this type, as Sophocles [*](Two lines of a longer quotation from an unknown play; cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No. 843.) puts it,

By babbling thoughtless talk is wont to hear Against his will the words he willing speaks.

There may be, then, so much that is profitable and useful in reviling one’s enemy; but no less profit lies in the alternative of being reviled oneself and ill spoken of by one’s enemies. Hence Antisthenes [*](Diogenes is given as the author of this saying twice elsewhere in the Moralia, 74 C and 82 A. One MS. gives Diogenes here.) was quite right in saying that, as a matter of self-preservation, men have need of true friends or else of ardent enemies; for the first by admonition, and the second by reviling, turn them from error. But since friendship’s voice has nowadays become thin and weak when it comes to frank speaking, while its flattery is voluble and its admonition mute, we have to depend upon our enemies to hear the truth. For as Telephus,[*](Among the many references to this story, it is perhaps sufficient to cite Moralia, 46 F; Propertius, ii. 1. 63; Ovid, Tristiav. 1. 15.) unable to find a suitable physician, subjected his wound to his enemy’s spear, so those who are cut off from benevolent admonition must submit with patience to the remarks of a malevolent enemy if he exposes and reprehends their vice, and they must give consideration to the facts only, and not to what is in the mind of the detractor. Another parallel is the case of the man who, with intent to kill the Thessalian Prometheus, [*](Apparetly a sort of nickname of Jason of Pherae; at any rate this story is told of Jason by Cicero, De natura deorum, iii. 28 (70); Pliny, Nat. Hist. vii. 51; and Valerius Maximus, i. 8, ext. 6. Cf. Xenophon, Hellenica, ii. 3. 36.) smote with his sword a tumour which Prometheus had, and opened it so that the man’s life

was saved, and he obtained relief from his tumour through its bursting; so oftentimes reviling launched upon a man by the prompting of anger or enmity cures some evil in his soul which either was not recognized or was disregarded by him. But most persons on being reviled do not stop to think whether the reproach is applicable to themselves, but they try to think what other form of reproach is applicable to the reviler, and, just as wrestlers do not wipe the dust from off their own bodies, so these persons do not wipe off the revilings from themselves, but they besmear one another, and in consequence get besmirched and begrimed by each other as they grapple together. But it is more imperative that the man who is ill spoken of by an enemy should rid himself of the attribute in question, than that he should get rid of a stain on his clothes to which his attention has been called; and if anybody mentions things which are not really attributes of ours, we should nevertheless seek to learn the cause which has given rise to such slanderous assertions, and we must exercise vigilance, for fear that we unwittingly commit some error either approximating or resembling the one mentioned. For example, an unwarranted suspicion of unmanliness was aroused against Lacydes, king of the Argives, by a certain arrangement of his hair and a mincing gait, and Pompey [*](Mention of this habit of Pompey’s is found also in the Moralia, 800 D, in the Life of Pompey, chap. xlviii. (p. 645 A), and in the Life of Caesar chap. iv. (p. 709 B).) suffered in the same way on account of his habit of scratching his head with one finger, although he was very far removed from effeminacy and licentiousness. Crassus [*](The story is told more fully in the Life of Crassus, chap. i. (p. 543 B).) incurred the charge of being too intimate with one of the Vestal virgins, when he only wanted to buy from her a piece of good land, and for this reason had many private

interviews with her and paid her much attention. Again, Postumia’s [*](A Vestal Virgin; cf. Livy, iv. 44.) ready laughter and overbold talk in men’s company put her under unjust suspicion, so that she was tried for unchastity. She was found innocent of the charge, but in dismissing her the Poritifex Maximus, Spurius Minucius, reminded her that the language she used should have no less dignity than her life. And again Pausanias inflicted on Themistocles, [*](Thucydides, i. 135; cf. also Plutarch, Life of Themistocles, chap. xxiii. (p. 123 c).) who was doing nothing wrong, the suspicion of treason by treating him as a friend, and by writing and sending messages to him continually.

Whenever, then, anything untrue has been said, you must not despise and disregard it just because it is false, but rather consider what word or act of yours, which of your pursuits or associations, has given colour to the calumny, and then be studiously careful to avoid it. For if others by becoming involved in undesired situations thereby learn a useful lesson—just as Merope says that

Inconstant Fortune took from me, To pay her fee, the dearest that I had, But she for that hath made me wise—[*](From the Cresphontes of Euripides; Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 458.)

what is to hinder a man from taking his enemy as his teacher without fee, and profiting thereby, and thus learning, to some extent, the things of which he was unaware ? For there are many things which an enemy is quicker to perceive than a friend (for Love is blind regarding the loved one, as Plato [*](Plato, Laws, p. 731 E. The quotation is repeated a few pages farther on (92 E), and also in the Moralia, 48 E and 1000 A.) says), and inherent in hatred, along with curiosity, is the inability to hold one’s tongue. Hiero [*](The story is repeated in the Moralia, 175 B, and elsewhere by other writers. One author tells it of Gelon.) was reviled by [*](The story is repeated in the Moralia, 175 b, and elsewhere by other writers. One author tells it of Gelon.)

one of his enemies for his offensive breath; so when he went home he said to his wife, What do you mean ? Even you never told me of this. But she being virtuous and innocent said, I supposed that all men smelt so. Thus it is that things which are perceptible, material, and evident to all the world, may sooner be learned from our enemies than from our friends and close associates.

But, quite apart from this, control over the tongue, which is no small part of virtue, is something which it is impossible to keep always in subjection and obedience to the reasoning faculties, unless a man by training, practice, and industry has mastered the worst of his emotions, such as anger, for example. For the voice that slips out unintended, [*](A picturesque experssion several times used by Homer, e.g. Il. iv. 350; xiv. 83; Od. i. 64; xxiii. 70. The source of the other two quotations is unknown.) and the

Word that has ’scaped the lips’ prison,[*](A picturesque experssion several times used by Homer, e.g. Il. iv. 350; xiv. 83; Od. i. 64; xxiii. 70. The source of the other two quotations is unknown.)

and

Some of the sayings that flit forth of themselves,[*](A picturesque experssion several times used by Homer, e.g. Il. iv. 350; xiv. 83; Od. i. 64; xxiii. 70. The source of the other two quotations is unknown.)

are all incident to temperaments that are quite untrained, and are unsteady and fluctuating, so to speak, owing to weakness of will, headstrong opinions, and a reckless way of living. Just for a word, the lightest thing in the world, is ordained, according to the divine Plato,[*](Plato, Laws, pp. 717 C and 935 A. Plutarch quotes it again in Moralia, 456 D and 505 C.) heaviest punishment, coming from both gods and men. But silence cannot under any circumstances be called to an accounting (it is more than a preventive of thirst, as Hippocrates [*](Cf. Moralia, 515 A.) says of it), and in the midst of reviling it is [*](e.g.II. iv. 350; xiv. 83; Od. i. 64; xxiii. 70. The source of the other two quotations is unknown. b Plato, Laws, pp. 717 c and 935 a. Plutarch quotes it again in Moralia, 456 d and 505 c. c Cf. Moralia, 515 a.)

dignified and Socratic, or rather Heraclean, if it be true that Heracles

Not so much as to a fly gave heed to words of hatred.[*](Source unknown; the story in Pausanias, v. 14, is not to the point.)

Indeed, there is nothing more dignified and noble than to maintain a calm demeanour when an enemy reviles one,

Passing by a man’s scoffs Just as swimmers swim past a precipitous rock,[*](The source of the quotation is not known.)

but far more important is the practice. If you once acquire the habit of bearing an enemy’s abuse in silence, you will very easily bear up under a wife’s attack when she rails at you, and without discomposure will patiently hear the most bitter utterances of a friend or a brother; and when you meet with blows or missiles at the hands of a father or mother, you will show no sign of passion or wrath. For instance, Socrates bore with Xanthippe,[*](Xenophon, Symposium, 2. 10.) who was irascible and acrimonious, for he thought that he should have no difficulty in getting along with other people if he accustomed himself to bear patiently with her; but it is much better to secure this training from the scurrilous, angry, scoffing, and abusive attacks of enemies and outsiders, and thus accustom the temper to be unruffled and not even impatient in the midst of reviling.

In this manner, then, it is possible for us to display the qualities of gentleness and forbearance in connexion with our enmities, and also straightforwardness, magnanimity, and goodness better than in our friendships. For it is not so honourable to do a good turn to a friend as it is disgraceful not to do it when he is in need; but even to forgo taking [*](Xenophon, Symposium, 2. 10.)

vengeance on an enemy when he offers a good opportunity is a handsome thing to do. But in case a man shows compassion for an enemy in affliction, and gives a helping hand to him when he has come to be in need, and displays some concern and zeal in behalf of his children and his household affairs when they come to want, I say that whosoever does not feel affection for such a man because of his kindliness, or does not commend his goodness,

Hath a black heart Forged from adamant or else from steel.[*](Part of a longer fragment of Pindar; cf. Pindar, Frag. 123 (ed. Christ); quoted again by Plutarch, Moralia, 558 A.)

When Caesar gave orders that the statues in honour of Pompey, which had been thrown down, should be restored, Cicero [*](Plutarch repeats this story in Moralia, 205 D; Life of Caesar, chap. lvii. (p. 734 E), and Life of Cicero, chap. xl. (p. 881 D). Cf.Suetonius, Caesar, 75.) said to him, You have restored Pompey’s statues, but you have made your own secure. Wherefore there must be no scanting of commendation or due honour in the case of an enemy who has justly gained a fair repute. For such an attitude wins greater commendation for those who bestow it, and inspires confidence, when later a man makes a complaint that he does so, not because he hates the person, but because he disapproves of the action. But best of all, and most advantageous, is the fact that a man is farthest removed from envying the good fortune of his friends or the success of his relatives, if he has acquired the habit of commending his enemies, and feeling no pang and cherishing no grudge when they prosper. And yet what other process of training produces greater benefit to our souls or a better disposition, than does that which takes from us all our jealousy and our proneness to envy ? Just as many of the things which are necessary in war, but bad under other conditions, when they once acquire the sanction of custom and law,

cannot easily be abolished by the people even though the people are being injured by them, so enmity introduces envy along with hatred, and leaves as a residue jealousy, joy over others’ misfortunes, and vindictiveness. Moreover, knavery, deceit, and intrigue, which seem not bad or unjust when employed against an enemy, if once they find a lodgement, acquire a permanent tenure, and are hard to eject. The next thing is that men of themselves employ these against their friends through force of habit, unless they are on their guard against using them against their enemies. If then Pythagoras [*](Cf. Moralia, 729 E.) was right when, in trying to accustom men to refrain from cruelty and rapacity in connexion with dumb animals, he used to intercede with fowlers, and buy up catches of fish and direct that they be released, and forbid the killing of any domesticated animal, it is surely a grander achievement by far, in disagreements and contentions with human beings, for a man to be a noble, honest, and ingenuous enemy, and to repress and put down his base, ignoble, and knavish propensities, so that in his dealings with his friends he may be always steadfast and may keep himself from wrongdoing. Scaurus was an enemy of Domitius and his accuser before the law. [*](For the facts see Cicero, Oration for King Deiotarus, 11 (31).)Now a servant of Domitius came to Scaurus before the trial, claiming to have information on some matters that had escaped Scaurus’s knowledge, but Scaurus would not let him speak, and caused the man to be arrested and taken back to his master. When Cato was prosecuting Murena for corrupt political practices and was getting together his evidence, there followed him, in accordance with the usage of the

time,[*](Explained more fully in the Life of Cato Minor, chap. xxi. (p. 769 B), where the story is repeated.) men who watched what was being done. Very often they would ask him if he was intending that day to gather evidence or to do any work on the case, and if he said No, they believed him and went away. In these facts may be found the greatest proof of Cato’s repute; but it is a greater thing, and indeed the noblest, that, if we acquire the habit of practising honesty in dealing even with our enemies, we shall never deal dishonestly and knavishly with our intimate associates and friends.

But since

On every lark a crest must grow,

as Simonides [*](Repeated by Plutarch in Moralia ) puts it, and since all human nature bears its crop of contention, jealousy, and envy,

Boon comrade of rattle-brained men,

as Pindar [*](Frag. 212 (ed. Christ).) says, a man would profit in no moderate degree by venting these emotions upon his enemies, and turning the course of such discharges,[*](Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia, i. 4. 6.) so to speak, as far away as possible from his associates [*](Cf.Moralia, 813 A, where the story is repeated almost word for word.) and relatives. This fact, as it seems, a statesman, Demus by name,e apprehended: when he found himself on the winning side in a civic strife in Chios, he advised his party associates not to banish all their opponents, but to leave some of them behind, in order, he said, that we may not begin to quarrel [*](of Timoleon, chap. xxxvii. (253 e), with much the same application. Cf. Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graec. iii. p. 418, Simonides, No. 68; Diehl, Anthologia Lyrica, ii. p. 62; Edmonds, Lyra Graeca (in L.C.L.), ii. p. 278, all differing in their reading of this one line. c Frag. 212 (ed. Christ). d Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia, i. 4. 6. e Cf. Moralia 813 a, where the story is repeated almost word for word.)

with our friends, through being completely rid of our enemies. So also in our own case, if our emotions of this sort are expended upon our enemies, they will cause less annoyance to our friends. For a potter must not envy potter, nor a minstrel a minstrel, as Hesiod [*](The references are to the Works and Days, 25-26 and 27.) puts it, nor must there be any feeling of rivalry against a neighbour or relative or brother who is winning his way towards riches and meeting with prosperity. But if there is no other way of getting rid of strifes, envies, and contentions, accustom yourself to feel the sting of resentment when your enemies enjoy health and happiness, and whet your contentiousness to a sharp jagged edge on these. For just as skilled gardeners believe that they improve their roses and violets by planting beside them garlic and onions (since whatever pungency and malod rousness there is in what the plants feed on is all drawn off into the vegetables), thus also your enemy, by taking up and diverting to himself your malice and jealousy, will render you more kindly and less disagreeable to your friends in their prosperity. For this reason it is with our enemies that we must also engage in rivalry for repute or office or honest money-getting, not only feeling the sting of resentment if they get the advantage of us, but also watching carefully every means by which they get the advantage, and trying to surpass them in painstaking, diligence, selfcontrol, and self-criticism: after the manner of Themistocles, who said that Miltiades’ victory at Marathon would not let him sleep.[*](Cf. Plutarch, Life of Themistocles, chap. iii. (p. 113 B), and Moralia, 84 B and 800 B.) For he who thinks that it is by mere good luck that his enemy surpasses him in public offices, in pleading cases, in state administration, or in his standing with friends

and leading men, and who from activity and emulation sinks down into a state of utter jealousy and discouragement, has abiding with him an envy that is inert and ineffectual. If, however, a man is not blind [*](Cf. the note on 90 A supra ) in regard to the object of his hatred, but makes himself an honest observer of the other’s life, character, words, and deeds, he will discover that most of the successes which excite the envy of others come to those who have won them as the result of painstaking, forethought, and fair conduct, and so, bending all his energies in this direction, he will put into practice his own ambitions and high aspirations, and will eradicate his listlessness and indolence.

But even if our enemies by flattery, knavery, bribery, or hireling service appear to reap their reward in the form of dishonourable and sordid influence at court or in the government, they will not be a source of annoyance but rather of joy to us when we compare our own freedom, the simplicity of our life, and its immunity from scurrilous attack. For all the gold on earth and beneath the earth is not worth so much as virtue, as Plato [*](Plato, Laws, p. 728 A; quoted also by Plutarch, Moralia1124 E.) says, and we must always keep ready in mind the sentiment of Solon [*](Quoted more fully in Moralia, 78 C, and as here, 472 E.): But we will not take in exchange All of their wealth for our virtue, nor yet the acclamations of spectators who have dined at our expense, nor honours such as front seats among eunuchs and concubines, and royal governorships; for nothing enviable or noble ever springs from dishonour. But since love is blind regarding [*](Quoted more fully in Moralia, 78 c, and as here, 472 e.)

the loved one, as Plato [*](A reminiscence from Plato; see the note on 90 A supra. ) says, and it is rather our enemies who by their unseemly conduct afford us an opportunity to view our own, neither our joy at their failures nor our sorrow at their successes ought to go without being employed to some purpose, but we should take into account both their failures and successes in studying how by guarding against the former we may be better than they, and by imitating the latter no worse. [*](A reminiscence from Plato; see the note on 90 a supra.)