Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur

Plutarch

Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. I. Babbitt, Frank Cole, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1927 (printing).

One mode of protection, as it would seem, is to realize and remember always that our soul has its two sides: on the one side are truthfulness, love for what is honourable, and power to reason, and on the other side irrationality, love of falsehood, and the emotional element; the friend is always found on the better side as counsel and advocate, trying, after

the manner of a physician, to foster the growth of what is sound and to preserve it; but the flatterer takes his place on the side of the emotional and irrational, and this he excites and tickles and wheedles, and tries to divorce from the reasoning powers by contriving for it divers low forms of pleasurable enjoyment. There are some sorts of food, for example, that are without affinity for either the blood or the breath, which add no vigour to nerves or marrow, but only excite the lower passions, arouse the appetite, and make unsound flesh that is morbid within. So the flatterer’s talk adds nothing to the thinking and reasoning powers, but only promotes familiarity with some amorous pleasure, intensifies a foolish fit of temper, provokes envy, engenders an offensive and inane bulk of conceit, commiserates in distress, or, by a succession of slanders and forebodings, causes malice, illiberality and distrust to grow bitter, timorous, and suspicious; and these are all matters that will not escape the observant. For the flatterer is always covertly on the watch for some emotion, and pampering it, and his presence is like that of a tumour in that he ever comes immediately following some morbid or inflamed condition of the soul. Are you angry? Punish then. Do you crave a thing? Then buy it. Are you afraid? Let’s run away. Have you a suspicion? Then give it credence. But if it is hard to detect the flatterer when he is engaged with these major emotions, inasmuch as our power to reason is deranged by their vehemence and magnitude, yet with the lesser ones he will better give a vantage, since his behaviour here will be the same. For example, if a man is afraid that he may
have a headache or a digestive upset from drinking or eating to excess, and hesitates about bathing and taking food, a friend will try to hold him back, and advise him to be careful and cautious, but the flatterer drags him off to the baths, and bids him order some novel dish, and not to maltreat his body by forced abstinence. And if he sees his man to be feebly inclined towards some journey or voyage or undertaking, he will say that the occasion is not pressing but that they will accomplish the same result by postponement or by sending somebody else. If the man, after promising money as a loan or a gift to some personal friend, wants to change his mind, but is ashamed to do so, the flatterer throws his weight upon the worse inclination, strengthens his opinion touching his purse, and banishes his feeling of mortification, bidding him be economical, since he has many expenses and many mouths to feed. It follows, therefore, that if we are not unaware of our own feelings of covetousness, shamelessness, and cowardice, we shall not be unaware of the flatterer. For he always acts as an advocate of such emotions, and is frank in discussing the results to which they lead. This, then, is enough on this subject.

Let us come without more ado to the topic of services and ministrations; for it is in these that the flatterer brings about a great confusion and uncertainty in regard to the difference between himself and the friend, because he appears to be brisk and eager in everything and never to make an excuse. For the character of a friend, like the language of truth, is, as Euripides [*](Euripides, Phoenissae, 469, 472.) puts it, simple, plain, and unaffected, whereas that of the flatterer, in very truth

Self-sick, hath need of dextrous remedies, and of a good many too, I venture to affirm, and of an uncommon sort. Take the case of one person meeting another: a friend sometimes, without the exchange of a word, but merely by a glance and a smile, gives and receives through the medium of the eyes an intimation of the goodwill and intimacy that is in the heart, and passes on. But the flatterer runs, pursues, extends his greeting at a distance, and if he be seen and spoken to first, he pleads his defence with witnesses and oaths over and over again. It is the same with actions: friends omit many of the trifling formalities, not being at all exacting or officious in this respect, not putting themselves forward for every kind of ministration; whereas the flatterer is in these matters persistent, assiduous, and untiring, giving to no one else place or space for a good office, but he is eager for orders, and if he receives none he is nettled, or rather he is utterly dispirited and gives way to lamentations.