Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat

Plutarch’s essay on the study of poetry is not a discussion of the essentials of poetry, nor an analysis of its various kinds after the manner of Aristotle’s Poetics, but it is concerned with poetry only as a means of training the young in preparation for the study of philosophy later. Some experience with the adumbrations of philosophic doctrines which are to be found in poetry will, in the opinion of the author, make such doctrines seem less strange when they are met later in the actual study of philosophy.

This training is to be imparted, not by confining the reading to selected passages, but by teaching the young to recognize and ignore the false and fabulous in poetry, to choose always the better interpretation, and, in immoral passages where art is employed for art’s sake, not to be deluded into approving vicious sentiments because of their artistic presentation. Such passages may be offset by other passages from the same author or from another author, and, as a last resort, one may try his hand at emending unsavoury lines to make them conform to a higher ethical standard. This last proposal seems to the modern reader a weak subterfuge, but it was a practice not unknown even before Plutarch’s time.

Philology, in the narrower sense, Plutarch says, is a science in itself, and a knowledge of it is not

essential to an unstanding of literature (a fact enunciated from time to time by modern educators as a new discovery). But, on the other hand, Plutarch strongly insists that an exact appreciation of words and of their meanings in different contexts is indispensable to the understanding of any work of poetry.

The various points in the essay are illustrated by plentiful quotations drawn in the main from Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, Pindar, Simonides, Theognis, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Menander. These are accompanied by many keen and intelligent observations (such, for example, as that regarding Paris), which attest Plutarch’s wide and careful reading in the classical authors.

The fact that Plutarch does not use the methods of historical criticism will not escape the reader, and, although this seems to us a great defect in the essay, it is wholly in keeping with the spirit of Plutarch’s age. On the other hand there is well shown the genial and kindly Plutarch, who wishes to believe only good of all men, including the poets, however much they may fall short of the standards set by the divine Homer.

If, my dear Marcus Sedatus, it is true, as the poet Philoxenus used to say, that of meats those that are not meat, and of fish those that are not fish, have the best flavour, let us leave the expounding of this matter to those persons of whom Cato said that their palates are more sensitive than their minds. And so of philosophical discourses it is clear to us that those seemingly not at all philosophical, or even serious, are found more enjoyable by the very young, who present themselves at such lectures as willing and submissive hearers. For in perusing not only Aesop’s Fables, and Tales from the Poets, but even the Abaris of Heracleides, the Lycon of Ariston, and philosophic doctrines about the soul when these are combined with tales from mythology,[*](Plutarch probably has Plato in mind, and is thinking of passages like The Last Judgement ( Gorgias, 523 ff.).) they get inspiration as well as pleasure. Wherefore we ought not only to keep the young decorous in the pleasures of eating and drinking, but, even more, in connexion with what they hear and read, by using in moderation, as a relish, that which gives pleasure, we should accustom them to seek what is useful and salutary therein. For close-shut gates do not

preserve a city from capture if it admit the enemy through one; nor does continence in the other pleasures of sense save a young man, if he unwittingly abandon himself to that which comes through hearing. On the contrary, inasmuch as this form of pleasure engages more closely the man that is naturally given to thought and reason, so much the more, if neglected, does it injure and corrupt him that receives it. Since, then, it is neither possible, perhaps, nor profitable to debar from poetry a boy as old as my Soclarus and your Cleander now are, let us keep a very close watch over them, in the firm belief that they require oversight in their reading even more than in the streets. Accordingly, I have made up my mind to commit to writing and to send to you some thoughts on poetry which it occurred to me recently to express. I beg that you will take them and peruse them, and if they seem to you to be no worse than the things called amethysts [*](Preventitives of intoxication; herbs or seeds (Plutarch,Symp.. 647 B, Athenaeus, 24 C), or nuts (Plutarch,Symp.. 624 C) which were eaten, or stones (Pliny, N.H. xxxvii. 9. 124) which were hung about the neck, in the belief that they would resist drunkenness.) which some persons on convivial occasions hang upon their persons or take beforehand, then impart them to Cleander, and thus forestall his natural disposition, which, because it is slow in nothing, but impetuous and lively in everything, is more subject to such influences.

Bad may be found in the head of the cuttle-fish; good there is also,[*](Cf. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroemiographi Graeci, i. p. 299; Plutarch, Moralia, 734 E.)

because it is very pleasant to eat but it makes one’s sleep full of bad dreams and subject to strange and disturbing fancies, as they say. Similarly also in the art of poetry there is much that is pleasant and nourishing for the mind of a youth, but quite as much that is disturbing and misleading, unless in the hearing of it he have proper oversight. For it may be said, as it seems, not only of the land of the Egyptians but also of poetry, that it yields

Drugs, and some are good when mixed and others baneful[*](Homer, Od. iv. 230.)

to those who cultivate it.

Hidden therein are love and desire and winning converse, Suasion that steals away the mind of the very wisest.[*](Homer, Il. xiv. 216.)

For the element of deception in it does not gain any hold on utterly witless and foolish persons. This is the ground of Simonides’ answer to the man who said to him, Why are the Thessalians the only people whom you do not deceive? His answer was, Oh, they are too ignorant to be deceived by me; and Gorgias called tragedy a deception wherein he who deceives is more honest than he who does not deceive, and he who is deceived is wiser than he who is not deceived. Shall we then stop the ears of the young, as those of the Ithacans were stopped, with a hard and unyielding wax, and force them to put to sea in the Epicurean boat, and avoid poetry and steer their course clear of it; or rather shall we set them against some upright standard of reason and there bind them fast, guiding and guarding their judgement, that it may not be carried away from the course by pleasure towards that which will do them hurt?

No, not even Lycurgus, the mighty son of Dryas[*](Homer, Il. vi. 130.)

had sound sense, because, when many became drunk and violent, he went about uprooting the grapevines instead of bringing the springs of water nearer, and thus chastening the frenzied god, as Plato says, through correction by another, a sober, god. [*](Plato, Laws, 773 D.) For the tempering of wine with water removes its harmfulness without depriving it at the same time of its usefulness. So let us not root up or destroy the Muses’ vine of poetry, but where the mythical and dramatic part grows all riotous [*](Cf. Theophrastus, De causis plantarum, iii. 1. 5.) and luxuriant, through pleasure unalloyed, which gives it boldness and obstinacy in seeking acclaim, let us take it in hand and prune it and pinch it back. But where with its grace it approaches a true kind of culture, and the sweet allurement of its language is not fruitless or vacuous, there let us introduce philosophy and blend it with poetry. For as the mandragora, when it grows beside the vine and imparts its influence to the wine, makes this weigh less heavily on those who drink it, so poetry, by taking up its themes from philosophy and blending them with fable, renders the task of learning light and agreeable for the young. Wherefore poetry should not be avoided by those who are intending to pursue philosophy, but they should use poetry as an introductory exercise in philosophy, by training themselves habitually to seek the profitable in what gives pleasure, and to find satisfaction therein; and if there be nothing profitable, to combat such poetry and be dissatisfied with it. For this is the beginning of education,

If one begin each task in proper way So is it likely will the ending be,[*](Nauck,Trag.Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No. 747.)

as Sophocles says.

First of all, then, the young man should be introduced into poetry with nothing in his mind so

well imprinted, or so ready at hand, as the saying, Many the lies the poets tell, [*](Proverbial; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, i. 2.) some intentionally and some unintentionally; intentionally, because for the purpose of giving pleasure and gratification to the ear (and this is what most people look for in poetry) they feel that the truth is too stern in comparison with fiction. For the truth, because it is what actually happens, does not deviate from its course, even though the end be unpleasant; whereas fiction, being a verbal fabrication, very readily follows a roundabout route, and turns aside from the painful to what is more pleasant. For not metre nor figure of speech nor loftiness of diction nor aptness of metaphor nor unity of composition has so much allurement and charm, as a clever interweaving of fabulous narrative. But, just as in pictures, colour is more stimulating than line-drawing because it is life-like, and creates an illusion, so in poetry falsehood combined with plausibility is more striking, and gives more satisfaction, than the work which is elaborate in metre and diction, but devoid of myth and fiction. This explains why Socrates, being induced by some dreams to take up poetry, since he was not himself a plausible or naturally clever workman in falsehood, inasmuch as he had been the champion of truth all his life, put into verse the fables of Aesop,[*](Cf. Plato, Phaedo, 60 A.) assuming that there can be no poetic composition which has no addition of falsehood. It is true that we know of sacrifices without dancing or flute, but we do not know of any poetic composition without fable or without falsehood. The verses of Empedocles and of Parmenides, the Antidotes against Poisons of Nicander, and the maxims of Theognis, are merely compositions which have borrowed from poetic art its metre and lofty style as a vehicle in order to avoid plodding along in prose. Whenever, therefore, in the poems of a man of note and repute some strange and disconcerting statement either about gods or lesser deities or about virtue is made by the author, he who accepts the statement as true is carried off his feet, and has his opinions perverted; whereas he who always remembers and keeps clearly in mind the sorcery of the poetic art in dealing with falsehood, who is able on every such occasion to say to it,

Device more subtly cunning than the lynx,a why knit your brows when jesting, why pretend to instruct when practising deception?[*](Nauck,Trag.Graec. Frag., Adesp., No. 349.)

will not suffer any dire effects or even acquire any base beliefs, but he will check himself when he feels afraid of Poseidon [*](Homer, Iliad, xx. 60.) and is in terror lest the god rend the earth asunder and lay bare the nether world; he will check himself when he is feeling wroth at Apollo in behalf of the foremost of the Achaeans,

Whose praises he himself did sing, himself Was present at the feast, these words he spoke Himself, and yet himself brought death to him;[*](Spoken by Thetis of the death of her son Achilles, as we are told by Plato, Republic, ii. p. 383 B, who quotes the passage more fully. Cf. Nauck,Trag. Graec. Frag., Aeschylus, No. 350.)

he will cease to shed tears over the dead Achilles and over Agamemnon [*](Homer, Od. xi. 470 and 360.) in the nether world, as they stretch out their impotent and feeble arms in their desire to be alive; and if, perchance, he is beginning to be disturbed by their suffering and overcome by the enchantment, he will not hesitate to say to himself,

Hasten eager to the light, and all you saw here Lay to heart that you may tell your wife hereafter.[*](Homer, Od. xi. 223.)

Certainly Homer has put this gracefully in reference to the visit to the shades, indicating that it is fit stuff for a woman’s ear because of the element of fable in it.

Such things as this are what the poets fabricate intentionally, but more numerous are the things which they do not fabricate, but think and believe in their own hearts, and then impart to us in their false colouring. Take for example what Homer has said relating to Zeus:

In the scales he placed two fates of Death so grievous, One of Achilles and the other of horse-taming Hector; Grasping the middle he poised it, and Hector’s fated day descended. Down to Hades he went, and Phoebus Apollo forsook him.[*](Homer, Il. xxii. 210.)

Now Aeschylus has fitted a whole tragedy to this story, giving it the title of The Weighing of Souls, and has placed beside the scales of Zeus on the one side Thetis, and on the other Dawn, entreating for their sons who are fighting. But it is patent to everybody that this is a mythical fabrication which has been created to please or astound the hearer. But in the lines Zeus, appointed to decide the outcome of men’s fighting[*](Ibid. iv. 84.) and A fault doth God create in men Whene’er he wills to crush a house in woe,[*](From the Niobe, of Aeschylus; Nauck,Trag.Graec. Frag., Aeschylus, No. 156.) we have at last statements in accord with their opinion and belief, as they thus publish to us and try to make us share their delusion and ignorance regarding the gods. Then again the monstrous tales of visits to the shades, and the descriptions, which in awful language create spectres and pictures of blazing rivers and hideous places and grim punishments, do not blind very many people to the fact that fable and falsehood in plenty have been mingled with them like poison in nourishing food. And not Homer nor Pindar nor Sophocles really believed that these things are so when they wrote:

From there the slow-moving rivers of dusky night Belch forth a darkness immeasurable,[*](Pindar, Frag. 130 Christ.)

and

On past Ocean’s streams they went and the headland of Leucas,[*](Homer, Od. xxiv. 11.)

and

The narrow throat of Hades and the refluent depths.[*](Cf. Nauck,Trag.Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No. 748.)

However, take the case of those who, bewailing and fearing death as something piteous, or want of burial as something terrible, have given utterance to sentiments like these: Go not hence and leave me behind unwept, unburied,[*](Homer, Od. xi. 72.) and

Forth from his body went his soul on wing to Hades, Mourning its fate and leaving its vigour and manhood,[*](Homer, Il. xvi. 856 and xxii. 362.)

and

Destroy me not untimely; for ’tis sweet To see the light. Compel me not to gaze Upon the regions underneath the earth.[*](Euripides, Iphigenia at Aulis, 1218.)

These are the voices of persons affected by emotion and prepossessed by opinions and delusions. For this reason such sentiments take a more powerful hold on us and disturb us the more, inasmuch as we become infected by their emotions and by the weakness from whence they proceed. Against these influences, then, once more let us equip the young from the very outset to keep ever sounding in their ears the maxim, that the art of poetry is not greatly concerned with the truth, and that the truth about these matters, even for those who have made it their sole business to search out and understand the verities, is exceedingly hard to track down and hard to get hold of, as they themselves admit; and let these words of Empedocles be constantly in mind:

Thus no eye of man hath seen nor ear hath heard this, Nor can it be comprehended by the mind,[*](The passage is quoted more fully by Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. vii. 122-4; cf. Diels, Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta, Empedocles, No. 2)

and the words of Xenophanes:

Never yet was born a man nor ever shall be Knowing the truth about the gods and what I say of all things,[*](Quoted with two additional lines by Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. vii. 49; cf. Diels, Poet. Philos. Frag., Xenophanes, No. 34.)

and by all means the words of Socrates, in Plato,[*](Plato, Phaedo, 69 D.) when he solemnly disavows all acquaintance with these subjects. For young people then will give less heed to the poets, as having some knowledge of these matters, when they see that such questions stagger the philosophers.

We shall steady the young man still more if, at his first entrance into poetry, we give a general description of the poetic art as an imitative art and faculty analogous to painting. And let him not

merely be acquainted with the oft-repeated saying that poetry is articulate painting, and painting is inarticulate poetry, but let us teach him in addition that when we see a lizard or an ape or the face of Thersites in a picture, we are pleased with it and admire it, not as a beautiful thing, but as a likeness. For by its essential nature the ugly cannot become beautiful; but the imitation, be it concerned with what is base or with what is good, if only it attain to the likeness, is commended. If, on the other hand, it produces a beautiful picture of an ugly body, it fails to give what propriety and probability require. Some painters even depict unnatural acts, as Timomachus painted a picture of Medea slaying her children, and Theon of Orestes slaying his mother, and Parrhasius of the feigned madness of Odysseus, and Chaerephanes of the lewd commerce of women with men. In these matters it is especially necessary that the young man should be trained by being taught that what we commend is not the action which is the subject of the imitation, but the art, in case the subject in hand has been properly imitated. Since, then, poetry also often gives an imitative recital of base deeds, or of wicked experiences and characters, the young man must not accept as true what is admired and successful therein, nor approve it as beautiful, but should simply commend it as fitting and proper to the character in hand. For just as when we hear the squealing of a pig, the creaking of a windlass, the whistling of the winds, and the booming of the sea, we are uneasy and annoyed; but if anybody gives a plausible imitation of these, as Parmeno imitated a pig, and Theodorus a windlass, we are pleased; and just as we avoid a diseased and ulcerous person as an unpleasant sight, but take delight in seeing Aristophon’s Philoctetes and Silanion’s Jocasta, who are represented on the stage as pining away or dying; so too the young man, as he reads what Thersites the buffoon, or Sisyphus the seducer of women, or Batrachus the bawd, is represented as saying or doing, must be taught to commend the faculty and art which imitates these things, but to repudiate and condemn the disposition and the actions which it imitates. For it is not the same thing at all to imitate something beautiful and something beautifully, since beautifully means fittingly and properly and ugly things are fitting and proper for the ugly. Witness the boots made for the crippled feet of Damonidas, who prayed once, when he had lost them, that the man who had stolen them might have feet which they would fit; they were sorry boots, it is true, but they fitted their owner. Consider the following lines:

If one must needs do wrong, far best it were To do it for a kingdom’s sake,[*](Euripides, Phoenissae, 324.)

and

Achieve the just man’s good repute, but deeds That fit the knave; therein shall be your gain,[*](From lines spoken by Ixion in an unknown play; cf. Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., adesp., No. 4.)

and

A talent dowry! Shall I not accept? Can I still live if I should overlook A talent? Shall I ever sleep again If I should give it up? In Hell shall I Not suffer for impiety to gold? [*](From an unknown poet of the new comedy; cf. Kock, Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta, iii. 430.)

These, it is true, are wicked and fallacious sentiments, but fitting respectively for Eteocles, Ixion, and an old usurer. If then we remind our sons that authors write them, not because they commend or approve them, but with the idea of investing mean and unnatural characters and persons with unnatural and mean sentiments, they could not be harmed by the opinions of poets; nay, on the contrary, the suspicion felt against the person in question discredits both his actions and words, as being mean because spoken or done by a mean man. Of such sort is the account of Paris in his wife’s arms after his cowardly escape from battle.[*](Homer, Il. iii. 369 ff. and 441 ff.) For since the poet represents no other save this licentious and adulterous man as dallying with a woman in the daytime, it is clear that he classes such sensuality as a shame and reproach.

In these passages, close attention must be given to see whether the poet himself gives any hints against the sentiments expressed to indicate that they are distasteful to himself; just as Menander in the prologue of his Thais has written:

Oh, sing to me, my muse, of such a girl, One bold and fair, and of persuasive tongue, Unjust, exclusive, and demanding much, In love with none, but always feigning love.[*](Kock, Com. Att. Frag., Menander, No. 217, and Allinson, Menander, in L.C.L., p. 356.)

But Homer has best employed this method; for he in advance discredits the mean and calls our attention to the good in what is said. His favourable introductions are after this manner: Then at once he spoke; his words were gentle and winning[*](Homer, Od. vi. 148.) and

He would stand by his side, and speak soft words to restrain him.[*](Homer, Il. ii. 189.)

But in discrediting in advance, he all but protests and proclaims that we are not to follow or heed the sentiments expressed, as being unjustifiable and mean. For example, when he is on the point of narrating Agamemnon’s harsh treatment of the priest, he says in advance,

Yet Agamemnon, Atreus’ son, at heart did not like it; Harshly he sent him away;[*](Ibid. i. 24.)

that is to say, savagely and wilfully and contrary to what he should have done; and in Achilles’ mouth he puts the bold words,

Drunken sot, with eyes of a dog and the wild deer’s courage,[*](Ibid. i. 225.)

but he intimates his own judgement in saying,

Then once more with vehement words did the son of Peleus Speak to the son of Atreus, nor ceased as yet from his anger; [*](Ibid. i. 223.)

hence it is likely that nothing spoken with anger and severity can be good. In like manner also, he comments upon actions:

Thus he spoke, and Hector divine he treated unseemly, Stretching him prone in the dust by the bier of the son of Menoetius.[*](Ibid., xxiii. 24.)

He also employs his closing lines to good purpose, as though adding a sort of verdict of his own to what is done or said. Of the adultery of Ares, he represents the gods as saying,

Evil deeds do not succeed: the swift by the slow is taken,[*](Homer, Od., viii. 329.)

and on the occasion of Hector’s great arrogance and boasting he says,

Thus he spoke in boast; queen Hera’s wrath was kindled[*](Homer, Il. viii. 198.)

and regarding Pandarus’s archery, Thus Athena spoke, and the mind of the fool she persuaded.[*](Ibid. iv. 104.) Now these declarations and opinions contained in the words of the text may be discovered by anybody who will pay attention, but from the actions themselves the poets supply other lessons: as, for example, Euripides is reported to have said to those who railed at his Ixion as an impious and detestable character, But I did not remove him from the stage until I had him fastened to the wheel. In Homer this form of instruction is given silently, but it leaves room for a reconsideration, which is helpful in the case of those stories which have been most discredited. By forcibly distorting these stories through what used to be termed deeper meanings, but are nowadays called allegorical interpretations, some persons say that the Sun is represented as giving information about Aphrodite in the arms of Ares, because the conjunction of the planet Mars with Venus portends births conceived in adultery, and when the sun returns in his course and discovers these, they cannot be kept secret. And Hera’s beautifying of herself for Zeus’s eyes,[*](Ibid. xiv. 166 ff.) and the charms connected with the girdle, such persons will have it, are a sort of purification of the air as it draws near the fiery element;—as though the poet himself did not afford the right solutions. For, in the account of Aphrodite, he teaches those who will pay attention that vulgar music, coarse songs, and stories treating of vile themes, create licentious characters, unmanly lives, and men that love luxury, soft living, intimacy with women, and Changes of clothes, warm baths, and the genial bed of enjoyment.[*](Homer, Od. viii. 239.) This too is the reason why he has represented Odysseus as bidding the harper Come now, change the theme and sing how the horse was builded,[*](Ibid. viii. 492.) thus admirably indicating the duty of musicians and poets to take the subjects of their compositions from the lives of those who are discreet and sensible. And in his account of Hera, he has shown excellently well how the favour that women win by philters and enchantments and the attendant deceit in their relations with their husbands, not only is transitory and soon sated and unsure, but changes also to anger and enmity, so soon as the pleasurable excitement has faded away. Such, in fact, are Zeus’s angry threats as he speaks to Hera in this wise: So you may see if aught you gain from the love and caresses Won by your coming afar from the gods to deceive me.[*](Homer, Il. xv. 32.) For the description and portrayal of mean actions, if it also represent as it should the disgrace and injury resulting to the doers thereof, benefits instead of injuring the hearer. Philosophers, at any rate, for admonition and instruction, use examples taken from known facts; but the poets accomplish the same result by inventing actions of their own imagination, and by recounting mythical tales. Thus it was Melanthius who said, whether in jest or in earnest, that the Athenian State was perpetually preserved by the quarrelling and disorder among its public speakers; for they were not all inclined to crowd to the same side of the boat, and so, in the disagreement of the politicians, there was ever some counterpoise to the harmful. And so the mutual contrarieties of the poets, restoring our belief to its proper balance, forbid any strong turning of the scale toward the harmful. When therefore a comparison of passages makes their contradictions evident, we must advocate the better side, as in the following examples:

Oft do the gods, my child, cause men to fail,[*](From Euripides, Archelaus, Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 254. The second line is again quoted by Plutarch, Moralia, 1049 F.)

as compared with You’ve named the simplest way; just blame the gods; [*](From Euripides, Archelaus, Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 254. The second line is again quoted by Plutarch, Moralia, 1049 F.) and again

You may rejoice in wealth, but these may not,[*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 1069.)

as compared with

’Tis loutish to be rich, and know naught else;[*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., No. 1069.)

and

What need to sacrifice when you must die? [*](Ibid., Adesp., No. 350.)

as compared with ’Tis better thus; God’s worship is not toil.[*](Ibid., Adesp., No. 350.) For such passages as these admit of solutions which are obvious, if, as has been said, we direct the young, by the use of criticism, toward the better side. But whenever anything said by such authors sounds preposterous, and no solution is found close at hand, we must nullify its effect by something said by them elsewhere to the opposite effect, and we should not be offended or angry at the poet, but with the words, which are spoken in character and with humorous intent. As an obvious illustration, if you wish, over against Homer’s accounts of the gods being cast forth by one another, their being wounded by men, their disagreements, and their displays of ill-temper, you may set the line:

Surely you know how to think of a saying better than this one,[*](Homer, Il. vii. 358 and xii. 232.)

and indeed elsewhere you do think of better things and say more seemly things, such as these:

Gods at their ease ever living,[*](Ibid. vi. 138; Od. iv. 805 and v. 122.)

and

There the blessed gods pass all their days in enjoyment,[*](Homer, Od. vi. 46.)

and

Thus the gods have spun the fate of unhappy mortals Ever to live in distress, but themselves are free from all trouble.[*](Homer, Il. xxiv. 525 (again quoted, infra, 22 B).)

These, then, are sound opinions about gods, and true, but those other accounts have been fabricated to excite men’s astonishment. Again, when Euripides says,

By many forms of artifice the gods Defeat our plans, for they are stronger far,[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 972.)

it is not bad to subjoin,

If gods do aught that’s base, they are no gods,[*](From Euripides, Bellerophon, according to Stobaeus, Florilegium, c. 3, who quotes also six preceding lines; cf. Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 292. 7.)

which is a better saying of his. And when Pindar very bitterly and exasperatingly has said,

Do what you will, so you vanquish your foe,[*](Pindar, Isthmian Odes, iv. 48.)

Yet, we may reply, you yourself say that

Most bitter the end Must surely await Sweet joys that are gained By a means unfair.

[*](Pindar, Isthmian Odes, vii. 47.) a= And when Sophocles has said, Sweet is the pelf though gained by falsity.[*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Sophocles , No. 749.) Indeed, we may say, but we have heard from you that

False words unfruitful prove when harvested.

[*](Ibid., No. 750.) And over against those statements about wealth:

Clever is wealth at finding ways to reach Both hallowed and unhallowed ground, and where A poor man, though he even gain access, Could not withal attain his heart’s desire. An ugly body, hapless with its tongue, Wealth makes both wise and comely to behold,[*](From Sophocles, Aleadae; quoted with additional lines by Stobaeus, Florilegium, xci. 27; cf. Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No 85.)

he will set many of Sophocles’ words, among which are the following:

E’en without wealth a man may be esteemed,[*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No. 761.)

and

To beg doth not degrade a noble mind,[*](Ibid., No. 752.)

and In the blessings of plenty What enjoyment is there, If blest wealth owe its increase To base-brooding care?[*](Perhaps from the Tereus of Sophocles; cf. Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No. 534.) And Menander certainly exalted the love of pleasure, with a suggestion of boastfulness too, in these glowing lines that refer to love:

All things that live and see the self-same sun That we behold, to pleasure are enslaved.[*](Kock, Com. Att. Frag. iii., Menander , No. 611, and Allinson, Menander, in L.C.L. p. 506.)

But at another time he turns us about and draws us towards the good, and uproots the boldness of licentiousness, by saying: A shameful life, though pleasant, is disgrace.[*](Kock, Com. Att. Frag. iii., Menander, No. 756.) The latter sentiment is quite opposed to the former, and it is better and more useful. Such comparison and consideration of opposing sentiments will result in one of two ways: it will either guide the youth over toward the better side, or else cause his belief to revolt from the worse.

In case the authors themselves do not offer solutions of their unjustifiable sayings, it is not a bad idea to put on the other side declarations of other writers of repute, and, as in a balance, make the scales incline toward the better side. For example, if Alexis stirs some people when he says, The man of sense must gather pleasure’s fruits, And three there are which have the potency Truly to be of import for this life— To eat and drink and have one’s way in love, All else must be declared accessory,[*](Ibid. ii., Alexis, No. 271.) we must recall to their minds that Socrates used to say just the opposite—that base men live to eat

and drink, and good men eat and drink to live. And he who wrote

Not useless ’gainst the knave is knavery,[*](Source unknown; quoted again by Plutarch in Moralia, 534 A.)

thus bidding us, in a way, to make ourselves like knaves, may be confronted with the saying of Diogenes; for, being asked how one might defend himself against his adversary, he said, By proving honourable and upright himself. We should use Diogenes against Sophocles, too; for Sophocles has filled hosts of men with despondency by writing these lines about the mysteries:

Thrice blest are they Who having seen these mystic rites shall pass To Hades’ house; for them alone is life Beyond; for others all is evil there.[*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No. 753.)

But Diogenes, hearing some such sentiment as this, said, What! Do you mean to say that Pataecion, the robber, will have a better portion after death than Epaminondas, just because he is initiate? And when Timotheus, in a song in the theatre, spoke of Artemis as Ecstatic Bacchic frantic fanatic,[*](Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. iii. p. 620; cf. Plutarch, Moralia, 170 A.) Cinesias at once shouted back, May you have a daughter like that I Neat too is Bion s retort to Theognis, who said:

Any man that is subject to poverty never is able Either to speak or to act; nay, but his tongue is tied.[*](Theognis, 177.)

How is it, then, said Bion, that you, who are poor, can talk much nonsense, and weary us with this rubbish?

We must not neglect, either, the means for rectifying a statement which are afforded by the words that lie near, or by the context; but just as physicians, in spite of the fact that the blister-fly is deadly, think that its feet and wings are helpful to counteract its potent effect, so in poetry if a noun or adjective or a verb by its position next to another word blunts the point which the passage, in its worse interpretation, would have, we should seize upon it and add explanation, as some do in the case of the following:

Thus, at the last, can honour be paid by miserable mortals Cutting the hair from their heads while the tears stream down their faces,[*](Homer, Od. iv. 197.)

and

Thus, then, the gods have spun the fate of unhappy mortals Ever to live in distress.[*](Homer, Il. xxiv. 525 (quoted supra, 20 F).)

For he did not say that absolutely and to all mankind a grievous life has been allotted by the gods, but to the silly and foolish, whom, since they are wretched and pitiable on account of wickedness, he is wont to call by the name of unhappy and miserable.

Another method, again, which transfers from the worse to the better sense suspicious passages in poetry, is that which works through the normal usage of words, in which it were better to have the

young man trained than in what are called glosses. [*](Strange of obsolete words.) It is indeed learned, and not unpleasing, to know that rhigedanos [*](Homer, Il. xix. 325.) means dying miserably (for the Macedonians call death danos ), that the Aeolians call a victory won by patience and perseverance an outlasting, [*](Ibid. xxii. 257 and xxiii. 661.) that the Dryopians call the divinities popoi. [*](There was a tradition, preserved in the scholia, that ὦ πόποι, often found in Homer, was the equivalent of ὦ θεοί gods. ) But it is necessary and useful, if we are to be helped and not harmed by poetry, to know how the poets employ the names of the gods, and again the names of bad and of good things, and what they mean when they speak of Fortune or of Fate, and whether these belong to the class of words which in their writings are used in one sense only or in several senses, as the case is with many other words. For, to illustrate, they apply the term house sometimes to a dwelling house, as

Into the lofty house,[*](Homer, Od. v. 42, vii. 77, and perhaps x. 474.)

and sometimes to property, as

My house is being devoured; [*](Ibid. iv. 318.)

and the term living they apply sometimes to life, as

But dark-haired Poseidon Thwarted his spear, nor would let him end his foeman’s living,[*](Homer, Il. xiii. 562.)

and sometimes to possessions, as

And others are eating my living;[*](Homer, Od. xiii. 419.)

and the expression be distraught is used sometimes instead of be chagrined and be at one’s wits’ end :

Thus he spoke, and she departed distraught and sore troubled[*](Homer, Il. v. 352.)

and at other times, instead of to be arrogant and be delighted, as

Are you now distraught since you vanquished Irus, the vagrant? [*](Homer, Od. xviii. 332, 392.)

and by huddle they mean either be in motion, as Euripides says:[*](From the Andromeda of Euripides, Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 145.) A monster huddling from th’ Atlantic’s surge, or sit down and be seated, as Sophocles [*](Oedipus Tyrannus, 2.) says: What means your huddling in these places here With suppliant garlands on the boughs ye bear? It is a graceful accomplishment also to adapt the usage of the words to fit the matter in hand, as the grammarians teach us to do, taking a word for one signification at one time, and at another time for another, as for example, Better commend a small ship, but put your goods on a big one.[*](Hesiod, Works and Days, 643.) For by commend is meant recommend, and the very expression of recommend to another is used nowadays instead of deprecating for one’s self, as in everyday speech we say, It’s very kind, and Very welcome, when we do not want a thing and do not accept it. In this way also some persons will have it that it must be commendable Persephone because she is deprecated.

Let us then observe closely this distinction and discrimination of words in greater and more serious matters, and let us begin with the gods, in teaching

the young that when the poets employ the names of the gods, sometimes they apprehend in their conception the gods themselves, and at other times they give the same appellation to certain faculties of which gods are the givers and authors. To take an obvious example, it is clear that Archilochus, when he says in his prayer,

Hear my praver, O Lord Hephaestus, and propitious Lend thy aid, and bestow what thy mercy bestows,[*](Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. ii. p. 703.)

is calling on the god himself; but when, lamenting his sister’s husband who was lost at sea and received no formal burial, he says that he could have borne the calamity with greater moderation,

If upon his head and his body so fair, All in garments clean, Hephaestus had done his office,[*](Ibid. p. 687.)

it is fire that he called by this name and not the god. And again when Euripides [*](Phoenissae, 1006.) said in an oath, By Zeus amidst the stars and Ares murderous, he named the gods themselves; but when Sophocles [*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No. 574; again cited by Plutarch, Moralia, 757 B.) says, Blind and unseeing Ares, worthy dames, With snout like that of swine upturns all ills, the name is to be understood as meaning war; just as again it suggests weapons of bronze in the passage where Homer [*](Homer, Il. vii. 329.) says,

Dark red blood of these men by the fair-flowing river Scamander Keen-edged Ares has shed.

Since, then, many words are used in this way, it is necessary to know and to remember that under the name Zeus also (or Zen) the poets address sometimes the god, sometimes Fortune, and oftentimes Fate. For when they say,

Father Zeus, enthroned on Ida, most glorious and mighty, Grant to Ajax victory,[*](Homer, Il. iii. 276, vii. 202, xxiv. 308.)

and O Zeus! who boasts to be more wise than thou? [*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Adesp., No. 351.) they mean the god himself; but when they apply the name of Zeus to the causes of all that happens, and say, Many valiant souls it sent to the realm of Hades, Goodly men, and their bodies gave to the dogs as ravin And to birds a feast—the design of Zeus in fulfilment,[*](Homer, Il. i. 3. ) they mean Fate. For the poet does not imagine that it is the god who contrives evils for mankind, but by the name he rightly implies the compelling force of circumstances, that States and armies and leaders, if they show self-control, are destined to succeed and to prevail over their enemies, but if they fall into passions and errors, if they disagree and quarrel among themselves, as these heroes did, then are they destined to act discreditably and to become disorganized and to come to a bad end, as Sophocles says [*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Adesp., No. 352.):

For fated is it that from evil plans An evil recompense shall mortals reap;

and certainly Hesiod [*](Hesiod, Works and Days, 86.) in representing Prometheus as exhorting Epimetheus

Never to welcome Any gifts from Zeus of Olympus, but always return them,

employs the name of Zeus as a synonym for the power of Fortune. For he has given the name of gifts of Zeus to the blessings of Fortune, such as wealth, marriage, office, and, in a word, all outward things, the possession of which is unprofitable to those who cannot make good use of them. Wherefore he thinks that Epimetheus, who is a worthless man and a fool, ought to be on his guard against any piece of good fortune, and be fearful of it, as he is likely to be injured and corrupted by it. And again when the poet says,

Never dare to reproach any man for accursed and woeful Poverty, gift of the blessed gods whose life is for ever,[*](Hesiod, Works and Days, 717.)

he now speaks of what happens by chance as godgiven, with the suggestion that it is not meet to impugn those who are poor through misfortune, but to reproach the penury that is accompanied by laziness, soft living, and extravagance, since then it is disgraceful and reprehensible. For at a time when men did not as yet use the name Fortune, but knew the force of causation as it traverses its irregular and indeterminate course, so strong, so impossible for human reason to guard against, they tried to express this by the names of the gods, exactly as we are wont to call deeds and characters, and in fact even words and men, divine and godlike. In this manner, then, a corrective is to be found for most of the seemingly unjustifiable statements regarding Zeus, among which are the following:

Fixed on Zeus’ floor two massive urns stand ever, Filled with happy lives the one, the other with sorrows,[*](The quotation follows Plato, Republic, 379 D, and not Homer, Il. xxiv. 528. The original, however, is quoted in the Moralia, 105 C.)

and

Cronos’ son, enthroned on high, hath made naught of our pledges, But for both our hosts with evil thought is planning,[*](Homer, Il. vii. 69.)

and

Then rolled forth the beginning of trouble Both on Trojans and Greeks through designs of Zeus the almighty.[*](Homer, Od. viii. 81.)

These are to be interpreted as referring to Fortune or Fate, in which guise are denoted those phases of causation which baffle our logic, and are, in a word, beyond us. But wherever there is appropriateness, reason, and probability in the use of the name, let us believe that there the god himself is meant, as in the following:

But he ranged to and fro ’gainst the lines of the rest of the fighters; Only with Ajax, Telamon’s son, he avoided a conflict, Seeing that Zeus was wroth if he fight with a man far better,[*](Homer, Il. xi. 540, 542. The third line is not found in the MSS. of Homer, but on the authority of this passage and 36 A and Aristotle, Rhetoric, ii. 9, and the life of Homer ascribed to Plutarch, it has commonly been printed as line 542 in the editions of Homer.)

and For Zeus takes thought for mortals’ greatest weal; The little things he leaves to other gods.[*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Adesp., No. 353.)

Particular attention must be paid to the other words also, when their signification is shifted about and changed by the poets according to various circumstances. An example is the word virtue. For inasmuch as virtue not only renders men sensible, honest, and upright in actions and words, but also often enough secures for them repute and influence,

the poets, following this notion, make good repute and influence to be virtue, giving them this name in exactly the same way that the products of the olive and the chestnut are called olives and chestnuts, the same names as the trees that bear them. So then when poets say,

Sweat the gods have set before the attainment of virtue,[*](Hesiod, Works and Days, 289.)

and

Then the Greeks by their virtue broke the line of their foemen,[*](Homer, Il. xi. 90.)

and

If to die be our fate, Thus to die is our right Merging our lives into virtue,[*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 994. Again quoted by Plutarch, Pelopidas, 317 E.)

let our young man at once feel that these sayings relate to the best and godliest estate to which we can attain, which we think of as correctness of reasoning, the height of good sense, and a disposition of soul in full agreement therewith. But when at another time, in his reading, he finds this line, Zeus makes virtue in men both to increase and diminish,[*](Homer, Il. xx. 242.) or this, Virtue and glory are attendant on riches,[*](Hesiod, Works and Days, 313.) let him not sit astounded and amazed at the rich, as though they were able to purchase virtue without ado for money, nor let him believe either that the increase or diminution of his own wisdom rests with Fortune, but let him consider that the poet has employed virtue instead of repute, or influence, or good fortune, or the like. For assuredly by evil the poets sometimes signify badness in its strict sense, and wickedness of soul, as when Hesiod [*](Hesiod, Works and Days, 287.) says, Evil may always be had by all mankind in abundance, and sometimes some other affliction or misfortune, as when Homer [*](Homer, Od. xix. 360.) says, Since full soon do mortals who live in evil grow aged. And so too anybody would be sadly deceived, should he imagine that the poets give to happiness the sense which the philosophers give to it, namely, that of complete possession or attainment of good, or the perfection of a life gliding smoothly along in accord with nature, and that the poets do not oftentimes by a perversion of the word call the rich man happy and blessed, and call influence or repute happiness. Now Homer [*](Ibid. iv. 93.) has used the words correctly:

No delight [*](Logically, we should expect here a word meaning happy. See the critical note on the opposite page.) have I in ruling these possessions,

and so has Menander:[*](Kock, Com. Att. Frag. iii. p. 184, and Allinson, Menander in L.C.L. p. 506.)

A great estate have I, and rich am called By all, but I am called by no man blest.

But Euripides [*](Euripides, Medea, 603.) works much disturbance and confusion when he says,

May I ne’er have a painful happy life,

and

Why do you honour show to tyranny, Happy iniquity? [*](Euripides, Phoenissae, 549.)

unless, as has been said, one follows the figurative and perverted use of the words. This, then, is enough on this subject.

There is a fact, however, which we must recall to the minds of the young not once merely, but over and over again, by pointing out to them that while poetry, inasmuch as it has an imitative basis, employs embellishment and glitter in dealing with the actions and characters that form its groundwork, yet it does not forsake the semblance of truth, since imitation depends upon plausibility for its allurement. This is the reason why the imitation that does not show an utter disregard of the truth brings out, along with the actions, indications of both vice and virtue commingled; as is the case with that of Homer, which emphatically says good-bye to the Stoics, who will have it that nothing base can attach to virtue, and nothing good to vice, but that the ignorant man is quite wrong in all things, while, on the other hand, the man of culture is right in everything. These are the doctrines that we hear in the schools; but in the actions and in the life of most men, according to Euripides, [*](From the Aeolus of Euripides; quoted again Moralia, 369 B and 474 A. Cf. Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 21.)

The good and bad cannot be kept apart But there is some commingling.

But when poetic art is divorced from the truth, then chiefly it employs variety and diversity. For it is the sudden changes that give to its stories the elements of the emotional, the surprising, and the unexpected, and these are attended by very great astonishment and enjoyment; but sameness is unemotional and prosaic. Therefore poets do not represent the same people as always victorious or prosperous or successful in everything; no, not even the gods, when they project themselves into human activities, are represented in the poets’ usage as free from emotion or fault, that the perturbing and exciting element in the poetry shall nowhere become idle and dull, for want of danger and struggle.

Now since this is so, let the young man, when we set him to reading poems, not be prepossessed with any such opinions about those good and great names, as, for instance, that the men were wise and honest, consummate kings, and standards of all virtue and uprightness. For he will be greatly injured if he approves everything, and is in a state of wonderment over it, but resents nothing, refusing even to listen or accept the opinion of him who, on the contrary, censures persons that do and say such things as these:

This I would, O Zeus, Athena, and Apollo, That not one escape death of all the Trojans living And of the Greeks; but that you and I elude destruction, So that we alone may raze Troy’s sacred bulwarks,[*](Homer, Il. xvi. 97.)

and

Saddest of all the sad sounds that I heard was the cry of Cassandra Priam’s daughter, whom Clytemnestra craftily planning Slew o’er my body,[*](Homer, Od. xi. 421.)

and

That I seduce the girl and ensure her hate for my father. So I obeyed her and did it,[*](Homer, Il. ix. 452.)

and

Father Zeus, none other of the gods is more baleful.[*](Homer, Il. iii. 365.)

Let the young man, then, not get into the habit of commending anything like this, nor let him be plausible and adroit in making excuses or in contriving some specious quibbles to explain base actions, but rather let him cherish the belief that poetry is an imitation of character and lives, and of men who are not perfect or spotless or unassailable in all respects, but pervaded by emotions, false opinions, and sundry forms of ignorance, who yet through inborn goodness frequently change their ways for the better. For if the young man is so trained, and his understanding so framed, that he feels elation and a sympathetic enthusiasm over noble words and deeds, and an aversion and repugnance for the mean, such training will render his perusal of poetry harmless. But the man who admires everything, and accommodates himself to everything, whose judgement, because of his preconceived opinion, is enthralled by the heroic names, will, like those who copy Plato’s stoop or Aristotle’s lisp, unwittingly become inclined to conform to much that is base. One ought not timorously, or as though under the spell of religious dread in a holy place, to shiver with awe at everything, and fall prostrate, but should rather acquire the habit of exclaiming with confidence wrong and improper no less than right and proper. For example, Achilles summons an assembly of the soldiers, who are suffering from an illness, since he is most impatient of all over the slow progress of the war because of his conspicuous position and reputation on the field; moreover, because he has some knowledge of medicine, and perceives now after the ninth day, on which these maladies naturally reach their crisis, that the disease is out of the ordinary and not the result of familiar causes, he does not harangue the multitude when he rises to speak, but makes himself an adviser to the king: Son of Atreus, now, as I think, are we destined to wander Back to seek our homes again.[*](Homer, Il. i. 59.) Rightly, moderately, and properly is this put. But after the seer has said that he fears the wrath of the most powerful of the Greeks, Achilles no longer speaks rightly and moderately, when he swears that nobody shall lay hands on the seer while he himself is alive, No, not though you name Agamemnon,[*](Ibid. 90.) thus making plain his slight regard and his contempt for the leader. A moment later his irritation becomes more acute, and his impulse is to draw his sword with intent to do murder; not rightly, either for honour or for expediency. Again, later, repenting, Back he thrust his massive blade once more to its scabbard, Nor ignored Athena’s words,[*](Ibid. 220.) this time rightly and honourably, because, although he could not altogether eradicate his anger, yet before doing anything irreparable he put it aside and checked it by making it obedient to his reason. Then again, although Agamemnon is ridiculous in his actions and words at the Assembly, yet in the incidents touching Chryseis he is more dignified and kingly. For whereas Achilles, as Briseis was being led away,

Burst into tears and withdrawing apart sat aloof from his comrades,[*](Homer, Il. i. 349.)

Agamemnon, as he in person put aboard the ship, and gave up and sent away, the woman of whom, a moment before, he has said that he cared more for her than for his wedded wife, committed no amorous or disgraceful act. Then again, Phoenix, cursed by his father on account of the concubine, says: True in my heart I had purposed to slay him with keenpointed dagger, Save that one of the deathless gods put an end to my anger, Bringing to mind the people’s talk and men’s many reproaches, Lest I be known among the Greeks as my father’s slayer.[*](These lines are not found in any MS. of Homer, but on the authority of this quotation they have been printed in practically all editions since that of Barnes (1711) as lines 458-61 of Book IX. of the Iliad. Plutarch cites the second and part of the third line in the Life of Coriolanus, chap. 32 (229 B), and the last line in Moralia, 72 B.) Now Aristarchus removed these lines from the text through fear, but they are right in view of the occasion, since Phoenix is trying to teach Achilles what sort of a thing anger is, and how many wild deeds men are ready to do from temper, if they do not use reason or hearken to those who try to soothe them. So also the poet introduces Meleager angry at his fellow-citizens, and later mollified, and he rightly finds fault with his emotions, but, on the other hand, his refusal to yield, his resistance, his mastery over them, and his change of heart the poet commends as good and expedient.

Now in these cases the difference is manifest; but in cases where Homer’s judgement is not made clear, a distinction is to be drawn by directing the young man’s attention in some such manner as the following: If, on the one hand, Nausicaa, after merely looking at a strange man, Odysseus, and experiencing Calypso’s emotions toward him, being, as she was,

a wanton child and at the age for marriage, utters such foolish words as these to her maid-servants,

How I wish that a man like this might be called my husband, Living here with us, and be contented to tarry,[*](Homer, Od. vi. 244.)

then are her boldness and lack of restraint to be blamed. But if, on the other hand, she sees into the character of the man from his words, and marvels at his conversation, so full of good sense, and then prays that she may be the consort of such a person rather than of some sailor man or dancing man of her own townsmen, then it is quite right to admire her. And again, when Penelope enters into conversation with the suitors, not holding herself aloof, and they favour her with gifts of garments and other apparel, Odysseus is pleased

Since she had coaxed all these gifts from them, and had cozened their senses.[*](Ibid. xviii. 282.)

If, on the one hand, he rejoices at the receipt of the presents and the profit, then in his prostitution of his wife he outdoes Poliager, who is satirized in the comedy as

Poliager blest Who keeps a Cyprian goat to yield him wealth.[*](Kock, Com. Att. Frag. iii. 299. Cf. Alciphro, Epist. iii. 62. The reference is probably to the goat Amalthea, the fabled nurse of the infant Zeus, but Pantazides thinks that Uranium (Οὐράνιον) may have been the woman’s name.)

But if, on the other hand, he thinks that he shall have them more in his power, while they are confident because of their hopes and blind to the future, then his pleasure and confidence has a reasonable justification. Similarly, in the enumeration of his possessions which the Phaeacians had put ashore with him before they sailed away, if on the one hand, upon finding himself in such solitude and in such uncertainty and ambiguity regarding his surroundings, he really fears about his possessions,

Lest the men on the ship had sailed away with something,[*](Homer, Od. xiii. 216.)

then it is quite right to pity or indeed even to loathe his avarice. But if, on the other hand, he, as some say, being of two minds whether he were in Ithaca, thinks that the safety of his possessions is a demonstration of the rectitude of the Phaeacians (for otherwise they would not have carried him for nothing, put him ashore in a strange land, and left him there, at the same time keeping their hands off his possessions), then he makes use of no mean proof, and it is quite right to praise his forethought. But some critics find fault also with the very act of putting him ashore, if this really was done while he was asleep, and assert that the Etruscans still preserve a tradition that Odysseus was naturally sleepy, and that for this reason most people found him difficult to converse with. Yet if his sleep was not real, but if, being ashamed to send away the Phaeacians without gifts and entertainment, and at the same time unable to elude his enemies if the Phaeacians were in company with him, he provided himself with a cloak for his embarrassment in feigning himself asleep, then they find this acceptable.

By indicating these things to the young, we shall not allow them to acquire any leaning toward such characters as are mean, but rather an emulation of the better, and a preference for them, if we unhesitatingly award censure to the one class and commendation to the other. It is particularly necessary to do this with tragedies in which plausible and artful words are framed to accompany disreputable and knavish actions. For the statement of Sophocles [*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Sophocles, No. 755.) is not altogether true when he says:

From unfair deed fair word cannot proceed.

For, as a fact, he is wont to provide for mean characters and unnatural actions alluring words and humane reasons. And you observe also that his companion-at-arms in the dramatic art has represented Phaedra [*](Presumably in the Hippolytus Veiled; cf. Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Eurip., 491.) as preferring the charge against Theseus that it was because of his derelictions that she fell in love with Hippolytus. Of such sort, too, are the frank lines, aimed against Hecuba, which in the Trojan Women [*](Euripides, The Trojan Women, 919.) he gives to Helen, who there expresses her feeling that Hecuba ought rather to be the one to suffer punishment because she brought into the world the man who was the cause of Helen’s infidelity. Let the young man not form the habit of regarding any one of these things as witty and adroit, and let him not smile indulgently, either, at such displays of verbal ingenuity, but let him loathe the words of licentiousness even more than its deeds.

Now in all cases it is useful also to seek after the cause of each thing that is said. Cato, for example, used, even as a child, to do whatever the attendant in charge of him ordered, yet he also demanded to know the ground and reason for the order. And so the poets are not to be obeyed as though they were our keepers or law-givers, unless their subject matter be reasonable; and this it will be if it be good, but if it be vile, it will be seen to be vacuous and vain. But most people are sharp in demanding the reasons for trivial things like the following, and insist on knowing in what sense they are intended:

Never ought the ladle atop of the bowl to be rested While the bout is on, [*](Hesiod, Works and Days, 744.)

and

Whoso from his car can reach the car of another Let him thrust with his spear.[*](Homer, Il. iv. 306.)

But in far weightier matters they take things on faith without testing them at all, such, for example, as these:

A man, though bold, is made a slave whene’er He learns his mother’s or his sire’s disgrace,[*](Euripides, Hippolytus, 424; cited also by Plutarch in Moralia, 1 C.)

and

Who prospers not must be of humble mind.[*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 957.)

And yet these sentiments affect our characters and disorder our lives, by engendering in us mean judgements and ignoble opinions, unless from habit we can say in answer to each of them, Why must the man who has ’ not prospered be of humble mind,’ and why must he not rather rise up against Fortune, and make himself exalted and not humbled? And why, though I be the son of a bad and foolish father, yet if I myself am good and sensible, is it unbecoming for me to take pride in my good qualities, and why should I be dejected and humble on account of my father’s crassness? For he who thus meets and resists, and refuses to entrust himself broadside on to every breath of doctrine, as to a wind, but believes in the correctness of the saying that a fool is wont to be agog at every word that’s said [*](A dictum of Heracleitus. It is again quoted by Plutarch, Moralia, 41 A; cf. Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, i. p. 95.) will thrust aside a good deal of what is not true or profitable therein. This, then, will take away all danger of harm from the perusal of poetry.

But, just as amid the luxuriant foliage and branches of a vine the fruit is often hidden and unnoticed from being in the shadow, so also amid the poetic diction and the tales that hang clustered about, much that is helpful and profitable escapes a young man. This, however, ought not to happen to him, nor should he allow his attention to be diverted from the facts, but he should cling especially close to those that lead toward virtue and have the power to mould character. In which regard it may not be a bad thing to treat this topic briefly, touching summarily the principal points, but leaving any extended and constructive treatment, and long list of examples, to those who write more for display. In the first place, then, as the young man takes note of good and bad characters and personages, let him pay attention to the lines and the actions which the poet assigns to them as respectively befitting. For example, Achilles says to Agamemnon, although he speaks with anger:

Never a prize like yours is mine whene’er the Achaeans Capture and sack some goodly and populous town of the Trojans.[*](Homer, Il. i. 163.)

But Thersites in reviling the same man says:

Full of bronze are your quarters, and many, too, are the women, Chosen from all the captives for you, and these we Achaeans Give to you first of all whenever we capture a city.[*](Ibid. ii. 226.)

And on another occasion Achilles says,

If perchance Zeus ever Grants to us that we plunder Troy, the well-walled city,[*](Ibid. i. 128.)

but Thersites,

One that I or another Achaean may bring in as captive.[*](Homer, Il. ii. 231.)

At another time, in the Inspection, when Agamemnon upbraided Diomede, the latter made no answer,

Showing respect for the stern rebuke of a king so respected.[*](Ibid. iv. 402.)

But Sthenelus, a man of no account, says:

Son of Atreus, speak not to deceive, knowing how to speak clearly; We can avow ourselves to be better far than our fathers.[*](Ibid. 404.)

A difference of this sort then, if not overlooked, will teach the young man to regard modesty and moderation as a mark of refinement, but to be on his guard against boasting and self-assertion as a mark of meanness. It is useful to note also the behaviour of Agamemnon in this case; for Sthenelus he passed by without a word, but Odysseus he did not disregard, but made answer and addressed him,

When he saw he was wroth, and tried to retract his saying.[*](Ibid. 357.)

For to defend one’s actions to everybody smacks of servility, not of dignity, while to despise everybody is arrogant and foolish. And most excellently does Diomede in the battle hold his peace, although upbraided by the king, but after the battle he uses plain speech to him:

First let me say that you ’mid the Danaans slighted my prowess[*](Ibid. ix. 34.)

It is well, too, not to miss a difference that exists between a man of sense and a seer who courts popularity. For example, Calchas [*](Ibid. i. 94-5.) had no regard to the occasion, and made nothing of accusing the king before the multitude, alleging that he had

brought the pestilence upon them; but Nestor, though anxious to put in a word for the reconciliation with Achilles, yet, in order that he may not seem to discredit Agamemnon with the multitude as having made a mistake and indulged in anger, says,

Give a feast for the elders; ’tis fitting and not unbefitting; Then, when many are gathered, whoever shall offer best counsel Him you will follow,[*](Homer, Il. ix. 70, and 74-5.)

and after the dinner he sends forth the envoys. For this was the way to amend an error; the other was arraignment and foul abuse.

Moreover, the difference between the two peoples should be observed, their behaviour being as follows: the Trojans advance with shouting and confidence, but the Achaeans

Silently, fearing their captains.[*](Ibid. iv. 431.)

For to fear one’s commanders when at close quarters with the enemy is a sign of bravery and of obedience to authority as well. Wherefore Plato [*](Cf. Plato, Apology, 28 F and E.) tries to establish the habit of fearing blame and disgrace more than toils and dangers, and Cato [*](Cf. Plutarch, Life of Cato, chap. 9 (341 C).) used to say that he liked people that blushed better than those that blanched.

There is also in the promises of the heroes a special character. For Dolon promises:

Straight to the midst of their host shall I go till I come to the vessel Which Agamemnon commands.[*](Homer, Il. x. 325.)

Diomede, [*](Ibid. 222.) however, promises nothing, but says that he should be less frightened if he were sent in company with another man. Prudence, then, is characteristic of a Greek and of a man of refinement, while presumption is barbaric and cheap: the one should be emulated and the other detested. And it is not unprofitable to consider how the Trojans and Hector were affected, at the time when Ajax was about to engage with him i single combat. Once when a boxer at the Isthmian games was struck in the face, and a clamour arose, Aeschylus [*](Cf. Plutarch, Moralia, 79 D.) said, What a thing is training. The onlookers cry out; it is the man who is struck who says nothing. In like manner, when the poet says [*](Homer, Il. vii. 214.) that when Ajax appeared resplendent in his armour, the Greeks rejoiced at seeing him, whereas

Dreadful trembling seized on the limbs of every Trojan; Even Hector himself felt his heart beat quick in his bosom,

who could fail to admire the difference? For the heart of the man who is facing the danger only throbs, as though indeed he were simply going to wrestle or run a race, while the onlookers tremble and shiver in their whole bodies through loyalty and fear for their king. Here, too, one should carefully consider the difference between the very valiant man and the craven. For Thersites

Hateful was most of all to Achilles as well as Odysseus,Ibid. ii. 220.

while Ajax was always friendly to Achilles, and says to Hector regarding him—

Now alone from one man alone shall you learn quite clearly What sort of men with us are the Danaans’ chieftains Even after the smiter of men, lion-hearted Achilles.[*](Ibid. vii. 226.)

This is the compliment paid to Achilles, but these succeeding lines in behalf of all are put in such a way as to be useful:

Yet are we of such sort as are ready to face you, Yea, and many of us,[*](Homer, Il. vii. 231.)

thereby declaring himself not the only man or the best, but only one among many equally capable of offering defence.

This is enough on the subject of differences, unless perhaps we desire to add, that of the Trojans many were taken alive, but none of the Achaeans; and that of the Trojans some fell down at the feet of the enemy, as did Adrastus,[*](Ibid. vi. 37.) the sons [*](Ibid. xi. 122.) of Antimachus, Lycaon,[*](Ibid. xxi. 64.) and Hector [*](Ibid. xxii. 337.) himself begging Achilles for burial, but of the Achaeans none, because of their conviction that it is a trait of barbarian peoples to make supplication and to fall at the enemy’s feet in combat, but of Greeks to conquer or to die fighting.

Now just as in pasturage the bee seeks the flower, the goat the tender shoot, the swine the root, and other animals the seed and the fruit, so in the reading of poetry one person culls the flowers of the story, another rivets his attention upon the beauty of the diction and the arrangement of the words, as Aristophanes [*](Kock, Com. Att. Frag. i. p. 513.) says of Euripides,

I use the rounded neatness of his speech;

but as for those who are concerned with what is said as being useful for character (and it is to these that our present discourse is directed), let us remind them how strange it is if the lover of fables does not fail to observe the novel and unusual points in the story, and the student of language does not allow faultless and elegant forms of expression to escape him, whereas he that affects what is honourable and good, who takes up poetry not for amusement but for education, should give but a slack and careless hearing to utterances that look toward manliness or sobriety or uprightness, such, for example, as the following:

Son of Tydeus, what has made us forget our swift prowess? Hither, stand, my friend, by me. Disgrace will befall us If yon Hector, gleaming-helmed, shall capture our vessels.[*](Homer, Il. xi. 313; the first line is quoted infra, 71 F.)

For to observe that the most wise and prudent man, when he is in danger of being destroyed and lost, together with the whole host, fears shame and disapprobation, but not death, will make the young man keenly alive to the moral virtues. And by the line,

Glad was Athena because of the man that was prudent and honest,[*](Homer, Od. iii. 52.)

the poet permits us to draw a similar conclusion in that he represents the goddess as taking delight, not in some rich man or in one who is physically handsome or strong, but in one who is wise and honest. And again when she says that she does not overlook Odysseus, much less desert him,

Since he is courteous and clever of mind and prudent,[*](Ibid. xiii. 332.)

her words indicate that the only one of our attributes that is dear to the gods and divine is a virtuous mind, if it be true that it is the nature of like to delight in like.

Since it seems to be, and really is, a great thing to master one’s anger, and since a greater thing is the exercise of precaution and forethought so as not to become involved in anger or to be made captive by

it, we must make a point of indicating to our young readers such matters as this: that Achilles, being not tolerant or mild in temper, bids Priam in these words to be quiet and not to exasperate him:

Anger me now no more, old man (to ransom your Hector I myself am disposed; from Zeus has come such a message), Lest, old man, even here ’neath my roof I leave you not scatheless Suppliant though you are, and sin against Zeus’s commandments,[*](Homer, Il. xxiv. 560-1, 569-70.)

and having washed and shrouded the body of Hector, he places it with his own hands on the wagon before its disfigurement was seen by the father,

Lest with heart so distressed he fail to master his anger, Seeing his son, and Achilles’ heart be stirred with resentment, So that he slay him there, and sin against Zeus’s commandments.[*](Ibid. 584.)

For it is mark of a wondrous foresight for a man whose hold on his temper is uncertain, who is naturally rough and quick-tempered, not to be blind to his own weakness, but to exercise caution, and to be on his guard against possible grounds for anger, and to forestall them by reason long beforehand, so that he may not even inadvertently become involved in such emotions. After the same manner should he that is fond of wine be on his guard against drunkenness, and he that is amorous against love. So did Agesilaus,[*](Xenophon, Agesilaus, v. 4.) who would not submit to being kissed by the handsome boy who approached him, so did Cyrus,[*](Xenophon, Cyropaedia, v. 1. 4.) who durst not even to look at Pantheia; but the uneducated, on the contrary, gather fuel to kindle their passions, casting themselves headlong into those wherein they are weakest and least sure of themselves. Yet Odysseus not only restrains himself when enraged, but perceiving from some words of Telemachus that he too is angry and filled with hatred of the wicked, labours to mitigate his feelings and prepares him well beforehand to keep quiet and restrain himself, bidding him,

Even if they within my own house shall dishonour me sorely, Let your heart within you endure all the wrongs that I suffer: Though through the house they should drag me out by the feet to the open, Yea, or with missiles smite me, still you must patient behold it.[*](Homer, Od. xvi. 274.)

For just as drivers do not curb their horses during the race, but before the race, so with those persons who are quick-tempered and hard to hold back when dangers threaten, we first gain control over them by reasoning, and make them ready beforehand, and then lead them into the strife.

While it is also necessary not to pass over the words carelessly, yet one should eschew the puerility of Cleanthes; for there are times when he uses a mock seriousness in pretending to interpret the words,

Father Zeus, enthroned on Ida,[*](Homer, Il. iii. 320; vii. 202; xxiv. 208)

and

Zeus, lord of Dodona,

bidding us in the latter case to read the last two words as one [*](Ibid. xvi. 233. It is of inerest that this reading is attested also in scholia on the passage.) (taking the word lord as the preposition up) as though the vapour exhaled from the earth were updonative because of its being rendered up! And Chrysippus also is often quite petty, although he does not indulge in jesting, but wrests the words ingeniously, yet without carrying conviction, as when he would force the phrase wide-seeing son of Cronos [*](Ibid. i. 498.) to signify clever in conversation, that is to say, with a widespread power of speech.

It is better, however, to turn these matters over to the grammarians, and to hold fast rather to those in which is to be found both usefulness and probability, such as

Nor does my heart so bid me, for I have learned to be valiant,[*](Homer, Il. vi. 444.)

and

For towards all he understood the way to be gentle.[*](Ibid. xvii. 671.)

For by declaring that bravery is a thing to be learned, and by expressing the belief that friendly and gracious intercourse with others proceeds from understanding, and is in keeping with reason, the poet urges us not to neglect our own selves, but to learn what is good, and to give heed to our teachers, intimating that both boorishness and cowardice are but ignorance and defects of learning. With this agrees very well what he says regarding Zeus and Poseidon:

Both, indeed, were of one descent and of the same birthplace, Yet was Zeus the earlier born and his knowledge was wider.[*](Ibid. xiii. 354.)

For he declares understanding to be a most divine and kingly thing, to which he ascribes the very great superiority of Zeus, inasmuch as he believes that all the other virtues follow upon this one.

At the same time, the young man must get the habit of perusing with a mind wide awake such sayings as these:

Falsehood he will not utter because he is very prudent,[*](Homer, Od. iii. 20 and 328.) and

What an act Is this, Antilochus, prudent aforetime! You have put my skill to disgrace and hindered my horses,[*](Homer, Il. xxiii. 570.)

and

Glaucus, what cause has a man like you for words so disdainful ? Truly I thought, my friend, that in sense you excelled all the others,[*](Ibid. xvii. 170.)

the implication being that men of sense do not lie or contend unfairly in games, or make unwarranted accusations against other people. And from the poet’s saying [*](Ibid. vi. 104.) that Pandarus was persuaded because of his want of sense to bring to naught the sworn agreement, he clearly shows his opinion that the man of sense would not do wrong. It is also possible to give similar intimations in regard to self-control, by directing the young man’s attention to statements like these:

Mad for him was Proetus’ royal wife Anteia Lusting to make him her lover in secret, but could not persuade him, Since the wise Bellerophon thought more of virtue,[*](Ibid. vi. 160.)

and She at the first would not consent to a deed so unseemly, Royal Clytemnestra, since her thoughts were for virtue.[*](Homer, Od. iii. 265.) In these lines the poet attributes to understanding the cause of self-control; and in his exhortations to battle he says on the several occasions:

Shame, men of Lycia, whither now flee ye ? Now be ye valiant,[*](Homer, Il. xvi. 422.)

and

But let all your minds be imbued with Shame and resentment, for now, as you see, great strife has arisen,[*](Ibid. xiii. 121.)

and thereby he appears to represent the men of self-control as brave because of their being ashamed of disgrace, and as able to overcome pleasures and to undergo dangerous adventures. Timotheus [*](Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. iii. 622; Timotheus, Frag. 14 ed. Wilamowitz.) also adopted this point of view, when in his Persians he urged the Greeks, not infelicitously, to have

Respect for shame that helps the brave in war;

and Aeschylus [*](Aeschylus, Seven Against Thebes, 599; the lines are quoted also, in whole or in part, by Plutarch, Moralia, 8 B, 186 B, and the Life of Aristeides, chap. iii. (320 B).) sets it down as a point of good sense not to be puffed up with fame, nor to be excited and elated by popular praise, when he writes of Amphiaraus,

His wish is not to seem, but be, the best, Reaping the deep-sown furrow of his mind In which all goodly counsels have their root.

For to take pride in oneself and in one’s state of mind when it is altogether good, marks the man of good sense; and since everything may be referred to understanding, it follows that every form of virtue is added unto him from reason and instruction.

Now the bee, in accordance with nature’s laws, discovers amid the most pungent flowers and the roughest thorns the smoothest and most palatable honey; so children, if they be rightly nurtured amid poetry, will in some way or other learn to draw some wholesome and profitable doctrine even from passages that are suspect of what is base and improper. For example, Agamemnon is suspected of having, for a bribe, released from service in the army the rich man who made him a present of the mare Aetha,

Gift so he fare not with him to Troy where the wind never ceaseth, But enjoy himself at home; for wealth in abundance Zeus had bestowed upon him.[*](Homer, Il. xxiii. 297.)

But, as Aristotle [*](Presumably in his Homeric Questions. ) observes, he did quite right in preferring a good mare to a man of that type. For a coward, and a weakling, made dissolute by wealth and soft living, is not, I swear, worth a dog or even an ass. Again, it appears most shameful in Thetis [*](Homer, Il. xxiv. 130.) when she incites her son to pleasures and reminds him of love. But even there we must contrast Achilles’ mastery of himself, that although he is in love with Briseis, who has come back to him, and although he knows that the end of his life is near, yet he does not make haste to enjoy love’s pleasures, nor, like most men, mourn for his friend by inactivity and omission of his duties, but as he refrains from such pleasures because of his grief, so he bestirs himself in the business of his command. Again, Archilochus cannot be commended, because while grieving over his sister’s husband, who was lost at sea, he is minded to fight against his grief by means of wine and amusement; he has, however, alleged a cause that has some appearance of reason,

By my tears I shall not cure it, nor worse make it By pursuing joys, yea, and festivities.[*](Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. ii. p. 687.)

For if he thought that he should not make matters worse by pursuing joys, yea, and festivities, how shall our present condition be any the worse if we engage in the study of philosophy or take part in public life, if we go out to the market-place or down to the Academy, or if we pursue our farming? Wherefore the corrected versions which Cleanthes and Antisthenes employed are themselves not without value. Antisthenes, observing that the Athenians had raised an uproar in the theatre at the line,

What’s shameful if its doer think not so? [*](From the Aeolus of Euripides, Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Euripides, Euripides, No. 17.)

at once interpolated,

A shame’s a shame, though one think so or no

and Cleanthes, taking the lines about riches, Give to your friends, and when your body’s ill, Save it by spending,[*](Euripides, Electra, 428.) rewrote them in this manner,

To harlots give, and when your body’s ill Waste it by spending.

And Zeno in amending the lines of Sophocles,

Whoever comes to traffic with a king To him is slave however free he come,[*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag. Sophocles, No. 789; quoted by Plutarch also in Moralia, 204 D and the Life of Pompey chap. lxxviii. (661 A).)

rewrote it thus:

Is not a slave if only free he come,

by the word free as he now uses it designating the man who is fearless, high-minded, and unhumbled. What, then, is to hinder us also from encouraging the young to take the better course by means of similar rejoinders, dealing with the citations something like this:

Most enviable is the lot of him The shaft of whose desire hits what he would.[*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Adesp. No. 354.)

Not so, will be our retort, but

The shaft of whose desire hits what is good.

For to gain and achieve one’s wish, if what one wishes is not right, is pitiable and unenviable. Again,

Not for good and no ill came thy life from thy sire, Agamemnon, but joy Thou shalt find interwoven with grief.[*](Euripides, Iphigenia at Aulis, 29; quoted also in Moralia, 103 B.)

No, indeed, we shall say, but you must find joy and not grief if your lot be but moderate, since

Not for good and no ill came thy life from thy sire, Agamemnon;

and:

Alas, from God this evil comes to men, When, knowing what is good, one does it not.[*](From the Chrysippus of Euripides; Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 841; again quoted by Plutarch, Moralia, 446 A.)

No, rather is it bestial, we reply, and irrational and pitiable that a man who knows the better should be led astray by the worse as a result of a weak will and soft living.

And again:

’Tis character persuades, and not the speech.[*](Kock, Com. Att. Frag. iii. p. 135; again quoted by Plutarch, Moralia, 801 C.)

No, rather it is both character and speech, or character by means of speech, just as a horseman uses a bridle, or a helmsman uses a rudder, since virtue has no instrument so humane or so akin to itself as speech. And:

To women more than men is he inclined? Where there is beauty, either suits him best.[*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Adesp. No, 355; again quoted by Plutarch, Moralia, 766 F.)

But it were better to say

Where there is virtue, either suits him best,

of a truth, and there is no difference in his inclination; but the man who is influenced by pleasure or outward beauty to shift his course hither and thither is incompetent and inconstant. Again:

God’s doings make the wise to feel afraid.[*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Adesp. No. 356.)

Not so by any means, but

God’s doings make the wise to feel assured,

but they do make the silly and foolish and ungrateful to feel afraid, because such persons suspect and fear the power which is the cause and beginning of every good thing, as though it did harm. Such then is the system of amendment.

Chrysippus has rightly indicated how the poet’s statements can be given a wider application, saying that what is serviceable should be taken over and made to apply to like situations. For when Hesiod [*](Hesiod, Works and Days, 348.) says,

Nor would even an ox disappear were there not a bad neighbour,

he says the same thing also about a dog and about an ass and about all things which in a similar way can disappear. And again when Euripides [*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 958; again quoted by Plutarch, Moralia, 106 D. Cf. Cicero, Ad Atticum, ix. 2a, 2.) says,

What man who recks not death can be a slave?

we must understand that he makes the same statement also about trouble and disease. For, as physicians who have learnt the efficacy of a drug adapted to one malady take it over and use it for every similar malady, so also when a statement has a general and universal value, we ought not to suffer it to be fixed upon one matter alone, but we ought to apply it to all the like, and inure the young men to see its general value, and quickly to carry over what is appropriate, and by many examples to give themselves training and practice in keen appreciation; so that when Menander says,

Blest is the man who has both wealth and sense,[*](From the Bridal Manager of Menander, cf. Kock, Com. Att. Frag. iii. Menander, No. 114, and Allinson, Menander in L.C.L. p. 342.)

they may think of the statement as holding good also about repute and leadership and facility in speaking; and so also that when they hear the rebuke which was administered by Odysseus to Achilles as he sat among the maidens in Scyrus,

Dost thou, to dim the glory of thy race, Card wool, son of the noblest man in Greece? [*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Adesp. No. 9; again quoted by Plutarch with variant reading, Moralia, 72 E.)

they may imagine it to be addressed also to the profligate and the avaricious and the heedless and the ill-bred, as, for example,

Dost drink, son of the noblest man in Greece,

or gamble, or follow quail-fighting, [*](The Greeks were very fond, not only of cock-fights, but also of quail-fights. Another form of the latter sport known as ὀρτυγοκοπία is often referred to by Greek writers and is perhaps best described by Pollus ix. 102 and 107. The quails were put into an enclosed ring, and their courage was tested by tapping them on the head with the finger or by pulling the feathers on op of their heads. If a bird showed fight, its owner won. Plutarch in the present passage, without doubt, uses ὀρτυγοκοπία to cover all forms of the sport.) or petty trading, or the exacting of usury, without a thought of what is magnanimous or worthy of your noble parentage?

Speak not of Wealth. I can’t admire a god Whose ready favour basest men secure.[*](From the Aeolus of Euripides. Nauck, TGF., Euripides, No. 20; cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, v. 16.)

Therefore speak not of repute, either, or of personal beauty, or the general’s cloak, or the priestly crown, to all which we see the worst of men attaining.

For ugly is the brood of cowardice,[*](Nauck, TGF., Adesp. No. 357.)

and the same we may also aver of licentiousness, superstition, envy, and all the other pestilent disorders. Most excellently has Homer said

Paris, poor wretch, excelling in looks,[*](Homer, Il. iii. 39.)

and

Hector, excelling in looks [*](Ibid. xvii. 142.)

(for he declares the man deserving of censure and reproach who is endowed with no good quality better than personal comeliness), and this we must make to apply to similar cases, thereby curtailing the pride of those who plume themselves on things of no worth, and teaching the young to regard as a disgrace and reproach such phrases as excelling in wealth and excelling in dinners and excelling in children or oxen, and in fact even the use of the word excelling in such a connexion. For we ought to aim at the pre-eminence which comes from noble qualities, and we should strive to be first in matters of first importance, and to be great in the greatest: but the repute which comes from small and petty things is disreputable and paltry.

This illustration at once reminds us to consider carefully instances of censure and commendation, particularly in Homer’s poems. For he gives us expressly to understand that bodily and adventitious

characteristics are unworthy of serious attention. For, to begin with, in their greetings and salutations, they do not call one another handsome or rich or strong, but they employ such fair words as these—

Heaven-sprung son of Laertes, Odysseus of many devices,[*](Homer, Il. ii. 173.)

and

Hector, son of Priam, peer of Zeus in counsel,[*](Ib. vii. 47.)

and

Son of Peleus, Achilles, great glory to the Achaeans,[*](Ib. xix. 216.)

and

Noble son of Menoetius, in whom my soul finds pleasure.[*](Ib. xi. 608.)

In the second place they reproach without touching at all upon bodily characteristics, but they direct their censure to faults: Drunken sot, with eyes of a dog and the wild deer’s courage,[*](Ib. i. 225.) and

Ajax, excelling at wrangling, ill advised,[*](Ib. xxiii. 483.)

and

Why, Idomeneus do you brag so soon? Unfitting Is it for you to be braggart,[*](Ib. xxiii. 474, 478.)

and Ajax, blundering boaster,[*](Ib. xiii. 824.) and finally Thersites is reproached [*](Ib. ii. 246.) by Odysseus, not as lame or bald or hunchbacked, but as indiscreet in his language, while on the other hand the mother of Hephaestus affectionately drew an epithet from his lameness when she addressed him thus:

Up with you, club-foot, my child

Thus Homer ridicules those who feel ashamed of lameness or blindness, in that he does not regard as blameworthy that which is not shameful, or as shameful that which is brought about, not through our own acts, but by fortune.

Plainly, then, two great advantages accrue to those who accustom themselves carefully to peruse works of poetry: the first is conducive to moderation, that we do not odiously and foolishly reproach anybody with his fortune; while the second is conducive to magnanimity, that when we ourselves have met with chances and changes we be not humiliated or even disturbed, but bear gently with scoffings and revilings and ridicule, having especially before us the words of Philemon:

There’s naught more pleasing or in better taste Than having strength to bear when men revile.[*](From the Epidicazomenus of Philemon; cf. Kock, Com. Att. Frag. ii. p. 484.)

But if anybody is plainly in need of reprehension, we should reprehend his faults and his giving way to emotion, after the fashion in which Adrastus of the tragedy, when Alcmaeon said to him,

You are the kin of her who slew her spouse,[*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Adesp. No. 358; again quoted by Plutarch, Moralia, 88 F.)

replied

And you have murdered her who gave you birth.[*](Ibidem.)

For just as those who scourge the clothes do not touch the body,[*](Plutarch says (Moralia, 173 D) that Artaxerxes (Longhand) ordained that nobles who had offended should lay off their clothes, and their clothes should be scourged instead of their bodies. Considerable corroborative evidence is cited by Wyttenbach in his note on Moralia, 565 A.) so those who scoff at misfortune or low birth, do but vainly and foolishly assail externals, never touching the soul or even such matters as really need correction and stinging reproof.

Moreover, just as in what we have said above we felt that by setting against cheap and harmful poems the sayings and maxims of statesmen and men of repute, we were inducing a revolt and revulsion of faith from such poetry, so whenever we find any edifying sentiment neatly expressed in the poets we ought to foster and amplify it by means of proofs and testimonies from the philosophers, at the same time crediting these with the discovery. For this is right and useful, and our faith gains an added strength and dignity whenever the doctrines of Pythagoras and of Plato are in agreement with what is spoken on the stage or sung to the lyre or studied at school, and when the precepts of Chilon and of Bias lead to the same conclusions as our children’s readings in poetry. Hence it is a duty to make a point of indicating that the lines

You, my child, have not the gift of arms in battle, Your concern must be for loving arms in wedlock,[*](Homer, Il. v. 428.)

and

Seeing that Zeus is wroth if you fight with a man far better,[*](Not found in the MSS. of Homer but often printed as Iliad, xi. 543. See note on 24 C supra. )

do not differ from Know thyself, but have the same purport as this; and the lines,

Fools! They know not how much more than all a half is,[*](Hesiod, Works and Days, 40.)

and

Evil counsel is the worst for him who gives it[*](Ibid. 265.)

are identical with the doctrines of Plato in the Gorgias [*](Plato, Gorgias, 473 A ff.) and the Republic [*](Plato, Republic, end of Book I. and Book IV.; cf. also 335 B.) upon the principle that to do wrong is worse than to be wronged and to do evil is more injurious than to suffer evil. And on the words of Aeschylus, [*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Aeschylus, No. 352.)

Fear not; great stress of pain is not for long,

we ought to remark that this is the oft repeated and much admired statement originating with Epicurus,[*](One of the leading principles of Epicurus; cf. Diogenes Laertius, x. 140.) namely that great pains shortly spend their force, and long continued pains have no magnitude. Of these two ideas Aeschylus has perspicuously stated the one and the other is a corollary thereto; for if great and intense pain is not lasting, then that which does not last is not great or hard to endure. Take these lines of Thespis [*](Nothing by Thespis has been preserved, although a few lines attributed to him were current. See Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag. p. 833.):

You see that Zeus is first of gods in this, Not using lies or boast or silly laugh; With pleasure he alone is unconcerned.

What difference is there between this and the statement, for the Divine Being sits throned afar from pleasure and pain, as Plato [*](Plato, Letters, iii. 315 C.) has put it? Consider what is said by Bacchylides [*](Bacchylides, i. 21.):

I shall assert that virtue hath the highest fame, But wealth with even wretched men is intimate,

and again by Euripides [*](Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 959.) to much the same effect:

There’s naught that I hold In a higher esteem Than a virtuous life; ’Twill ever be joined With those that are good.

and

Why seek vain possessions? Do ye think Virtue by wealth to compass? Wretched amid your comforts shall ye sit.[*](Plutarch, as was often his practice (e.g.Moralia, 25 C or 646 C), seems to have condensed this quotation. The original of the first portion appears to have been given by Satyrus in his Life of Euripides (Oxyrhynchus Papyri, ix. 142), Why have you mortals acquired in vain many possessions, and think that by wealth you shall compass virtue? What boots it, should you have in your ancestral halls some fragment of Aetna’s cliff or Parian stone, gold-wrought, which you have secured? Cf. Nauck, Trag.Graec. Frag., Euripides, No. 960.)

Is not this a proof of what the philosophers say regarding wealth and external advantages, that without virtue they are useless and unprofitable for their owners?

This method of conjoining and reconciling such sentiments with the doctrines of philosophers brings the poet’s work out of the realm of myth and impersonation, and, moreover, invests with seriousness its helpful sayings. Besides, it opens and stimulates in advance the mind of the youth by the sayings in philosophy. For he comes to it thus not altogether without a foretaste of it, nor without having heard of it, nor indiscriminately stuffed with what he has heard always from his mother and nurse, and, I

dare say, from his father and his tutor as well, who all beatify and worship the rich, who shudder at death and pain, who regard virtue without money and repute as quite undesirable and a thing of naught. But when they hear the precepts of the philosophers, which go counter to such opinions, at first astonishment and confusion and amazement take hold of them, since they cannot accept or tolerate any such teaching, unless, just as if they were now to look upon the sun after having been in utter darkness, they have been made accustomed, in a reflected light, as it were, in which the dazzling rays of truth are softened by combining truth with fable, to face facts of this sort without being distressed, and not to try to get away from them.[*](The whole passage is a reminiscence of Plato, Republic, vii. chap. 2 (515 E).) For if they have previously heard or read in poetry such thoughts as these:

To mourn the babe for th’ ills to which he comes; But him that’s dead, and from his labours rests, To bear from home with joy and cheering words,[*](Celebrated lines from the Cresphontes of Euripides. Nauck, TGF., Eurip. No. 449; cf. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 48. 115.)

and What needs have mortals save two things alone, Demeter’s grain and draught from water-jar?[*](Nauck, ibid., Eurip. No. 892 (again quoted by Plutarch, Moralia, 1043 E, 1044 B and F).) and

O Tyranny, beloved of barbarous folk,[*](Ibid., Adesp. o 359.)

and

And mortal men’s felicity Is gained by such of them as feel least grief,[*](Ibid., Adesp. No. 360.)

they are less confused and disquieted upon hearing at the lectures of the philosophers that Death is nothing to us, [*](One of Epicurus’s leading principles, Diogenes Laertius, x. 139.) and The wealth allowed by Nature is definitely limited, [*](Another of Epicurus’s leading principles, Diogenes Laertius, x. 144.) and Happiness and blessedness do not consist in vast possessions or exalted occupations or offices or authority, but on impassivity, calmness, and a disposition of the soul that sets its limitations to accord with Nature. [*](Also from Epicurus, without much doubt, but not to be found in just this form; cf., however, Diogenes Laertius, x. 139, 141, 144.)

Wherefore, both because of these considerations and because of those already adduced, the young man has need of good pilotage in the matter of reading, to the end that, forestalled with schooling rather than prejudice, in a spirit of friendship and goodwill and familiarity, he may be convoyed by poetry into the realm of philosophy.