Antony

Plutarch

Plutarch. Plutarch's Lives, Vol. IX. Perrin, Bernadotte, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1920.

Secondly, his engines necessary for siege operations were carried along on three hundred waggons, and among them was a battering ram eighty feet long. Not one of these, if destroyed, could be replaced in time to be of use, because the upper country produced only wood of insufficient length and hardness. Nevertheless, in his haste, he left these behind him, on the ground that they retarded his speed, setting a considerable guard under the command of Statianus over the waggons, while he himself laid siege to Phraata, a large city, in which were the wives and children of the king of Media.

But the exigencies of the case at once proved what a mistake he had made in leaving behind him his engines, and coming to close quarters he began to build a mound against the city, which rose slowly and with much labour. In the meantime, however, Phraates came down with a great army, and when he heard that the waggons carrying the engines had been left behind, he sent a large number of his horsemen against them. By these Statianus was surrounded and slain himself, and ten thousand of his men were slain with him. Moreover, the Barbarians captured the engines and destroyed them. They also took a great number of prisoners, among whom was Polemon the king.

This calamity naturally distressed all the followers of Antony, for they had received an unexpected blow at the outset; besides, Artavasdes, the king of Armenia, despairing of the Roman cause, took his own forces and went off, although he had been the chief cause of the war.

And now the Parthians presented themselves to the besiegers in brilliant array, and threatened them insultingly. Antony, therefore, not wishing that the inactivity of his army should confirm and increase among them consternation and dejection, took ten legions and three praetorian cohorts of men-at-arms, together with all his cavalry, and led them out to forage, thinking that in this way the enemy would best be drawn into a pitched battle.

After advancing a single day’s march, he saw that the Parthians were enveloping him and seeking to attack him on the march. He therefore displayed the signal for battle in his camp, and after taking down his tents, as though his purpose was not to fight but to withdraw, he marched along past the line of the Barbarians, which was crescent-shaped. But he had given orders that when the first ranks of the enemy should appear to be within reach of his legionaries, the cavalry should charge upon them.

To the Parthians in their parallel array, the discipline of the Romans seemed to beggar description, and they watched them marching past at equal distances from one another, without confusion, and in silence, brandishing their javelins. But when the signal was given, and the Roman horsemen wheeled about and rode down upon them with loud shouts, they did indeed receive their onset and repel them, although their foes were at once too close for them to use their arrows; when, however, the legionaries joined in the charge, with shouts and clashing of weapons, the horses of the Parthians took fright and gave way, and the Parthians fled without coming to close quarters.