Caesar

Caesar called his soldiers together, and after telling them that Corfinius[*](An error for Cornificius.) was near with two legions for him, and that fifteen cohorts besides under Calenus were stationed at Athens and Megara, asked them whether they wished to wait for these troops, or to hazard the issue by themselves. Then the soldiers besought him with loud cries not to wait for the troops, but rather to contrive and manoeuvre to come to close quarters with the enemy as soon as possible.

As he was holding a lustration and review of his forces and had sacrificed the first victim, the seer at once told him that within three days there would be a decisive battle with the enemy. And when Caesar asked him whether he also saw in the victims any favourable signs of the issue, Thou thyself, said the seer, canst better answer this question for thyself. For the gods indicate a great change and revolution of the present status to the opposite. Therefore, if thou thinkest thyself well off as matters stand, expect the worse fortune; if badly off, the better.

Moreover on the night before the battle, as Caesar was making the round of his sentries about midnight, a fiery torch was seen in the heavens which seemed to be carried over his camp, blazing out brightly, and then to fall into Pompey’s. And during the morning watch it was noticed that there was actually a panic confusion among the enemy.[*](Cf. the Pompey, lxviii. 3.) However, Caesar did not expect to fight on that day,[*](August 9, 48 B.C.) but began to break camp for a march to Scotussa.

But just as the tents had been struck, his scouts rode up to him with tidings that the enemy were coming down into the plain for battle. At this he was overjoyed, and after prayers and vows to the gods, drew up his legionaries in three divisions. Over the centre he put Domitius Calvinus, while of the wings Antony had one and he himself the right, where he intended to fight with the tenth legion.

But seeing that the enemy’s cavalry were arraying themselves over against this point, and fearing their brilliant appearance and their numbers, he ordered six cohorts from the furthermost lines to come round to him unobserved, and stationed them behind his right wing, teaching them what they were to do when the enemy’s horsemen attacked. Pompey had one of his wings himself and Domitius the left, while Scipio, Pompey’s father-in-law, commanded the centre.

But his horsemen all crowded to the left wing, intending to encircle the enemy’s right and make a complete rout about the commander himself; for they thought that no legionary array, however deep, could resist them, but that when so many horsemen made an onset together the enemy would be utterly broken and crushed.[*](Cf. the Pompey, lxix. 1-3.)

When both sides were about to sound the charge, Pompey ordered his legionaries to stand with arms at the ready and await in close array the onset of the enemy until they were within javelin cast. But Caesar says[*](B. C. iii. 92.) that here too Pompey made a mistake, not knowing that the initial clash with all the impetus of running adds force to the blows and fires the courage, which everything then conspires to fan.