Pompey

At break of day, however, both generals drew up their forces again to make the victory assured, but on the approach of Metellus, Sertorius retired and his army dispersed. His men were accustomed to scatter in this way, and then to come together again, so that often Sertorius wandered about alone, and often took the field again with an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men, like a winter torrent suddenly swollen.

Pompey, then, when he went to meet Metellus after the battle and they were near each other, ordered his lictors to lower their fasces, out of deference to Metellus as his superior in rank. But Metellus would not allow this, and in all other ways was considerate of him, not assuming any superiority as a man of consular rank and the elder, except that when they shared the same camp the watchword was given out to all from the tent of Metellus; but for the most part they encamped apart.

For their versatile enemy used to cut off their communications and separate them, and showed great skill in appearing in many places within a short time, and in drawing them from one contest into another. And finally, by cutting off their supplies, plundering the country, and getting control of the sea, he drove both of them out of that part of Spain which was under him, and forced them to take refuge in other provinces for lack of provisions.[*](Cf. the Sertorius, chapter xxi.)

When Pompey had exhausted most of his private resources and spent them on the war, he asked money of the senate, threatening to come back to Italy with his army if they did not send it. Lucullus was consul at this time, and was not on good terms with Pompey, but since he was soliciting the conduct of the Mithridatic war for himself, made great efforts to have the money sent,[*](Cf. the Lucullus, v. 2. f. ) for fear of furthering Pompey’s desire to let Sertorius go, and march against Mithridates, an antagonist whose subjection, as it was thought, would bring great glory and involve little difficulty.

But in the meantime Sertorius was treacherously killed by his friends,[*](In 72 B.C., two years after Lucullus had set out against Mithridates.) and Perpenna, the ringleader among them, attempted to carry on his work. He had indeed the same forces and equipment, but lacked equal judgement in the use of them. Accordingly, Pompey took the field against him at once, and perceiving that he had no fixed plan of campaign, sent out ten cohorts as a decoy for him, giving them orders to scatter at random over the plain.

Perpenna attacked these cohorts, and was engaged in their pursuit, when Pompey appeared in force, joined battle, and won a complete victory. Most of Perpenna’s officers perished in the battle, but Perpenna himself was brought before Pompey, who ordered him to be put to death. In this he did not show ingratitude, nor that he was unmindful of what had happened in Sicily,[*](Cf. chapter x. 2, where there is nothing to imply that Perpenna put Pompey under any obligations to him, except that he made no resistance.) as some allege against him, but exercised great forethought and salutary judgement for the commonwealth.