Fabius Maximus

Plutarch

Plutarch. Plutarch's Lives, Vol. III. Perrin, Bernadotte, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1914.

In the battle Hannibal practiced a double strategy. In the first place, he took advantage of the ground to put the wind at his back. This wind came down like a fiery hurricane, and raised a huge cloud of dust from the exposed and sandy plains and drove it over the Carthaginian lines hard into the faces of the Romans, who turned away to avoid it, and so fell into confusion.

In the second place, he formed his troops as follows: the sturdiest and most warlike part of his force he stationed on either side of the centre, and manned the centre itself with his poorest soldiers, intending to use this as a wedge jutting out far in advance of the rest of his line. But orders were given to the picked troops, when the Romans should have cut the troops in the centre to pieces, pursued them hotly as they retreated and formed a deep hollow, and so got within their enemy’s line of battle,—then to turn sharply from either side, smite them on the flanks, and envelop them by closing in upon their rear.

And it was this which seems to have produced time greatest slaughter. For the centre gave way and was followed by the Romans in pursuit, Hannibal’s line of battle thus changing its shape into that of a crescent; and the commanders of the picked troops on his wings wheeled them swiftly to left and right and fell upon the exposed sides of their enemy, all of whom, except those who retired before they were surrounded, were then overwhelmed and destroyed.