Vitae philosophorum

These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved.[*](Cf.§ 54.) It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities.

Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. (Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else:[*](The missing premiss is supplied by Cicero, De div. ii. 103 at quod omne est, id non cernitur ex alio extrinsecus. Cf. Lucr. i. 960.)) hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite.

Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void.

For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counter-checks

Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in them—out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved—vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a definite number of the same shapes. The like atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite; but the variety of shapes, though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite.

[For neither does the divisibility go on ad infinitum, he says below[*](Properly further within—a proof that the Scholiast read his Epicurus from a papyrus scroll which had to be unrolled. Hence further within or nearer the centre expresses the same thing as further on or below in a modern book.); but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to keep enlarging their magnitudes also simply ad infinitum.]

The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity. [Further, he says below,[*](Properly further within—a proof that the Scholiast read his Epicurus from a papyrus scroll which had to be unrolled. Hence further within or nearer the centre expresses the same thing as further on or below in a modern book.) that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike.] Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.[*](Note the distinction between (1) solids, composed of interlacing atoms (which have got entangled), and (2) fluids, composed of atoms not interlaced, needing a sheath or container of other atoms, if they are to remain united. To (2) belongs Soul (§ 66). See Lucr. ii. 80-141; Cic. De fin. i. 7.)

This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision,

The repetition at such length of all that we are now recalling to mind furnishes an adequate outline for our conception of the nature of things.

Moreover, there is an infinite number of worlds, some like this world, others unlike it.[*](This remark is not misplaced. For infinity of worlds follows from the infinity of (a) atoms, (b) space; see inf.§§ 73, 89; Lucr. ii. 1048 foll.) For the atoms being infinite in number, as has just been proved, are borne ever further in their course. For the atoms out of which a world might arise, or by which a world might be formed, have not all been expended on one world or a finite number of worlds, whether like or unlike this one. Hence there will be nothing to hinder an infinity of worlds.

Again, there are outlines or films, which are of the same shape as solid bodies, but of a thinness far exceeding that of any object that we see. For it is not impossible that there should be found in the surrounding air combinations of this kind, materials adapted for expressing the hollowness and thinness of surfaces, and effluxes preserving the same relative position and motion which they had in the solid objects from which they come. To these films we give the name of images or idols. Furthermore,

Not that, if we consider the minute times perceptible by reason alone,[*](Cf. Lucr. iv. 794-8: In one unit of time, when we can perceive it by sense and while one single word is uttered, many latent times are contained which reason finds to exist Obviously such minute times are immeasurably short. The unit of sensible time appears to be that called (in § 62) the minimum continuous time. Cf. Sext. Emp. x.§§ 148-154.) the moving body itself arrives at more than one place simultaneously (for this too is inconceivable), although in time perceptible to sense it does arrive simultaneously, however different the point of departure from that conceived by us. For if it changed its direction, that would be equivalent to its meeting with resistance, even if up to that point we allow nothing to impede the rate of its flight. This is an elementary fact which in itself is well worth bearing in mind. In the next place the exceeding thinness of the images is contradicted by none of the facts under our observation. Hence also their velocities are enormous, since they always find a void passage to fit them. Besides, their incessant effluence meets with no resistance,[*](Or, inserting τὸ, not τῷ, before τῷ ἀπείρῳ, a passage of the proper size to secure that nothing obstructs their endless emanation. But the meaning cannot be called certain.) or very little, although many atoms, not to say an unlimited number, do at once encounter resistance.

Besides this, remember that the production of the images is as quick as thought. For particles are continually streaming off from the surface of bodies, though no diminution of the bodies is observed, because other particles take their place.[*](If vision is to be not merely intermittent but continuous, images must be perpetually streaming from the objects seen to our eyes; there must be a continual succession of similar images. Cf. Fr. 282 (Us.); Lucr. ii. 67-76, iv. 143-167.) And those

We must also consider that it is by the entrance of something coming from external objects that we see their shapes and think of them.[*](Thought, as well as vision, is explained by images, but images of a much finer texture, which fail to affect the eyes but do affect the mind: cf. Fr. 317 (Us.); Lucr. iv. 777 f.) For external things would not stamp on us their own nature of colour and form through the medium of the air which is between them and us,[*](This was the view of Democritus; cf. Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition, p. 26.) or by means of rays of light or currents of any sort going from us to them, so well as by the entrance into our eyes or minds, to whichever their size is suitable, of certain films coming from the things themselves, these films or outlines being of the same colour and shape as the external things themselves.

They move with rapid motion;[*](The reader is left to infer that, the more rapid the motion, the more continuous is the succession of fresh images. It is this uninterrupted train of images which guarantees the continued existence of the external object, just as their similarity or identity guarantees its oneness: cf. Lucr. iv. 87, 104 f., 189, 256 f., 714 f.; Cic. N.D. i. 105.) and this again explains why they present the appearance of the single continuous object, and retain the mutual interconnexion which they had in the object, when they impinge upon the sense, such impact being due to the oscillation of the atoms in the interior of the solid object from which they come. And whatever presentation we derive by direct contact, whether it be with the mind or with

For the presentations which, e.g., are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact. Error would not have occurred, if we had not experienced some other movement in ourselves, conjoined with, but distinct from,[*](διάληψιν ἔχειν,to be distinct; again,§ 58; so διαληπτόν, distinguishable (§ 57).) the perception of what is presented. And from this movement, if it be not confirmed or be contradicted, falsehood results; while, if it be confirmed or not contradicted, truth results.

And to this view we must closely adhere, if we are not to repudiate the criteria founded on the clear evidence of sense, nor again to throw all these things into confusion by maintaining falsehood as if it were truth.[*](Epicurus was a severe critic of the Sceptics; cf.§§ 146, 147; Frs. 252, 254 (Us.); Lucr. iv. 507-521.)

Again, hearing takes place when a current passes from the object, whether person or thing, which emits voice or sound or noise, or produces the sensation of hearing in any way whatever. This current is broken up into homogeneous particles, which at the same time preserve a certain mutual connexion and a distinctive unity extending to the object which emitted them, and thus, for the most part, cause the perception in that case or, if not, merely indicate the presence of the external object.

For without the transmission from the object of a certain interconnexion of the parts no such sensation could arise. Therefore we must not suppose that the air itself is moulded into shape by the voice emitted or something similar[*](Air is not, as Democritus held (Beare, op. cit.p. 99), the medium, any more than for vision (§ 49). By something similar Epicurus probably means to include sound or noise. Lucretius treats of hearing in iv. 524-614, ii. 410-413.); for it is very far from being the case that the air is acted upon by it in this way. The blow which is struck in us when we utter a sound causes such a displacement of the particles as serves to produce a current resembling breath, and this displacement gives rise to the sensation of hearing.

Again, we must believe that smelling,[*](Cf. Lucr. iv. 673-705, ii. 414-417. Neither taste nor touch is treated separately in this epistle.) like hearing, would produce no sensation, were there not particles conveyed from the object which are of the proper sort for exciting the organ of smelling, some of one sort, some of another, some exciting it confusedly and strangely, others quietly and agreeably.

Moreover, we must hold that the atoms in fact possess none of the qualities belonging to things which come under our observation, except shape, weight, and size, and the properties necessarily conjoined

For in the case of changes of configuration within our experience the figure is supposed to be inherent when other qualities are stripped off, but the qualities are not supposed, like the shape which is left behind, to inhere in the subject of change, but to vanish altogether from the body. Thus, then, what is left behind is sufficient to account for the differences in composite bodies, since something at least must necessarily be left remaining and be immune from annihilation.

Again, you should not suppose that the atoms have any and every size, [*](The opinion of Democritus.)lest you be contradicted by facts; but differences of size must be admitted; for this addition renders the facts of feeling and sensation easier of explanation.

But to attribute any and

Besides, you must not suppose that there are parts unlimited in number, be they ever so small, in any finite body. Hence not only must we reject as impossible subdivision ad infinitum into smaller and smaller parts, lest we make all things too weak and, in our conceptions of the aggregates, be driven to pulverize the things that exist, i.e. the atoms, and annihilate[*](Admitting indivisible atoms, hard solid bodies can be explained; whereas, if atoms were soft and thus divisible ad infinitum, all things would be deprived of solidity (Lucr. i. 565-576). Just before Lucretius has argued that, if atoms did not set a limit to the division of things, production or reproduction would be impossible, since destruction is wrought more quickly than it is repaired, and endless future time could not undo the waste of endless past time. Possibly, however, Epicurus is thinking of an argument similar to that used by Lucretius in ii. 522-568—that a finite number of shapes implies and requires an infinity of atoms of each shape.) them; but in dealing with finite things we must also reject as impossible the progression ad infinitum by less and less increments.

For when once we have said that an infinite number of particles, however small, are contained in anything, it is not possible to conceive how it could any longer be limited or finite in size. For clearly our infinite number of particles must have some size; and then, of whatever size they were, the aggregate they made would be infinite. And, in the next place, since what is finite has an extremity which is distinguishable, even if it is not by itself observable, it is not possible to avoid thinking of another such extremity next to this. Nor can we help thinking that in this way, by proceeding forward

We must consider the minimum perceptible by sense as not corresponding to that which is capable of being traversed, i.e. is extended,[*](That which admits the successive transitions from part to part. As Bignone remarks, a mathematical series, whether of integers or fractions or powers, might be so described. But Epicurus is obviously dealing with areas and surfaces; since generally to us the visible will also be extended.) nor again as utterly unlike it, but as having something in common with the things capable of being traversed, though it is without distinction of parts. But when from the illusion created by this common property we think we shall distinguish something in the minimum, one part on one side and another part on the other side, it must be another minimum equal to the first which catches our eye. In fact, we see these minima one after another, beginning with the first, and not as occupying the same space; nor do we see them touch one another’s parts with their parts, but we see that by virtue of their own peculiar character (i.e. as being unit indivisibles) they afford a means of measuring magnitudes: there are more of them, if the magnitude measured is greater; fewer of them, if the magnitude measured is less.

We must recognize that this analogy also holds of the minimum in the atom; it is only in minuteness that it differs from that which is observed by sense, but it follows the same analogy. On the analogy of things within our experience we have declared that the atom has magnitude; and this, small as it is, we have merely reproduced on a larger scale. And further, the least and simplest[*](i.e.uncompounded. But v. Arnim’s ἀμερῆ, void of parts, is more suitable.) things must be regarded as extremities of lengths, furnishing from themselves as units the means of measuring lengths, whether greater or less, the mental vision being

Further, we must not assert up or down of that which is unlimited, as if there were a zenith or nadir.[*](Objection was taken by Aristotle to the atomic motion of Democritus, on the ground that it implied a point or region absolutely high, and an opposite point or region absolutely low, these terms being unmeaning in infinite space (Aristotle, Phys. iii. 5. 205 b 30; iv. 8. 215 a 8). See Classical Review, xxxv. p. 108.) As to the space overhead, however, if it be possible to draw[*](This verb (ἄγειν) is technical in Euclid.) a line to infinity from the point where we stand, we know that never will this space —or, for that matter, the space below the supposed standpoint if produced to infinity—appear to us to be at the same time up and down with reference to the same point; for this is inconceivable. Hence it is possible to assume one direction of motion, which we conceive as extending upwards ad infinitum, and another downwards, even if it should happen ten thousand times that what moves from us to the spaces above our heads reaches the feet of those above us, or that which moves downwards from us the heads of those below us. None the less is it true that the whole of the motion in the respective cases is conceived as extending in opposite directions ad infinitum.