Vitae philosophorum

one sensation cannot convict another and kindred sensation, for they are equally valid; nor can one sensation refute another which is not kindred but heterogeneous, for the objects which the two senses judge are not the same[*](Cf. inf.§ 146.); nor again can reason refute them, for reason is wholly dependent on sensation; nor can one sense refute another, since we pay equal heed to all. And the reality of separate perceptions guarantees[*](i.e. the trustworthiness of the senses (αἰσθής εων) considered as faculties of sense-perception: cf. Sext. Emp. Adv math. viii. 9 (Usener, Fr. 244).) the truth of our senses. But seeing and hearing are just as real as feeling pain. Hence it is from plain facts that we must start when we draw inferences about the unknown.[*](More precisely ἄδηλον = that which does not come within the range of sense. Compare e.g.§ 38 τὸ προσμέν ον καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον, and the way in which the conception of void is obtained in § 40. In § 62 it is called τὸ προσδοξαζόμενον περὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου.) For all our notions are derived from

perceptions, either by actual contact or by analogy, or resemblance, or composition, with some slight aid from reasoning. And the objects presented to madmen[*](Cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. math. viii. 63.) and to people in dreams are true, for they produce effects—i.e. movements in the mind—which that which is unreal never does.