History of the Peloponnesian War

and they supposed that they were already all but there. And indeed, if they had been more bold, they might easily have done that, and so have either divided the city still more than ever, by lying near it, or if they had remained and blockaded it, have compelled the fleet in Ionia, though opposed to the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their own relatives and the whole city; and in the mean time the Hellespont would have been theirs, with Ionia, the islands, every thing as far as Euboea, in a word, the whole empire of Athens.

But it was not on this occasion, but on many others also, that the Lacedaemonians proved themselves most convenient people for the Athenians to be at war with. For by being very widely different in character—the one people being quick, and the other slow; the one enterprising, and the other unadventurous—they presented very many advantages, especially in the case of a naval empire. A proof of this was given by the Syracusans; for they, through being of a congenial disposition, were also most successful in carrying on war with them.

On receiving therefore this news, the Athenians, notwithstanding, manned twenty ships, and called an assembly; one immediately, which was summoned to meet on that occasion for the first time in what was called the Pnyx, (where they had been accustomed to meet in other days,) and in which they deposed the Four Hundred, and resolved that the government should be put into the hands of the Five Thousand; that [*](εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, κ. τ. λ.] We must suppose that all who could furnish heavy arms were eligible into the number of the Five Thousand; whether the members were fixed on by lot, by election, or by rotation; as it had been proposed to appoint the Four Hundred by rotation out of the whole number of the Five Thousand. See ch. 93. 2. —Arnold.) in that body should be included all who furnished themselves with heavy armour, and that no one should receive pay for the discharge of any office;