History of the Peloponnesian War

Accordingly they now united, and found fault with the present state of things, having as their leaders some of the most influential generals and men in office, such as Theramenes the son of Hagnon, Aristocrates the son of Scellias, and others; who, though amongst the first members of the government, were yet afraid, as they alleged, of the army at Samos, and of Alcibiades most especially, as also of those whom they were sending as ambassadors to Lacedaemon, lest without the authority of the greater part of them they might do the state some harm; [*](φοβούμενοι δ᾽, ὡς ἔφασαν, κ. τ. λ.] This passage, as it stands in Arnold's text, being utterly untranslatable, I was compelled either to omit it altogether, or to adopt such corrections as would at any rate give some sense to it, whether the true one or not. I have therefore, with Göller, changed τούς into οὕς taken away the comma after πρεσβευομένους, and substituted ἀπαλλαξείειν for ἀπαλλάξειν. With regard to the τό before that infinitive, I am disposed to think that it is not so hopeless a reading as has been considered; but that this may be added to those instances given by Jelf, Gr. Gr. §670, in which the article shows that especial emphasis is laid on the notion expressed by the infinitive. Compare especially II. 53. 4, καὶ τὸ μὲν προσταλαιπωρεῖν τῷ δόξαντι καλῷ οὐδεὶς πρόθυμος ἦν; Xen. Apol. Soc. 13, τὸ προειδέναι τὸν θεὸν τὸ μέλλον πάντες λέγουσι Id. Symp. III. 3, οὐδεὶς σοι, ἐφη, ἀντιλέγει τὸ μὴ οὐ λέξειν. The last two quotations prove that this construction is common after verbs of ' saying;' and in the present instance I suppose the infinitive to depend upon such a verb understood from ὡς ἔφασαν in the preceding part of the paragraph. There seems therefore to be no reason for changing τό into τοί as I was once led by the various reading τῷ to conjecture, before I knew that Göller had done the same.) and so they declared, not that they wished to escape from the administration falling into too few hands, but that they ought to establish the Five Thousand in reality, not in mere name, and to settle the government on a more equal basis.

This, however, was but a public profession made by them in word; but it was from private ambition that most or them pursued that very method by which an oligarchy formed out of a democracy is most sure to be overturned. For all at once not only claim to be equal, but every one decidedly the first man. [And in such a case failure is intolerable:] whereas, when an election is made under a democracy, [*](ῥᾶον τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ... φέρει.] Because, as Arnold observes, they know that the weight of the government is against them, and are thus spared the peculiar pain of being beaten in a fair race, when they and their competitors start with equal advantages, and there is nothing therefore to lessen the mortification of defeat. ) a man more easily submits to the result, as he does not think himself beaten on equal terms.

But what most evidently encouraged them was the interest of Alcibiades being so strong in the army, and their not thinking that the power of the oligarchy would be permanent. Each one therefore strove to be himself the first to take the lead of the commons.

But those of the Four Hundred who were most opposed to such a form of government, and who now took the lead, namely, Phrynichus, (who when general at Samos had quarrelled, as already mentioned, with Alcibiades;) and Aristarchus, a man in the highest degree and for the longest opposed to democracy; and Pisander, and Antiphon, and others who were most influential, had before—as soon as they were established in power, and afterwards, when the forces at Samos revolted from them for a democracy—sent members of their body as ambassadors to Lacedaemon, and been very anxious for peace with them, and been engaged in building the fort in what is called [*](Ἠετιωνία.] For the nature and object of this fort, see Arnold's, ZZZacto.) Eetionia. And far more than ever was this the case, after their ambassadors from Samos had arrived; seeing, as they did, that both the majority of the people, and those of their own members, who before appeared trustworthy, were now changing their views.

And so they despatched Antiphon, Phrynichus, and ten others with all speed, (for they were afraid of what was going on both at home and at Samos,) with instructions to make terms with the Lacedaemonians in any way whatever that was at all tolerable.

And they worked with still greater earnestness at the fort in Eetionia. Now the object of the fort, as Theramenes and his party maintained, was this; not that they might avoid admitting the army at Samos into the Piraeus, should they attempt to sail in by force; but rather that they might admit the enemy, whenever they pleased, both with ships and troops. For Eetionia is a mole of the Piraeus, and the entrance into the harbour is straight by it.

It was being fortified therefore in such a manner, in connexion with the wall previously existing on the land side, that, with only a few men posted in it, it would command the entrance. For in the very tower standing on one of the two sides, at the mouth of the harbour, which was narrow, was the termination both of the original wall on the land side, and of the new and inner one which was being built on the side of the sea.

They also built a portico, which was very large and in immediate connexion with this wall in the Piraeus; of which they themselves had the command, and in which they compelled all to deposit both what corn they had before and what was now brought in, and to take it out thence when they sold it.

On these subjects, then, Theramenes had long been murmuring; and ever since the ambassadors had returned from Lacedaemon without effecting any general arrangement for them, he did so still more, saying that there would be danger of this fort's proving the ruin of the city.

For some ships from the Peloponnese, whose aid the Euboeans had invited, to the number of two and forty, including some Italian and Sicilian vessels from Tarentum and Locri, also happened to be now lying off Las, in Laconia, and preparing for their passage to Euboea, under the command of Agesandridas son of Agesander, a Spartan. These Theramenes declared to be sailing, not so much to the aid of Euboea, as of those who were fortifying Eetionia; and that if they were not on their guard now, they would be lost before they were aware of it.

And there really was some plan of this kind entertained by those who were charged with it, and it was not merely a verbal misrepresentation. For it was the wish of that party, if possible, to retain their dominion over the allies with an oligarchical government; if not, to retain their independence, with the possession of their ships and walls; but if excluded from that also, at any rate not to perish themselves under the restored democracy before and above all others, but even to call in the enemy, and without walls and ships to make peace with them, and retain the government of the city on any terms whatever, if they had only security for their persons.