History of the Peloponnesian War

The same summer, and at the very time when the Peloponnesians were most offended with Tissaphernes, both on other accounts, and especially because of the return of Alcibiades, thinking that he was now evidently Atticizing, he, wishing, as it seemed, to clear himself to them of these charges, prepared to go to Aspendus for the Phoenician ships, and desired Lichas to accompany him; saying, that with regard to the armament, he would appoint Tamos as his lieutenant, to furnish the supplies while he was himself absent. The same account, however, is not given by all;

nor is it easy to decide with what motive he went to Aspendus, and yet, after going. did not bring the fleet. For it is certain that the Phoencician ships, a hundred and forty seven in number, came as far as Aspendus;

but why they did not come on, is a subject of many conjectures. For some think it was, that by going away he might, in accordance with his plan, wear down the power of the Peloponnesians; (at any rate Tamos, who was intrusted with the charge, provided them with supplies no better, but even worse, than himself.) Others, that after bringing the Phoenicians to Aspendus, he might exact money from them for their discharge; (for under no circumstances did he intend to employ them on any service.) Others, that it was on account of the clamour against him, which had spread to Lacedaemon—to have it said that he was not wronging them, but was certainly gone for the ships, which were undoubtedly manned for service.

To me, however, it appears most evident that it was with a view to wear out the Greeks, and to keep them in suspense, that he did not bring the fleet; to weaken them, during all the time that he was going there and delaying; and to keep them balanced, in order that he might make neither party too strong by joining them. For had he wished to bring the war to a conclusion, it is surely evident that he might have done it without any doubt. For by bringing the fleet he would in all probability have given the victory to the Lacedaemonians; since even at present they maintained their opposition with their navy, on terms of equality rather than of inferiority.

But what most clearly convicts him is the excuse which he alleged for not bringing the ships. For he said that they were fewer in number than the king had commanded to be collected. But surely he would have gained still greater thanks by that, through not spending so much of the king's money, and yet effecting the same object at a less cost. [*](ᾗ τινὶ δὴ γνώμῃ.] This passage affords a very good instance of the force which the conjunctions δ᾽ οὖν most commonly have, though not always; the doubtfulness being here expressed, which in most cases is only implied, when they are thus joined together. See note, p. 93.)

At any rate, with whatever intention it might have been, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus, and had an interview with the Phoenicians; and the Peloponnesians, by his desire, sent Philippus, a man of Lacedaemon, with two triremes to fetch the fleet.

Alcibiades, on finding that Tissaphernes had gone to Aspendus, sailed thither himself also with thirteen ships, promising the forces at Samos a sure and great benefit; for that he would either himself bring the Phoenician fleet to the Athenians, or at any rate prevent its going to the Peloponnesians. For in all probability he had long known the purpose of Tissaphernes, that he did not intend fetching them, and wished to prejudice him as much as possible with the Peloponnesians, on the ground of his friendship for himself and the Athenians, that so he might be the more compelled to join the side of Athens. Accordingly he set sail and pursued his voyage [*](ἄνω,] i. e. towards the countries on the way to the East, and the centre of the Persian government. —Arnold.) upwards, straight for Phaselis and Caunus.

When the ambassadors sent from the Four Hundred arrived at Athens from Samos, and delivered the message from Alcibiades, namely, that he begged them to hold out, and not submit at all to the enemy; and that he had great hopes of reconciling the army to those at home, and of getting the better of the Peloponnesians; they gave much more courage to the greater part of those implicated in the oligarchy, who had even before been discontented with it, and would gladly have been quit of the business by any safe means.

Accordingly they now united, and found fault with the present state of things, having as their leaders some of the most influential generals and men in office, such as Theramenes the son of Hagnon, Aristocrates the son of Scellias, and others; who, though amongst the first members of the government, were yet afraid, as they alleged, of the army at Samos, and of Alcibiades most especially, as also of those whom they were sending as ambassadors to Lacedaemon, lest without the authority of the greater part of them they might do the state some harm; [*](φοβούμενοι δ᾽, ὡς ἔφασαν, κ. τ. λ.] This passage, as it stands in Arnold's text, being utterly untranslatable, I was compelled either to omit it altogether, or to adopt such corrections as would at any rate give some sense to it, whether the true one or not. I have therefore, with Göller, changed τούς into οὕς taken away the comma after πρεσβευομένους, and substituted ἀπαλλαξείειν for ἀπαλλάξειν. With regard to the τό before that infinitive, I am disposed to think that it is not so hopeless a reading as has been considered; but that this may be added to those instances given by Jelf, Gr. Gr. §670, in which the article shows that especial emphasis is laid on the notion expressed by the infinitive. Compare especially II. 53. 4, καὶ τὸ μὲν προσταλαιπωρεῖν τῷ δόξαντι καλῷ οὐδεὶς πρόθυμος ἦν; Xen. Apol. Soc. 13, τὸ προειδέναι τὸν θεὸν τὸ μέλλον πάντες λέγουσι Id. Symp. III. 3, οὐδεὶς σοι, ἐφη, ἀντιλέγει τὸ μὴ οὐ λέξειν. The last two quotations prove that this construction is common after verbs of ' saying;' and in the present instance I suppose the infinitive to depend upon such a verb understood from ὡς ἔφασαν in the preceding part of the paragraph. There seems therefore to be no reason for changing τό into τοί as I was once led by the various reading τῷ to conjecture, before I knew that Göller had done the same.) and so they declared, not that they wished to escape from the administration falling into too few hands, but that they ought to establish the Five Thousand in reality, not in mere name, and to settle the government on a more equal basis.