History of the Peloponnesian War

For since they held the whole fleet at their command, they would compel the other cities under their dominion to give them money, just the same as though they were coming from Athens. For they had a city in Samos, and no weak one either, but such as, when at war with them, had been within a very little of taking away the command of the sea which the Athenians enjoyed. And as for the enemy, they were defending themselves against them from the same position as before. They, then, inasmuch as they had command of the ships, were more able to provide themselves with necessaries than those at home. Nay, it was through their being stationed in advance at Samos, that those at home had before commanded the entrance to the Piraeus;

and now also they would be brought to such a strait, should they not consent to give them back the government, that they themselves would be better able to exclude them from the sea than to be excluded from it by them.

Indeed it was but a trifling and inconsiderable degree in which the city was of use to them towards gaining the victory over the enemy; and they had lost nothing in losing those who had neither any more money to send them, (but the soldiers provided it themselves,) nor yet good counsel to give them, for the sake of which a state has authority over armaments. On the contrary, even on these points the other party had done wrong by abolishing the laws of their fathers; while they themselves maintained those laws, and would endeavour to make them do it also. So that neither had they the inferiority as regarded those who should give good counsel.

Alcibiades, too, would gladly secure them the alliance of the king, should they grant to him security of person and a restoration to his country. And what was most important, should they fail on all points, yet, having so large a fleet as they had, there were many places for them to retire to, in which they would find both cities and territory.

Having thus debated the matter together, and encouraged one another, they proceeded to make preparations for the war no less than before; and the ten ambassadors who had been sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, hearing of this when they were now at Delos, remained quiet there.

About this time also the soldiers in the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus were raising a clamour amongst themselves, about their cause being ruined by Astyochus and Tissaphernes. For Astyochus, they said, would neither fight before, while they themselves were still the stronger, and the Athenian fleet was small, nor would he now, when the enemy were said to be in a state of sedition, and their ships were not yet brought together; but they would run the risk of being worn out by delay, while waiting for the Phoenician fleet—an idle pretence, and not a reality. And Tissaphernes, on the other hand, did not bring up this fleet, and at the same time injured their own navy by not giving them supplies regularly, or to the full amount. They ought therefore to wait no longer, but to come to a decisive engagement at sea. It was the Syracusans that most especially urged this.