History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

WHEN the news was brought to Athens, for a long time they disbelieved even the most respectable of the soldiers, who had escaped from the very scene of action, and gave them a correct account of it; not crediting that their forces could have been so utterly destroyed. When, however, they were convinced of it, they were angry with those of the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition; (as though they had not voted for it themselves;) and were enraged with the soothsayers and reciters of oracles, and whoever at that time by any practice of divination had put them on hoping that they should subdue Sicily.

Every thing, indeed, on every side distressed them; and after what had happened, fear and the greatest consternation overwhelmed them. For they were at once weighed down by the loss which every man individually, as well as the whole state at large, had experienced, by the destruction of so many heavy-armed, and horsemen, and troops in the flower of their youth, like which they saw they had none left; and at the same time being aware that they had no competent number of ships in the docks, nor money in the treasury, nor crews for their vessels, they were at present without hope of saving themselves. They thought, too, that they should have their enemies in Sicily directly sailing with their fleet against the Piraeus, especially after they had gained such a victory; and that their foes at home, then doubly equipped on all points, would surely now press them with all their might, both by land and by sea, and their own allies with them in revolt.

But nevertheless it was determined, that, as far as their present resources allowed, they ought not to submit, but to equip a fleet, by whatever means they could, providing by contribution both timber and money; and to put matters on a secure footing amongst the allies, especially in Euboea: and, moreover, to reform every thing in the city, with a view to greater economy, and elect a council of elders, who should deliberate beforehand on their present measures, as there might be occasion.

And through their excessive fear at the moment they were ready, (as is the people's fashion,) to be orderly in every thing. Having thus determined, they acted accordingly, and so the summer ended.

The following winter, all the Greeks were immediately excited by the great misfortune of the Athenians in Sicily. Those who were not in alliance with either side thought, that even f no one called on them for aid, they ought not any longer to keep aloof from the war, but should volunteer to march against the Athenians, when they reflected, severally, that they might have attacked them also, if they had succeeded in their measures at Syracuse; and, moreover, that the remainder of the war would be but brief, and that it was creditable for them to take their share in it. The allies of the Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, felt to a greater degree than before a common anxiety to have done speedily with their heavy labours.

But, above all, the subjects of the Athenians were ready, even beyond their power, to revolt from them; because they judged of affairs under the influence of strong feeling, and did not so much as leave them a chance of being able to hold out the following summer.