History of the Peloponnesian War

The Athenians, from the extent of their present misery, did not so much as think about their dead or their wrecks, or of asking permission to take them up, but wished to retreat immediately during the night.

Demosthenes, however, went to Nicias, and expressed it as his opinion, that they should still man their remaining ships, and force their passage; out, if they could, in the morning; alleging that they still had left more ships fit for service than the enemy; for the Athenians had about sixty remaining, while their adversaries had less than fifty.

But when Nicias agreed with this opinion, and they wished to man them, the seamen would not embark, through being dismayed at their defeat, and thinking that they could not now gain a victory. And so they all now made up their minds to retreat by land.

But Hermocrates the Syracusan, suspecting their purpose, and thinking that it would be a dreadful thing, if so large a force, after retreating by land and settling any where in Sicily, should choose again to carry on the war with them, went to the authorities, and explained to them that they ought not to suffer them to retreat during the night, (stating what he [*](ἃ καὶ αὐτῷ ἐδόκει.] I see no reason whatever for any such alteration of αὐτῷ, as Bauer and Dobree propose; as the words evidently refer to the fact mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, that Hermocrates had himself suspected (ὑπονοήσας αὐτῶν τὴν διάνοιαν) what he stated to the magistrate as the design of the Athenians.) himself thought,) but that all the Syracusans and allies should at once go out, and block up the roads, and keep guard beforehand at the narrow passes.