History of the Peloponnesian War

Then the sea forces, as many as were not taken afloat, put in to the land at different parts, and rushed from on board to the camp; while the army, no longer with any different feelings, but all on one impulse, lamenting and groaning, deplored the event, and proceeded, some to succour the ships, others to guard what remained of their wall; while others, and those the greatest part, began now to think of themselves, and how they should best provide for their own preservation.

Indeed their dismay at the moment had been exceeded by none of all they had ever felt. And they now experienced pretty nearly what they had themselves inflicted at Pylus: for by the Lacedaemonians' losing their ships, their men who had crossed over into the island were lost to them besides: and at this time for the Athenians to escape by land was hopeless, unless something beyond all expectation should occur.

After the battle had been thus obstinately disputed, and many ships and men destroyed on both sides, the Syracusans and allies, having gained the victory, took up their wrecks and dead, and then sailed away to the city, and erected a trophy.

The Athenians, from the extent of their present misery, did not so much as think about their dead or their wrecks, or of asking permission to take them up, but wished to retreat immediately during the night.

Demosthenes, however, went to Nicias, and expressed it as his opinion, that they should still man their remaining ships, and force their passage; out, if they could, in the morning; alleging that they still had left more ships fit for service than the enemy; for the Athenians had about sixty remaining, while their adversaries had less than fifty.

But when Nicias agreed with this opinion, and they wished to man them, the seamen would not embark, through being dismayed at their defeat, and thinking that they could not now gain a victory. And so they all now made up their minds to retreat by land.

But Hermocrates the Syracusan, suspecting their purpose, and thinking that it would be a dreadful thing, if so large a force, after retreating by land and settling any where in Sicily, should choose again to carry on the war with them, went to the authorities, and explained to them that they ought not to suffer them to retreat during the night, (stating what he [*](ἃ καὶ αὐτῷ ἐδόκει.] I see no reason whatever for any such alteration of αὐτῷ, as Bauer and Dobree propose; as the words evidently refer to the fact mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, that Hermocrates had himself suspected (ὑπονοήσας αὐτῶν τὴν διάνοιαν) what he stated to the magistrate as the design of the Athenians.) himself thought,) but that all the Syracusans and allies should at once go out, and block up the roads, and keep guard beforehand at the narrow passes.

But though the magistrates also agreed with him in thinking this, no less than himself, and were of opinion that it ought to be done, yet they thought that the people, in their recent joy and relaxation after the labours of a great sea-fight, especially, too, as it was a time of feasting, (for they happened to celebrate on this day a sacrifice to Hercules,) would not easily be induced to listen to them; as the majority, from excessive gladness at their victory, had fallen to drinking during the festival, and would, they expected, rather obey them in any thing than in taking arms, just at present, and marching out.

When, on consideration of this, it appeared a difficulty to the magistrates, and Hermocrates could not then prevail upon them to attempt it, he afterwards devised the following scheme. Being afraid that the Athenians might get the start of them by quietly passing during the night the most difficult points of the country, he sent certain of his own friends with some cavalry to the Athenian camp, as soon as it grew dark. These, riding up to within hearing, and calling to them certain individuals, as though they were friends of the Athenians, (for there were some who sent tidings to Nicias of what passed within the city,) desired them to tell that general not to lead off his army by night, as the Syracusans were guarding the roads; but to retire leisurely by day after making his preparations.

They then, after delivering this message, returned; while those who heard it, reported the same to the Athenian generals.

They, in accordance with the information, stopped for the night, considering it to be no false statement. And since they had not, as it was, set out immediately, they determined to remain over the next day also, that the soldiers might pack up, as well as they could, the most useful articles; and though they left every thing else behind, to take with them, when they started, just what was necessary for their personal support.