History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

Again, those points in which they are imitating our equipments are familiar to our habits, and we shall not be [*](ἀνάρμοστοι,] or, as others take it, unprepared against each of them. ) awkward at each of them: whereas, on their side, when many soldiers are on their decks contrary to their custom, and many dart-men, mere [*](χερσαῖοι.] I have ventured to use a rather slang term, because the qualifying expression, ὡς εἰπεῖν, which is added in the original, seems to imply that χερσαῖοι was employed by him with a similar meaning of reproach. The meaning of σφάλλω, as used just below, seems borrowed from the unsteady reeling motion of an intoxicated person; the simile used by the Psalmist with reference to mariners tossed in the storm, they reel to and fro, and stagger like a drunken man, and are at their wits' end. Or it may mean to embarrass. ) land-lubbers, (so to speak,) Acarnanians and others, have gone on board their ships, who will not so much as know how to discharge their weapons while stationary, how can they avoid swaying the ships, and falling all into confusion amongst themselves, by not moving according to their own fashion?

For neither will they derive any benefit from the superior number of their ships, (if any of you be afraid of this, I mean the idea of his not going to fight them with an equal number;) for many ships in a small space will be less effective for executing any of the movements they may wish, while they are most liable to he injured by our preparations. On the contrary, be assured of this, which is most true, according to the certain information which we believe we have received.

It is through the excess of their miseries, and from being forced to it by their present distress, that they are induced to make a desperate effort; not so much from confidence in their resources, as from hazarding a chance, in whatever way they can, that they may either force their passage and sail out, or afterwards retreat by land; since, at any rate, they could not fare worse than at present.

To avail yourselves then of such confusion, and of the very fortune of our bitterest enemies, which has betrayed itself, let us close with them in wrath, and consider that the feeling of those men is most lawful, with regard to their enemies, who determine, when taking vengeance on their aggressor, to glut the animosity of their heart: and that we too shall have an opportunity of avenging ourselves on our foes—the very thing which is every where said to be most sweet.

For that they are our foes, and our bitterest foes, you all know; inasmuch as they came against our country to enslave it, and if they had succeeded, would have imposed on our men all that was most painful; on our children and wives, all that is most dishonourable; and on our whole country, the title which is most degrading.

Wherefore no one ought to relent, or deem it gain that they should merely go away without danger to us. For that they will do just the same, even if they gain the victory. But that, through our succeeding (as we probably shall do) in our wishes, these men should be punished, and should leave a more secure liberty for the whole of Sicily, which even before enjoyed that blessing; this is a glorious object to contend for. And of all hazards those are most rare, which, while they cause least harm by failure, confer most advantage by success.

The Syracusan commanders and Gylippus having in their turn thus exhorted their men, immediately manned the ships on their side also, since they saw that the Athenians were doing it.