History of the Peloponnesian War

For when they had been carried by a tempest to Libya, and the Cyrenaeans had given them two triremes, and pilots for their voyage, during their passage along shore they entered into alliance with the Euesperitae, who were being besieged by the Libyans, and defeated the latter people; and after coasting along thence to Neapolis, an emporium of the Carthaginians, from which the distance is shortest to Sicily, namely, a voyage of two days and a night, they crossed over there from that place, and arrived at Selinus.

Immediately on their arrival, the Syracusans prepared to attack the Athenians again on both sides, by sea and by land. When the Athenian generals, on the other hand, saw that a fresh force had joined them, and that their own circumstances at the same time were not improving, but were daily becoming worse, and most especially were depressed through the sickness of the men, they repented of not having removed before. And as even Nicias did not now oppose them in the same degree, except by begging them not openly to vote on the question, they gave orders, as secretly as they could, for all to sail out of their station, and to be ready when the signal should be given.

And when, after all was in readiness, they were on the point of sailing away, the moon was eclipsed; for it happened to be at the full. The greater part therefore of the Athenians urged the generals to stop, regarding the matter with religious scruple; and Nicias (for he was somewhat over addicted to superstition, and such feelings,) declared that he would not now so much as consider the matter, with a view to moving, until, as the soothsayers directed, he had waited thrice nine days. And so the Athenians, having been stopped on this account, remained in the country.

When the Syracusans, too, heard this, they were much more stimulated not to relax in their efforts against the Athenians, since they themselves had now confessed that they were no longer their superiors, either by sea or by land, (for they would not else have meditated sailing away;) and at the same time, because they did not wish them to go and settle in any other part of Sicily, and so to be more difficult to make war upon;

but were desirous of forcing them to a sea-fight there, as quickly as possible, in a position that was advantageous to themselves. They manned their ships therefore, and practised as many days as they thought sufficient. And when a favourable opportunity presented itself, on the first day they assaulted the Athenian lines; and a small division of their heavy-armed and horse having sallied forth against them through certain gateways, they intercepted some of the heavy-armed, and routed and pursued them back; and as the entrance was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses, and some few heavy-armed.

On that day, then, the army of the Syracusans drew off; but on the next they both sailed out with their ships, seventy-six in number, and at the same time advanced with their troops against the walls. The Athenians put out to meet them with eighty-six ships, and closed and fought with them.

Now when Eurymedon, who commanded the right wing of the Athenians, and wished to surround the ships of the enemy, had sailed out from the line too much towards the shore; the Syracusans and their allies, after first defeating the centre of the Athenians, intercepted him also in the bottom and furthest recess of the harbour, and both killed him, and destroyed the ships that were following him. After which the Syracusans closely pursued all the ships of the Athenians, and drove them ashore.

When Gylippus saw the enemy's ships defeated, and carried beyond the stockades and their own station, wishing to cut off the men that were landing from them, and that the Syracusans might more easily tow off the vessels, through the land being in possession of their friends, he ran down to meet them at the break-water with some part of his army.