History of the Peloponnesian War

After this, the Syracusans being again, as before, restored to confidence on the strength of such unexpected good fortune, despatched Sicanus with fifteen ships to Acragas, which was torn by factions, to induce the city to join them, if he could: while Gylippus again went by land to the other parts of Sicily to bring more forces, being in hope of even taking the Athenian lines by storm, since the affair on Epipolae had turned out as it did.

The Athenian commanders, in the mean time, consulted on the disaster which had befallen them, and on the want of vigour which at present on all accounts prevailed in their camp; seeing that they were both unsuccessful in their attempts, and that the soldiers were annoyed by their stay in the country.

For they were suffering with sickness from two different causes, both because this was the season of the year at which men are most liable to disease, and at the same time, too, because the position in which they were encamped was marshy and unfavourable; while they were also distressed because every thing else appeared hopeless to them. Demosthenes then, was of opinion that they ought not to stay any longer;

but, according to the plan with which he had hazarded the attack on Epipolae, since that had failed, he gave his vote for departing, and not wasting the time, while the sea might yet be crossed, and while, as regarded forces, they might command the superiority with the squadron that had lately joined them, at any rate.

He said, too, that it would be more beneficial to the state to carry on the war against those who were building fortresses for their annoyance in their own country, than against the Syracusans, whom it was no longer easy to subdue: nor, again, was it right for them to waste large sums of money to no purpose by continuing the siege. Such, then, was the view entertained by Demosthenes.

Nicias, however, though he too considered their circumstances to be bad, yet did not wish to display their weak. ness by words, nor that they should become a laughing-stock to their enemies by voting for the retreat openly, and in [*](μετὰ πολλῶν,] i. e. with the Taxiarchs and Trierarchs, who attended when a regular council of war was held. Compare ch. 50. 3.) conjunction with many; for so they would far less elude their observation in executing it, whenever they might wish.

To a certain extent also the affairs of the enemy, judging from what he, more than others, knew of them, still afforded some hope that they would be worse than their own, should they persist in carrying on the siege; for so they would exhaust them by want of funds; especially, too, as they had now, with their present fleet, a more extensive command of the sea. A party in Syracuse also, which wished to surrender the city to the Athenians, was sending messengers to him, and urging him not to raise the siege. Knowing these things, then, he was in fact waiting because he was still inclined both ways, and wished to see his course more clearly;

but in the speech openly made by him on that occasion he said,

that he refused to withdraw the forces; for he well knew that the Athenians would not put up with such a step on the part of the generals—their returning, he meant, without a vote from themselves to authorize it. Besides, those who would vote in their case, would not give their verdict from seeing the facts, as they themselves had done, instead of hearing them from the invectives of others; but whatever calumnies any clever speaker threw upon them, by those would they be persuaded. Many too, nay, even the greater part of the soldiers present on the spot, who were now clamouring about their perilous condition, would, he said, on arriving there, raise the very contrary clamour, namely, that their generals had utterly betrayed them for money, when they returned.