History of the Peloponnesian War

Nor would the Athenians in their narrow room have opportunity [*](περίπλουν ... διέκπλουν.] These manoeuvres, as well as the ἀνάκρουσις afterwards mentioned, were different methods of giving the ship a momentum required for a second attack. See Arnold's notes on I. 49. 3, and II 89. 12.) of sailing round or cutting through their line, the manoeuvres of their naval science in which they most confided; for they themselves, to the best of their power, would not allow them to cut through their line, and the want of room would prevent their making a circuit.

And what was before thought to be want of skill in masters, namely, to charge stein to stem, was the very method they would chiefly adopt; for they would have the advantage in it; as the Athenians, if forced out of the line, would have no means of backing water in any direction but towards shore, and that, too, at only a short distance from them, and for a short space, namely, just opposite their own encampment. The rest of the harbour they should themselves command;

and the enemy, if forced at any point, by crowding together into a confined space, and all to the same point, would run foul of each other, and be thrown into confusion; (the very thing, indeed, which most hurt the. Athenians in all their sea-fights, since they had not, like the Syracusans, the power of retreating over the whole harbour.) And as for making a circuit into clearer sea-room, since they themselves commanded the entrance from, and the retreat into, the open deep, they would not be able to do it; especially as Plemyrium would be hostile to them, and the mouth of the harbour was not large.

Having adopted such contrivances to suit their own degree of knowledge and power, and at the same time feeling now more assured in consequence of their former battle, the Syracusans prepared to attack them at once by land and by sea.

Those of their land forces which were in the city Gylippus led out a little before, and brought them up to the wall of the Athenians, at that part of it which looked towards the city; while the troops from the Olympieum, both all the heavy-armed that were there, and the horse and light-armed of the Syracusans, advanced against the wall on the other side; immediately after which, the ships of the Syracusans and their allies sailed out.

The Athenians thought at first that they would make an attempt on the land side alone, but when they saw their fleet also suddenly coming against them, they were thrown into alarm; and some were making preparations on and in front of the walls to meet the attack, while others marched out against those who with all speed were coming from the Olympieum and the parts outside the city—both horse in great numbers and dart-men—and others proceeded to man the ships, and at once ran to the beach to oppose the enemy. And when they were manned, they put out against them with seventy-five vessels, those of the Syracusans being about eighty in number.

For a great part of the day they continued advancing and retiring and making attempts upon one another; and when neither party could gain any advantage worth mentioning, except that the Syracusans sank one or two of the Athenians' ships, they separated; and the troops at the same time withdrew from the walls.

The next day the Syracusans remained quiet, without showing at all what were their plans for the future. Nicias, on the other hand, seeing that the battle had been a drawn one, and expecting that they would attack them again, compelled the captains to refit their ships, whichever of them had at all suffered; and stationed merchantmen before the stockade which had been fixed in the sea in front of their ships, to serve the purpose of an enclosed harbour.

These vessels he placed at intervals of two hundred feet from each other, that if any ship were hard pressed, it might have means of retreating in safety and sailing out again at leisure. The Athenians, then, continued to make these preparations during the whole day until the night.

The day following, the Syracusans engaged the Athenians at an earlier hour, but on the same plan of attack, both by sea and by land.

And being opposed in the same manner with their ships, they again continued making attempts upon each other for a great part of the day; until Aristo son of Pyrrhicus, a Corinthian, and the most able master the Syracusans had, persuaded their naval commanders to send to those who had the direction in the city, and beg them to remove as quickly as possible the supply of things for sale, and to bring it to the sea-side; and whatever eatables any one had, to compel all to come there and sell them; that so [*](αὐτοῖς.] According to the rule given in the note on III. 98. 1, the dative expresses the action in its relation to another party, namely, the Syracusan government. —Arnold.) they might enable them to land their seamen and take their dinner immediately by the side of their ships, and, after a short interval, again the very same day to attack the Athenians, when they were not expecting it.