History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

And do not ye, either as judges of what is done by us, or as moderators, attempt to divert us, [which would now be difficult,) but so far as any thing in our meddling policy and disposition is at the same time profitable for you, that take, and make the most of it. And believe that it is not equally injurious to all, but that to a large majority of the Greeks it is even beneficial.

For every one in every place, even where we are not already present, both he who thinks that he will suffer wrong, and he who is meditating to commit it, through having a prospect ever close at hand, the one, of obtaining help from us against his injurer, the other, that if we come, [*]( I see no reason, either for changing ἀδεεῖς into ἀδεές, as Dobree and Arnold wish to do, or for taking the word with an active signification, thought it may possibly be so used sometimes.) they run a risk of not being free from alarm, both, I say, are alike compelled, the one, to be moderate against his own will, the other, to be saved without his own exertion.

This security, then, which is common to all who require it, and which is now presented to you, do not ye reject; but, acting like others, instead of constantly guarding against the Syracusans, now unite with us, and take at length your equal share in plotting against them.

To this effect spoke Euphemus. Now the Camarinaeans had felt on the subject as follows: Towards the Athenians they were well inclined, except so far as they might think that they would subjugate Sicily, but with the Syracusans they had always, in the spirit of borderers, been at variance. Being, however, more afraid of the Syracusans, who were close at hand, lest they might, even without their assistance, gain the ascendency, they both sent them in the first instance that small body of horse, and determined for the future to do more actual service for the Syracusans, (though as sparingly as possible;) but for the present, that they might not seem to show less respect for the Athenians—since they had even proved the stronger in the battle—they resolved to give a verbal answer that should be fair to both parties.

Having, therefore, adopted this counsel, they answered,

That since mutual hostilities were being carried on by parties who were both in alliance with them, they thought it to be most consistent with their oaths to aid neither party for the present.