History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

In this way, then, you are connected with us in the greatest degree; and on this account too it is reasonable that we should reinstate the Leontines, not as subjects, like their kinsmen in Euboea, but in as powerful a condition as possible; that from their own country, living as they do close to these men's borders, they may in our behalf be annoying to them.

For in Greece we are by ourselves able to cope with our enemies; and the Chalcidians, after whose subjugation the orator says that we are inconsistently giving liberty to those here, are advantageous to us by being without any armament, and only paying us money; but the people here, both the Leontines and our other friends, by being left as independent as possible.

"To an individual, however, who has absolute power, or to a state that holds dominion, nothing is inconsistent that is profitable, nothing reckoned as kindred that does not command confidence; but in every case, as opportunity may serve, you must become either a foe or a friend. And in our case, our advantage here consists in this,—not that we should reduce our friends to weakness, but that, owing to the strength of our friends, our foes should be powerless. Nor ought you to doubt this.

For even in the case of our allies in those parts, as they are severally useful to us, so we govern them; the Chians and Methymnaeans as independent, on condition of their supplying ships; the greater part of them on more stringent terms, subject to contribution of money; but others, although they are islanders and easy to reduce, as allies on terms of entire freedom, because they he in favourable positions around the Peloponnese.

So that here also it is natural that we should regulate them with an eye to our advantage, and, as we say, with reference to our fear of the Syracusans. For they are aiming at dominion over you, and wish, after uniting you on the strength of your suspicions of us, themselves to sway the empire of Sicily, by force, or through your forlorn condition, when we have departed without gaining our object. And it must be so, if you unite with them; for neither will so great a force, when united, be any longer easy for us to manage, nor would these men want strength to deal with you, when we were not here.