History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

For it was winter, and they thought it impossible at present to carry on war before Syracuse, till they had sent for cavalry from Athens, and also raised some from their allies in the country, to avoid being utterly defeated by the enemy's horse. They wished too, at the same time, to collect money in the island, and to get a supply from Athens; as also to win over some of the cities to their cause, which they hoped would more readily listen to them after the battle; and to provide themselves with corn and every thing else they might require, with a view to attacking Syracuse in the spring.

They, then, with these intentions sailed off to Naxos and Catana, for the winter. The Syracusans, on the other hand, after burying their dead, held an assembly.

And now came forward to them Hermocrates son of Hermon, a man at once second to none in general intelligence, and who had proved himself able in war through his experience, and a person of signal bravery. He encouraged them, and told them

not to submit in consequence of what had happened;

for it was not their spirit that was vanquished, but their want of discipline that had been so injurious. They had not, however, been so much inferior to their enemies as might have been expected; especially since they had been matched against the first of the Greeks— [*]( Or, as Bloomfield renders it, raw-hands. See his note. Poppo reads χειροτέχνας and renders the passage, Quod cum iis qui primi Graecorum peritia (rei militaris) essent, idiotae, propemodum dixerim operrii, pugnassent. ) mere amateurs, so to speak, against regular workmen.