History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

Alcibiades, on the other hand, said that they ought not, after sailing from home with so large a force, to return with dishonour and without effecting their purpose; but to send heralds to all the other cities, except Selinus and Syracuse, and endeavour also to get some of the Sicels to revolt from the Syracusans, and to gain the friendship of others amongst them, with a view to obtaining corn and troops; but first of all to win over the Messanians; (for they lay just in the passage and approach to Sicily, and there would be a harbour for them there, and the most suitable station for observing the enemy.) When, then, they had brought over the cities, and knew with whose assistance they would carry on the war, then they should attack Syracuse and Selinus, if the latter did not come to terms with Segesta, and the former permit them to settle the Leontines.

Lamachus, again, urged that they ought to sail straight to Syracuse, and immediately fight the battle under the walls of the city, while the inhabitants were most unprepared and panic-struck. For every armament was most formidable in the first instance;

but if it spent much time before coming into sight, men grew bold again in spirit, and felt more contempt for it even on its appearance. If, then, they attacked them on a sudden, while they were still with terror looking for them, they would gain the most decided advantage over them, and strike fear into them in every way; by their sight of the forces, (for they would appear most numerous at the present time,) by their expectation of what they would suffer, and, most of all, by the immediate peril of the engagement. It was probable, too, that many would be surprised outside the city in consequence of their not believing that they would come;

or, [*]( Or, as Arnold renders it, while they were carrying, etc.) if they were now carrying in their effects, yet the army would be in no want of property, if it sat down in superior force before the city. And so the rest of the Siceliots would then the more shrink from entering into alliance with the Syracusans, and join the Athenians;

and would not put off, while they waited to see which party would be the stronger. As for a naval station, he said that after retiring [from before Syracuse,] and bringing their ships to anchor, they should establish one at Megara; which was an uninhabited place, at no great distance from Syracuse either by sea or land.