History of the Peloponnesian War

And I am not now for the first time convinced of them, but have ever been so, that they wish to terrify your populace by such tales as these, and still more wicked ones, if not even by deeds; and so themselves to have the rule of the city. And in truth I am afraid, lest some time or other, by making many attempts, they should even succeed; while we are ill disposed, before we are in the act of suffering, to take precautionary measures against them, and after finding them out, to proceed against them.

And so by these means our city is seldom at rest, but is involved in many feuds and conflicts—not more frequently with its enemies than with itself—and sometimes in tyrannies and unprincipled cabals. But I will endeavour, if only you will follow my advice, to let none of these things occur in our time;

by convincing you who form the mass of the people, and by chastising those who plot such things; not only when convicted in the act, (for it is difficult so to catch them,) but also for what they have the wish, though not the power, to do. For we must avenge ourselves on our enemy, not only for what he does, but beforehand also, for his intention to do it; inasmuch as if we are not first in guarding against him, we shall be first in suffering. With regard to the oligarchs, on the other hand, I shall reprove them on some points, watch them on others, and warn them on others; for in this way I think I shall best deter them from their evil practices. And, indeed, what is it (a question which I have often asked) that ye really wish, ye young men?

Is it to enjoy power at once? But that is not lawful; and that law was so enacted in consequence of your incompetency, rather than with a wish to degrade you when competent for the task. Well then, is it to avoid being under the same laws with the people at large? And how then is it right for the same people not to be thought worthy of the same privileges?

"Some one will say, that a democracy is neither a sensible nor an equitable thing, but that those who have property are also most competent to rule best. But I say, in the first place, that 'democracy' is a name for all, but ' oligarchy' for only a part; and, in the second place, that though the rich are the best guardians of property, the intelligent would be the best counsellors, and the mass of the people the best judges after hearing measures discussed;

and that all these things, both severally and collectively, have their due share allotted to them in a democracy. An oligarchy, on the other hand, admits, indeed, the many to a share of dangers, but of advantages it not only enjoys the larger part, but even takes away and keeps the whole. And this is what the powerful and young among you desire—a thing impossible to attain in a great city.

Nay then at length, even now, [*]( I have attempted to translate this passage as it is found in the MSS., but must refer to the different editors for the emendations which they propose for what they all agree in thinking the corrupt part of it.) O ye dullest of all men—(for of all the Greeks I know, are you either most senseless, if you are not sensible that you are coveting evil things; or most unprincipled, if you know it, and still dare to pursue them:)—nay then, I say, either acquire that knowledge, or change those principles, and so advance the interest of the city, which is the common interest of all. For consider, that those who are good among you will share that in an equal, or even greater degree, than the mass of the people in the city;

but that if you wish any thing else, you run a risk of being deprived of all. And have done with such reports as these, knowing that they are brought to those who are aware of, and will not tolerate, your designs. For this city, even if the Athenians are coming, will resist them in a manner worthy of itself; and we have generals who will look to these matters. And if none of the reports be true, (which is my opinion,) it will not lay a voluntary slavery on itself, by being panic-struck at your intelligence, and by choosing you as its rulers; but will look at the circumstances itself, and consider the words spoken by you as equivalent to deeds; and will not be deprived of its present liberty by listening to you, but will endeavour to preserve it by being cautious in its actions, and not allowing you to go unpunished.

To this effect spoke Athenagoras. One of the generals then rose up, and would no longer permit any one else to come forward, but himself spoke on the subject before them to the following effect: