History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

To this effect spoke Alcibiades. When the Athenians had heard him and the Segestans and some Leontine exiles, who, coming forward, begged and entreated them to assist them, reminding them of their oaths, they were much more eager for the expedition than before.

So Nicias, perceiving that he could not now turn them from it by the same arguments as he had used before, but might perhaps change their purpose by the amount of armament, if he should command a numerous one to be prepared; he came forward again, and addressed them as follows:

"Since I see you, Athenians, altogether bent on making the expedition, may these things turn out as we wish: at the present time, however, I will declare to you what my opinion is.

We are about to go then, as I learn from report, against cities which are great, and not subject one to another, or in want of a change, like that by which men would gladly pass from a state of violent slavery to an easier condition instead f it; which will reasonably refuse to accept our dominion instead of freedom, and are many in number, considering that they are in one island, even those of Greek origin.

For besides Naxos and Catana, which I expect will side with us on the strength of their connexion with Leontini, there are seven others, and those equipped with every thing in a style just agreeing with our own power, and most of all, those against which we are more especially sailing, namely, Selinus and Syracuse.

For there are in them many heavy—armed, and bowmen, and dartmen, with many triremes, and crowds to man them. They have money too, partly in private funds, and partly in the temples also at Selinus; while the Syracusans have also first-fruits paid them by certain barbarian tribes. But what they most of all excel us in is, that they possess many horses, and use corn of native growth, and not imported

"Against such a power then we require, not only [*](ναυτικῆς καὶ φαύλου στρατιᾶς,] i. e. a force consisting only of the few fighting men on board the ships. Or even if the seamen themselves were joined with them, yet their want of arms and training for land service would render them a very inefficient and weak force against the troops of Syracuse, on shore, however efficient they might be on their own element.) a marine and inefficient armament, but that a large land force also should sail with us, if we are to achieve any thing suitable to our design, and are not to be shut out from the land by numerous cavalry; especially should the cities league together in their fear, and none but the Segestans be our friends, and furnish us with horse, wherewith to defend ourselves.