History of the Peloponnesian War

But with regard to the present attack, I will explain in what way I purpose making it;

that the fact of your meeting the danger in small divisions, and not in one body, may not cause a want of courage by an appearance of weakness.

For I conjecture that it is through contempt of us, and their not expecting any one to march out against them to battle, that the enemy went up to their present position, and are now thinking nothing of us, while, without any order, they are engaged in looking about them. But whoever best observes such mistakes in his opponents, and also plans his attack upon them [*]( i.e. when it is deficient in actual strength, making up for it by art and by rapidity of movement. —Arnold.) with regard to his own power, not so much in an open manner and in regular battle-array, as with reference to his present advantage, that man would be most successful.

And those stratagems by which one would most deceive his enemies, and benefit his friends, have the highest reputation.

While, then, they are still unprepared, yet confident, and are thinking, from what I see, of retiring rather than remaining; while their minds are irresolute, and before their plans are more definitely arranged, I will take my own division, and surprise them, if I can, by falling at full speed on the centre of their forces.