History of the Peloponnesian War

Ath.

We then shall not ourselves advance fair pretences, either of our justly enjoying empire in consequence of having overthrown the Mede, or of now coming against you because we are being injured-and so make a long speech which would not be believed; nor do we wish you to think of persuading us by saying, either that you did not join the standard of the Lacedaemonians, though you were their colony; or that you have done us no wrong. But we advise you, according to the real sentiments of us both, to think of getting what you can; since you know, and are speaking to those who know, that, in the language of men, what is estimated by equality of power compel; but what is possible is that which the stronger practise, and to which the weak submit.

Mel.[*]( I have not followed Arnold's reading in this passage, though Bekker and Göller adopt it; because it seems improbable that ἦ μέν, the reading of nearly all the MSS., should have been a mistake of the copyists for one so much easier, and so different from it, as ἡμεῖς. At the same time I am far from certain whether ᾗ μέν that which I have preferred, on the authority of Herman, Poppo, and Bloomfield, be really the true one; for in no other passage in Thucydides, I believe, has ᾗ the force which is here given to it; and though Bloomfield quotes one instance of its being so used by Xenophon, he is there writing, not as an historian, but as a philosopher; and so uses it, as it is very commonly used by philosophical writers in later times. Should this objection be thought to have any weight, I would venture to propose ἡμῖν which comes nearer to the various readings of the MSS. than ἡμεῖς; and gives a sense in exact accordance with what follows: for καὶ πρὸς ὑμῶν, at the beginning of the next paragraph, would stand in strong opposition to it: For us, then, we certainly think it advantageous——and it is no less for your interest also. It may perhaps be regarded as some corroboration of this conjecture, that the scholiast quoted by Arnold uses ἡμῖν in his paraphrase; νομίζομεν ἡμῖν προσήκειν μὴ καταλύειν τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν.) So far then as our opinion goes, it is for our advantage (for we must, since you have so prescribed, speak of what is expedient, to the neglect of what is right) that you should not take away what is a common benefit; but that for every one who at any time is in danger, what is reasonable should also be considered right; and that if he can gain assent to something which ails short of strict justice, he should have the benefit of it. And this is not less for your interest; in as much, as [*]( This is pretty nearly the interpretation of the passage given by Bauer, and sanctioned by Poppo. For the many others that have been adopted see the note of the latter.) you would afford to others, should you fail, a pattern for inflicting the heaviest vengeance upon you.