History of the Peloponnesian War

For if he showed the enemy his numbers, and the equipment of the troops with him, which was such as [*](ἀναγκαίαν οὐσαν, i. e. not such as they would have wished, but such as they could get. Compare II. 70. 1, βρώσεως περὶ ἀναγκαίας, and I. 61. , ξύμβασιν ἀναγκαίαν. —Arnold.) necessity alone dictated, he did not think that he should conquer them so well as he should without their seeing his forces beforehand, [*]( Or, and ceasing to despise them on insufficient grounds. For the different explanations of this strange construction which have been proposed, see Poppo's note, in his last edition; which has been completed since this translation was commenced, and will be always referred to in future, unless the larger edition is expressly mentioned. The position of the τέ seems to show that καταφρονήσεως, as well as προόψεως, is dependent upon ἄνευ. and therefore that the μὴ must be considered as redundant. Or is it possible that it could have been carelessly used with a double force, qualifying at once both ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος and καταφρονήσεως; as it is in a somewhat similar manner, I. 40. 2?) and despising them on sufficient grounds.

Having therefore himself picked out a hundred and fifty heavy-armed, and having put the rest under the command of Clearidas, he purposed making a sudden attack on the Athenians before they could retire; as he did not think that he should catch them again so isolated, if once their reinforcements should have joined them. Calling therefore all his soldiers together, and wishing to encourage them and acquaint them with his design, he spoke to the following effect:

Men of the Peloponnese, with regard to the character of the country from which we are come, namely, that through its bravery it has always been a free country, and that you are Dorians about to engage with Ionians, to whom you are habitually superior, let a brief declaration suffice.