History of the Peloponnesian War

Now when Cleon, at the lime we last mentioned him, sailed round from Torone to go against Amphipolis, making Eion the base of his operations, he assaulted Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, but without reducing it; but Galepsus, the Thasian colony, he took by storm.

And having sent ambassadors to Perdiccas, that he might join him with an army according to the terms of their alliance, and others into Thrace, to Polles, the king of the Odomantians, who was to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as he could, he himself remained quiet in Eion, awaiting their arrival.

On hearing this, Brasidas, on his side also, took up an opposite position on Cerdylium. This spot is in the Argilian country, being on the high ground on the other side of the river, not far from the city of Amphipolis; and every thing was distinctly seen from it; so that Cleon could not unobserved by him set out with his army; as he expected him to do, and despising the numbers of the Lacedaemonians to march up with the forces he had with him against Amphipolis.

At the same time he was getting ready fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries, and was calling all the Edonians to his aid, both targeteers and cavalry; and he had a thousand targeteers of the Myrcinians and Chalcidians, in addition to those in Amphipolis.

All his heavy-armed force too was mustered, about two thousand in number, and three hundred Grecian horse. With fifteen hundred of these Brasidas stationed himself on Cerdylium, whilst the rest were posted with Clearidas in Amphipolis.

Cleon remained quiet for some time, but was then compelled to do what Brasidas had expected.

For his soldiers being annoyed at sitting still, and reflecting, with regard to his command, against what skill and daring in the enemy, with what ignorance and cowardice in himself it would be held, and how unwillingly they had accompanied him from home, he perceived their murmers; and not wishing them to be exasperated by remaining stationary in the same place, he broke up his camp and led them forward.

And [*]( Or τῷ τρόπῳ may be understood, as by Haack and Arnold, of the temper and habits of Cleon's mind. But the aorist tense of the verbs ἐχρήσατο, ἐπίστευσε, and ἤλπισεν seems intended to refer to the single fact of his having adopted a particular plan, and his reasons for doing it, rather than to a continued state of mind, which would rather take the imperfect. And the following description of that plan, οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ ... ἀλλ᾽ ὡς κύκλῳπεριστὰς βίᾳ αἱρήσων τὴν πόλιν, agrees, as closely as the different position of the parties rendered possible, with that of the arrangements for the decisive battle in Sphacteria, which were made by Demosthenes, but the credit of which Cleon would, of course, assume to himself. Compare especially IV. 32. 3, ὅπως ὅτι πλείστη ἀπορία ᾖ τοῖς πολεμίοις πανταχόθεν κεκυκλωμένοις, και μὴ ἔχωσι πρὸς ὅτι ἀντιτάξωνται, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμφίβολοι γίγνωνται τῷ πλήθει, κ. τ. λ.) he adopted the same plan as he had also succeeded with at Pylus, and therefore felt confident in his own discernment. For that any one would come out against him to battle, he had not so much as a thought; but said that he was going up rather to see the place, and was waiting for his more numerous forces; not for the purpose of gaining a victory without any risk, should he be compelled to engage, but of surrounding the city on all sides, and so taking it by storm.

Having come, therefore, and posted his army on a strong hill in front of Amphipolis, he himself proceeded to reconnoitre the lake formed by the Strymon, and what was the position of the city on the side of Thrace.

He thought to retire, whenever he pleased, without a battle; for indeed there was neither any one seen on the wall, nor did any one come out through the gates, but they were all closed: so that he even considered he had made a mistake in not having come down with engines; for he believed that in that case he might have taken the city.

Immediately that Brasidas saw the Athenians in motion, he too went down from Cerdylium, and entered Amphipolis. Now for any regular sally, and array of troops against the Athenians, he made none;

being afraid of his own resources, and considering them inferior to the enemy; not so much in numbers, (for they were pretty nearly equal,) but in character; (for [*]( Literally, the Athenian force that was in the field had gone forth pare; i. e. free from all such things as might have marred their efficiency: χσηστοῖς καταλόγοις ἐκκριθέν, as he expresses it, VI. 31. 3.) it was the flower of the Athenian force that was in the field, and the best of the Lemnians and Imbrians;) but he prepared to attack them by means of a stratagem.